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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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15 JANUARY 1987

WORLDWIDE REPORT

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR INTENTION TO CONTINUE TALKS STARTED IN REYKJAVIK

PM171751 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Dec 86 First Edition p 5

[Article by A. Fedorov: "Washington's Hypocrisy"]

[Text] The mutual understanding on questions of nuclear weapons -- strategic and medium-range missiles -- reached at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik generated great and justified hopes throughout the world. Furthermore, both sides in Reykjavik discussed decisions which, if they were to be implemented, would be of historic -- in the full sense of the word -- importance from the viewpoint of the struggle for nuclear disarmament: It was agreed to eliminate all USSR and U.S. strategic offensive weapons within a 10-year period -- in other words, by the end of 1996. A zero option -- in other words, elimination -- was also envisaged with respect to U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe.

It is known, however, that the positive results of the Reykjavik meeting also generated a different, a directly opposite reaction among certain circles in the West. Some figures in the United States itself, and even in West Europe, frightened of the prospect of a radical lessening of nuclear confrontation and the corresponding easing of international tension, took a course of discrediting the Reykjavik accords and actually dismantling them.

Under these circumstances the Soviet Union, guided by the program for nuclear disarmament by the end of this century which was put forward by M.S. Gorbachev back on 15 January, resolutely urged that Reykjavik's success be consolidated and developed, and that the package of measures aimed at a global solution to the problem of nuclear and space weapons, which took shape there, be transformed into a comprehensive agreement binding on both sides. All that was needed for this purpose was to agree on measures to strengthen the ABM Treaty's provisions in order to block the arms race in space and to agree on the start of talks regarding the complete banning of nuclear tests.

With a view to materializing the positive results from Reykjavik the Soviet side at the Geneva talks submitted on 7 November 1986 a package of interconnected proposals on all aspects of the problems of nuclear and space weapons which were discussed in the Icelandic capital. In order not to slacken the pace and to prepare the ground for constructive progress in the next round, scheduled for 15 January next year, it was proposed to the U.S. side that a working meeting between USSR and U.S. representatives at the nuclear and space weapons talks be held. This meeting took place in Geneva 2-3 December.

What did it produce? Unfortunately, the results of the discussions which took place are disappointing. The point is that while the Soviet side arrived at the meeting with the firm intention to seek and find a way to resolve the questions on which differences still exist, and thus attain the materialization of the solution of the nuclear and space weapons problem which started to emerge in Reykjavik, it became clear that the U.S. representatives were committed to a different approach -- to judge by everything, it had been made incumbent upon them to do everything to distance Washington's present position as much as possible from the Reykjavik accords and to shunt the Geneva talks onto the old unconstructive tracks. And, it has to be said, they spared no energy for this purpose. There were numerous meetings and conversations in Geneva during the first week of December, but they proved fruitless. Because it is impossible to engage in constructive work when the other side at the talks -- the U.S. side -- wants only to liquidate the positive results of Reykjavik.

When talking to journalists now, Max Kampelman, chief U.S. representative at the nuclear and space weapons talks and at the working meeting in Geneva, tries to shift responsibility for the failure of the Geneva working meeting onto the Soviet side. He claims that the Soviet side does not want the destruction of ballistic missiles, advocates a comprehensive solution to the nuclear and space weapons problems, and is against a settlement of differences. But these and other arguments used by Kampelman cannot substantiate his complaints against the Soviet side. They are clearly meant for the ignorant.

Take the question of ballistic missiles. To state that the USSR supposedly does not wish their destruction is to utter a deliberate untruth. The Soviet side is in favor of ballistic missiles, in other words ICBM's and SLBM's, being destroyed by the end of 1996 but, of course, within the context of eliminating the entire strategic triad and not just a part of it. This was the approach -- the elimination of all strategic offensive weapons within 10 years -- that was agreed upon in Reykjavik, and it is this approach, coupled with the pledge on simultaneous nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty, that can ensure equality and equal security for the sides and the maintenance of strategic stability with a sharply reduced level of nuclear confrontation.

But now the United States is talking about eliminating only ballistic missiles. This is not just a gross distortion of the Reykjavik accord in the sphere of nuclear and space weapons. This is a blatant claim to the acquisition of overwhelming military superiority by the United States. On the pretext of destroying the so-called "most destabilizing" nuclear and space weapons -- in other words as if this is in the interests of lessening the military threat -- claims are being made to ensure a decisive U.S. advantage in forces, through heavy bombers and also through forward-based nuclear means including carrier-based aircraft capable of reaching targets on USSR territory. Thus, laments about Soviet objections regarding the destruction of just ballistic missiles instead of all strategic offensive weapons by 1996 cannot be described as anything but hypocritical.

There is an equally hypocritical look to Mr Kampelman's complaints about the package solution to nuclear and space weapons problems proposed by the Soviet Union. The USSR delegation at the Geneva talks adheres precisely to the positions spelled out by M.S. Gorbachev in Reykjavik. And the U.S. side knew from the very beginning that we put forward nothing but a comprehensive solution in the Icelandic capital. This did not produce any reservations at the time.

So why have they now started talking to us about the desirability and even necessity for a separate solution on questions concerning the 50-percent reduction of strategic

offensive weapons and the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe? For one single purpose — to pocket the major concessions made on these questions by the Soviet Union for the sake of reaching agreement, without giving anything in exchange. In other words, they would like to destroy the package of compromises and mutual interests which took shape in Reykjavik for the sake of gaining unilateral advantages for the United States. Thus, progress at the Geneva talks is being obstructed not by the Reykjavik package, but by Washington's continuing pursuit of the dream of military superiority.

Similarly, as regards concrete questions of reducing strategic offensive arms by 50 percent and also eliminating the medium-range missiles of the USSR and the United States in Europe, the present American position is by no means constructive.

Contrary to the results of Reykjavik, Washington is now once again raising the question of imposing additional sublevels for warheads on strategic ballistic missiles, seeking to wreck the established structure of the Soviet strategic forces, and is demanding, without any grounds, the halving of the aggregate throw-weight of Soviet ICBM's and SLBM's, as well as a ban on mobile ICBM's.

At the Geneva consultations the U.S. side has not displayed the slightest desire to talk about the question of establishing effective limitations on long-range sea-based cruise missiles, a question which was resolved in principle in Reykjavik. Yet this is necessary in the interests of preventing the bypassing and ensuring the viability of the accord in the sphere of strategic offensive arms.

The Geneva consultations have also demonstrated Washington's clear loss of interest in reaching an accord on medium-range missiles in Europe. How has this been expressed? By the fact that the U.S. representatives now prefer to talk mainly not about medium-range missiles, but about missiles with a range shorter than medium, despite the fact that both in Reykjavik and in Geneva the Soviet Union has clearly proposed that in the course of resolution of the question of eliminating Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, a freeze be imposed on shorter-range missiles in Europe and talks be commenced immediately concerning their future. Moreover, the U.S. side formulates its position on shorter-range missiles in such a way as to allow a sharp buildup for the United States, in flagrant contradiction to the task of eliminating nuclear weapons.

Another characteristic feature: As a counterweight to the Soviet proposal not to site medium-range missiles (in Asia for us, and on its own territory for the United States) so that they can reach targets on each other's territory, Washington seeks the right to deploy its medium-range missiles in Alaska, which would result in the emergence of a new source of tension in that part of the world. This, clearly, is evidence of an integrated militarist line, inspired by Pentagon strategists and confirmed in the recent decision to site U.S. Lance nuclear missiles in South Korea. In a word, there is clearly no intention of stopping the export of the U.S. nuclear threat to the Asian-Pacific region. On the contrary, they are working toward extending this practice.

Thus in seeking to pull apart the Reykjavik package Washington politicians would like to drive the Geneva talks into the old pre-Reykjavik impasses, and thereby halt progress toward equal, effective accords. While verbally claiming adherence to the goals of achieving constructive solutions, in practice they are doing everything to wreck such solutions. That is the real meaning of the present U.S. behavior at the Geneva talks. And no two-faced expatiations played to the gallery can conceal this fact.

The American side also continues to engage in obstructionism in the examination of a key question, the strengthening of the ABM Treaty. Here too there is the same hypocrisy. Verbally, agreement is expressed not to use the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a 10-year period, but in practice this is hedged about with stipulations which would negate the aforementioned mutual pledge. First, the agreement not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty is made conditional on the USSR's consent to the elimination by the end of 1996 only of ballistic missiles, which, as we have seen, is fundamentally incapable of forming the basis for a mutually acceptable accord. Second, the pledge not to withdraw is interpreted by the U.S. side so arbitrarily that in effect it turns into its own opposite — the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty on any imaginary pretext. Third, the U.S. side does not agree to confine work in the sphere of space ABM defense to within the laboratory walls. Washington has no desire to put restrictions on the SDI program, which is the main obstacle on the path to radical nuclear arms reductions; it seeks the legalization of its "right" to test ABM systems in space.

The U.S. representatives also avoided resolving in principle the question of the commencement of talks concerning a complete ban on nuclear tests.

All these elements of the present U.S. position were the reason why the working consultations in Geneva did not yield a positive result. The Soviet side sought to sound out ways to overcome differences, while the U.S. representatives placed the emphasis on drawing up a list of the differences. This is a pointless occupation. The unresolved questions are already well known. It is important to find a way of settling them, but that was precisely what the U.S. representatives did not want to do, thereby showing that they had no intention of bringing any fresh constructive ideas to Geneva with them.

The question may arise: What next? Will the talks on nuclear and space arms again reach an impasse, despite Reykjavik? Unfortunately it must be admitted that the efforts of the United States and certain circles in NATO are leading to precisely this. And these efforts are being made not only at the talks, but elsewhere. Suffice it to recall that the White House has exceeded one of the key limitations under the SALT II treaty — on the aggregate number of MIRVed strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with air-based long-range cruise missiles.

However, the Soviet Union does not yield to provocations. We do not intend to break off the talks, any more than we intend to indulge the initiators of new, still more dangerous spirals in the arms race. It is our conviction that the potential exists to avert an unfavorable turn of events and prevent the destruction of the existing treaty base in the strategic arms limitation sphere. Every opportunity also exists to consolidate and develop the positive results of Reykjavik and to resolve radically and in full the problem of nuclear and space arms. We believe that a sense of responsibility and new approaches to policy will prevail.

It is in this mood and in the expectation of constructive amendments to the U.S. position that the Soviet side is preparing for the next round of talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva.

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CSO: 5200/1195

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: NATO 'NOT READY' TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR ARMS

LD161522 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1420 GMT 16 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow, 16 Dec (TASS) -- The session of the NATO Council, which has ended in Brussels, has shown that the NATO countries are not ready for a complete elimination of nuclear arms, said Boris Pyadyshev, first deputy head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry, at today's briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists held in the USSR Foreign Ministry's Press Center. Linking their military plans precisely to the nuclear factor and clearly being in difficulty to explain their unwillingness, as a matter of principle, to part company with nuclear arms, the NATO members are confined to hackneyed references to the nuclear deterrence factor which, it is alleged, is the guarantee of NATO's security, pointed out the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman.

It is clear from the materials of the NATO session that the United States is departing more and more from the Reykjavik spirit and from the positions indicated there by both sides. The NATO session has shown that it is obvious that the leadership of this bloc has no wish to consider the prospect of a complete elimination of nuclear arms.

We were expecting a reply from the NATO council to the Budapest program of reductions in armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. We have not received this reply in full, Boris Pyadyshev said.

But we would not want to regard NATO's present proposals on conventional armaments as entirely negative. The Brussels declaration on verification [kontrol] of conventional armaments speaks of the expediency of "drafting a new mandate for talks in the field of verification [kontrol] of conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals."

At the same time, the hackneyed idea of "assymetrical reductions" of conventional armaments was again articulated. This means the question is really being posed in such a way that only the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact member-countries should engage in reductions of conventional weapons. The NATO session has embarked on an open course of accelerated build-up of conventional weapons by the members of the organization.

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CSO: 5200/1184

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S GERASIMOV ON U.S., USSR POST-REYKJAVIK POSITIONS

LD131057 Prague International Service in Czech 2230 GMT 12 Dec 86

[Text] Dear listeners, Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Department at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been visiting Prague. We took this opportunity to ask him for an interview on the subject: What have the 2 months since the Reykjavik meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan shown?

Asked whether the U.S. President has made use of this time to reevaluate his approach to the problems of disarmament, and especially nuclear disarmament, Gennadiy Gerasimov said:

[Begin Gerasimov recording, in Russian fading into Slovak translation] In my view, President Reagan has used this time very badly. He has not used it to build on what was achieved at Reykjavik — on the contrary, he has backtracked from Reykjavik. President Reagan himself compared the Reykjavik meeting to a base camp that mountaineers set up when they are preparing to climb a summit. They are not yet at the summit, but meanwhile they are setting up a camp below it. This comparison was a very apt one, because it was truly possible to say: Yes, after Reykjavik we will try to achieve the summit, that summit being nuclear disarmament. What actually happened was just the opposite. The U.S. has backpedalled from all the conclusions they agreed on at Reykjavik. Ronald Reagan also recently said that in 2 days at Reykjavik more was achieved than in 2 years at Geneva, where the Soviet-U.S. disarmament talks are taking place.

Unfortunately, these words do not reflect the positions currently held by U.S. diplomats in Geneva. Once again, everything has reached a deadlock in the arithmetical discussions, just as it did at Reykjavik. This is because the U.S. military industrial complex has become frightened. You see, President Reagan very nearly agreed to nuclear disarmament. Had it not been for his dream about the SDI — Star Wars — it would have been possible to reach an agreement. When he got back home, however, those forces opposed on principle to nuclear disarmament went on the offensive, and criticism was voiced by certain European allies because, as they put it, he went too far at Reykjavik without consulting them first. Here we could cite, for example, Margaret Thatcher or Jacques Chirac, who both reject nuclear disarmament. [end recording]

Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States still play a very important role in Soviet foreign policy. But the other capitalist countries do exist, too, as do the developing ones. What is the Soviet Union's approach to these countries, what did Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to India contribute in this respect? This is what Gennadiy Gerasimov said:

[Begin Gerasimov recording, in Russian fading into Slovak translation] The Soviet position today is very straightforward: A country must follow the same norms in its mutual relations as those followed by civilized people in their relations with one another. We must live in a civilized way. We believe that all countries must respect the interests of other countries, and if there is a conflict in these interests, they must find a solution by political means. Of course we realize that Soviet-U.S. relations are exceptionally important, because they are the two most important nuclear powers; but in fact they are not the only two countries that count. That is why we also develop relations with many other countries.

For example, Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to India demonstrated how it is possible to have good relations with different social systems. In the past, too, we have developed relations of mutual cooperation and good-neighboringness with India.

Mikhail Gorbachev's visit not only emphasized this fact, it also elevated relations between the two countries to a new level. In the Delhi declaration signed on that occasion, and in the talks, we noted a large area of common ground with the Indian Government, and here we see elements of the new political thinking. [end recording]

Soviet foreign policy has been permeated with new political thinking throughout this year. Now, however, we are on the threshold of 1987. How does Gennadiy Gerasimov see the future? Is he optimistic or pessimistic?

[Begin Gerasimov recording, in Russian with superimposed Slovak translation] It can be said that this year is ending in a slightly pessimistic way. This year was declared the International Peace Year by the United Nations. That means that the UN countries were dutybound to make a special effort to ensure that 1986 was truly a year of peace. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it made enormous efforts. Here are just a few examples: On 15 November [as heard] Mikhail Gorbachev presented a program for nuclear disarmament up to the year 2000. In the summer, in Budapest, the Warsaw Pact countries put forward a plan for deep cuts in conventional weapons in Europe. Third, at the Soviet Union's initiative, the meeting took place in Reykjavik. Unfortunately, the United States and its allies in NATO still adhere to the old way of thinking reflected in the saying: If you want peace, prepare for war. This is a very dangerous way of thinking because it leads to a continuation of the arms race, thereby increasing the risk of a nuclear catastrophe. Nevertheless, in terms of history, we must be optimists. We must have faith in the common sense of mankind, in the hope that politicians in the West, too, will conclude that in the nuclear age we cannot allow ourselves to take risks, and that security must be sought by political means and not by weapons. I hope that in this respect, 1987 will represent a step forward. [end recording]

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: SENATOR HART DISCUSSES SALT, SDI IN MOSCOW

Talks With Gorbachev

LD151641 Moscow TASS in English 1620 GMT 15 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 15 TASS -- Mikhail Gorbachev today received in the Kremlin the American Senator Gary Hart.

The state and prospects of present-day politics were discussed in an informal and well-wishing atmosphere. The two discussed the causes of international tension, the arms race, regional conflicts, the need of new thinking and abandoning the attitudes to relations with other states, including with scores of young states which are following their own road, that took centuries to form but are now no longer suitable. Herein lies the critical point of achieving a realistic, reasonable policy that takes into account one's own interests and those of others.

The USSR and the United States could do much in searching for such international relations that would be based on a recognition of the profound changes in the world during the past 30-40 years, Mikhail Gorbachev said. The greatness of a state, especially a big one, now is not in displaying its ability endlessly to build up and improve its military machine, not in pursuing the spectre of military superiority. It is necessary to search for ways of how to live together and not how to consign each other to the "ash heap of history".

On the senator's request Mikhail Gorbachev told him what had really happened in Reykjavik, gave his assessment of the reaction to its results in NATO countries and confirmed the invariable Soviet position: Talks with any administration on problems of ending the arms race have a future only if there is further advance from Reykjavik. It was possible to reach an accord there and today too it is possible to come to terms if what has already been achieved is not dismantled. Rejection of Reykjavik means rejection of the line at disarmament.

Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoliy Dobrynin took part in the conversation.

Received by Shevardnadze

LD161750 Moscow TASS in English 1733 GMT 16 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 16 TASS -- Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, received the prominent American politician Senator Gary Hart, who is now staying in Moscow, on the latter's request.

During their conversation Eduard Shevardnadze noted the complex and contradictory nature of the present stage of Soviet-American relations. Preconditions for their positive, ongoing development were created at the meeting in Reykjavik which opened up real possibilities for a cardinal solution of the questions of war and peace in the interests of the security not only of the USSR and the United States but also of the entire world community. The task is to proceed firmly from the positive moments of Reykjavik and ensure a steady advance along the road of reducing and liquidating nuclear arsenals, keeping arms out of outer space, and developing equal and mutually advantageous cooperation in most diverse fields.

However, the U.S. Administration, carrying on its destructive policy, has not only adopted a line towards a revision of the results of the Reykjavik meeting and towards eroding the accords reached there but also through its unilateral actions disrupts the established treaty system for curbing the arms race, Eduard Shevardnadze said.

This is precisely what is evidenced by the decision of the U.S. side to abandon the SALT-2 treaty and its steps aimed at undermining the ABM Treaty. The U.S. Administration stubbornly goes ahead with the policy of heightening tension in various parts of the world and of stirring up regional conflicts.

The Soviet Union, showing restraint and consistency, firmly adheres to the course towards building a nuclear-free world on the basis of the comprehensive programme dated January 15, 1986, and towards the implementation of the other initiatives aimed at ensuring real disarmament.

There was a detailed exchange of views on other aspects of relations between the USSR and the USA, and on some common international matters.

The two sides expressed a mutual desire to develop Soviet-U.S. contacts at various levels, including parliamentary ones, promoting mutual understanding and stabilisation of relations between the two countries.

The day before Gary Hart had visited the Space Research Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and had a conversation with the institute's director, Academician Roald Sagdeev.

Interviewed on SDI

LD171140 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1600 GMT 16 Dec 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; interview with U.S. Senator Gary Hart with unidentified station correspondent; Hart and correspondent speaking in English with superimposed Russian translation -- live or recorded]

[Text] In the quest for the kind of international relations which would be based on a recognition of the profound changes which have taken place in the world over 30-40 years, the USSR and the United States could do a great deal. This was emphasized yesterday at the meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and U.S. Senator Gary Hart. This is what the senator said in an interview with our correspondent:

[Hart] I had a very good and warm conversation with General Secretary Gorbachev, a very open and honest one. The general secretary set out the Soviet position on arms control according to Reykjavik. And this helped me to have a better understanding of what happened there.

[Correspondent] The subject of SDI is now being widely discussed in our countries. What is your opinion of this program?

[Hart] I took an active part in the struggle to reduce spending on armaments which the Reagan administration demanded, but I believe that the SDI problem cannot be seen in just one dimension. It also involves research carried out by the Soviet Union. Many Americans, including myself, are anxious about it. I think that both countries should approach research in the field of space armaments very carefully.

[Correspondent] As we know, you supported the movement in support of a nuclear weapons freeze. Did this not damage your popularity in the conditions of the so-called "conservative wave" in the United States?

[Hart] No, the vast majority of the American people want arms control and want a limitation in the number of nuclear weapons from both sides. I believe that there does not exist a conservative wave in the United States which is strong enough to suppress this desire. The majority of Americans want the same as the Soviet people. They want to work and to have all the necessary things to live, and for peace. I don't believe that these values are now any less important to them than armaments.

As you know, the U.S. Congress every year for the past 4 or 5 years has reduced President Reagan's military budget. [Hart says in English "defense budget"]

[Correspondent] In 1984 you said that the United States, it seems, is forgetful of the lessons of Watergate. Have you changed your opinion?

[Hart] I don't remember saying that in 1984. Perhaps I did. But when I ran for senator in 1974 I said that the memory of Watergate would remain for about 20 years. And I think that it is. As far as our problems are concerned, we are very open. As you know, not every country is so open in its attitude to discussion and criticism from the press. I think that every time a subject like Watergate crops up, we have an honest debate and an inquiry, and as a result we learn from it.

[Correspondent] What measures do you think are necessary to make relations between our countries more stable?

[Hart] A serious and immediate reduction in arms. [Hart says in English "nuclear weapons"] balanced and controlled; a reduction in tension between the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe; more active economic cooperation, and more active exchanges of groups of people and cultural ties.

[Correspondent in English] Thank you very much.

[Hart in English] Thank you, my pleasure.

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CSO: 5200/1195

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: ARMAND HAMMER MEETS WITH OFFICIALS ON REYKJAVIK, SALT II

Meets With Shevardnadze

PM081609 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 3

[Text] On 6 December E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Foreign Minister, received Armand Hammer, an eminent representative of U.S. business circles, at the latter's request.

During the conversation that took place E.A. Shevardnadze stressed that Soviet-U.S. relations are now at such a stage that particularly crucial decisions are required in favor of a real turn toward reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons and not allowing an arms race in space and toward constructive interaction and cooperation in various fields. The Soviet Union firmly stands on the positions of the accords reached during the summit in Reykjavik which opened up an historic opportunity for a radical solution to the issues of war and peace.

However, the U.S. side, E.A. Shevardnadze said, adheres to a directly contrary approach, having unleashed a campaign of attacks on Reykjavik and of virtually undermining its results. This is confirmed by the demonstrative breach by the U.S. Administration of such a fundamental agreement in the sphere of security as the SALT II treaty.

It was pointed out that, while consistently favoring the all-round development of relations with the United States, the Soviet Union decisively insists that they be based on the principles of equality, mutual advantage and inadmissibility of any sign of discrimination, including trade.

For his part, A. Hammer expressed hope that the persistent efforts for the benefit of peace and mutual understanding will continue and that the positive aspects of Reykjavik will not be wasted. He reaffirmed the interest of U.S. business circles in a fuller utilization of the existing possibilities and the development of new and promising forms of economic cooperation with the USSR.

Received by Ryzhkov

PM081205 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Dec 86 First Edition p 2

[Excerpt] Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, received in the Kremlin on 6 December Armand Hammer, president and chairman of the board of the U.S. company "Occidental Petroleum" on his request.

During the exchange of views on Soviet-American relations it was noted that the meeting of the leaders of both countries in Reykjavik, by charting a realistic road to a nuclear-free future, had opened up unprecedented opportunities for resolving most urgent problems facing mankind. That is why the central task in relations between the two countries, and of the entire international community, as well, is to preserve the positive element of Reykjavik and to obstruct efforts of the enemies of nuclear disarmament to hurl the world back to the positions without prospects. The Soviet Union wholly and totally stands for advancing on the basis of what has been achieved and searching jointly for mutually acceptable agreements.

Headway on key security issues, Nikolay Ryzhkov said, would have a favorable impact on the entire complex of Soviet-U.S. relations, including the commercial and economic sphere. Vast plans for the socio-economic development currently implemented in the Soviet Union and the switch to new forms of cooperation with other countries created favorable conditions for the expansion of commercial and economic ties. However, Washington's discriminatory policy and all kinds of artificial bans and restrictions remained a stumbling-block in relations with the United States in that field.

Armand Hammer reaffirmed the growing interest of American business in an improved business cooperation with their Soviet foreign trade partners, especially involving the use of new forms of economic ties. Of decisive importance for that would be an improvement of the political atmosphere in relations between the two countries and their steps toward the realization of the possible accords that appeared in Reykjavik and deal with fundamental questions of war and peace.

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CSO: 5200/1195

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR'S KARPOV ON POST-REYKJAVIK PERIOD, ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Explains USSR's Arms Stance

PM111432 Paris LE MONDE in French 11 Dec 86 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Soviet Negotiator Karpov's Explanations on the 'Post-Reykjavik' Period"]

[Text] The memory of Reykjavik is fading and polemics have replaced the celebration of the "near agreements" reached at the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in October. But this is an additional reason for Soviet officials to talk constantly about the "post-Reykjavik" period. During a long visit to Paris this week, Mr Karpov, the Principal Soviet negotiator at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva, made strenuous efforts to explain Moscow's views on the major disarmament problems in a lecture to the French International Relations Institute and then to various interlocutors.

First, he explained Moscow's views on the U.S. strategic defense initiative (SDI) which is regarded as responsible for all the problems. In one of the scenarios presented by Mr Karpov, the malfunctioning of a space-based receiver [capteur spatial] would trigger the firing of nuclear-pumped lasers within a few fractions of a second not only at any missiles in flight but also at targets on earth, causing huge fires in cities and leading to a nuclear war. However, he explained, Mr Gorbachev never tried to deprive Mr Reagan of his favorite project; he merely demanded that the ABM Treaty be strictly observed and that research be limited to laboratories. Mr Karpov added that it was precisely "laboratory research" which the U.S. President mentioned when he presented the SDI during the first round of talks in Reykjavik.

As for the controversial "package" which has prevented any further progress in Geneva (as is known the Soviets are now demanding agreement on the SDI before any agreement on other matters), Mr Karpov admitted that this idea took shape late in the day. He also confirmed that, if the Western countries so wish, it is possible to return to the previous situation and negotiate a separate agreement on the Euromissiles, but only on the basis of the January 1986 positions without the concessions which Moscow has made since then: Paris and London will therefore have to abandon the modernization of their arsenals, the Soviet SS-20 missiles in Asia will be maintained at the present level of around 180 and not reduced to 33, as Mr Gorbachev agreed to do in Reykjavik. Why are the latest Soviet concessions linked to the SDI and to strategic arms in general whereas the January 1986 concessions were not? Mr Karpov was not very convincing when he explained that the existing "package" (unlike the previous one apparently) is a "careful balance of interests and concerns."

France Criticized [subhead]

However, the Soviet negotiator offered a few openings: The short-range missiles in Europe will be the subject of separate negotiations immediately after any agreement is reached on medium-range missiles, but the missiles which Moscow deployed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia can be withdrawn at the same time as the American Pershing II and cruise missiles because they were deployed to counter the American missiles after 1983. Similarly the question of the nature of an SDI research "laboratory," whether it is one or several buildings, whether they are far apart or not, may form the subject of discussions among experts "and I am not an expert," Mr Karpov explained in excellent French.

Of course, this did not prevent him from strongly criticizing France for launching into the production of chemical weapons, the Europeans in general for drawing back from the agreements outlined in Reykjavik, and finally the Americans who, he thinks, have gone back on their promise to dismantle all nuclear weapons within 10 years. Mr Reagan, he confirmed, had said that to Mr Gorbachev, but immediately afterwards he refused to confirm that pledge in writing....

Calls For Further Talks

LD111151 Paris International Service in French 0800 GMT 11 Dec 86

[Text] In Paris the head of the Soviet delegation to the U.S.-Soviet disarmament negotiations has called for the continuation of the discussions on the subject of arms limitation.

Viktor Karpov stressed the goodwill shown by the USSR over the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. He also referred to the crisis the United States is currently going through with the Irangate affair, stating that this situation should not change anything in the negotiations under way between the two great powers.

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CSO: 5200/1184

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR SPOKESMEN ON POST-REYKJAVIK SITUATION, SDI

Ambassador to Oslo

PM031007 Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 13 Nov 86 p 5

[Soviet Ambassador Dimitriy Polyanskiy article: "What Now After Reykjavik?"]

[Text] The meeting between CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan ended a few weeks ago. But passions are still running high in the debate over what the meeting achieved. This is hardly surprising. For it was actually a major issue which was to be decided at the 2-day meeting in the Icelandic capital--whether there will be nuclear arms in the world of the future or whether it will be nuclear-free. The result was that the two sides were on the verge of reaching an agreement which would have been thought completely unrealistic only a few years ago.

I would like to remind you that in Reykjavik agreement was reached in principle that all Soviet and U.S. nuclear arms should be destroyed in two stages by the year 1996 and that this would happen under strict controls--both nationally and through on-site inspection. The two countries' foreign ministers would lay down the principles for this in concrete agreements.

Unfortunately the meeting did not arrive at the agreement which seemed to be so close. But does this mean that the interrupted finish draws a line through everything on which it proved possible to reach agreement? Of course not. In my opinion Reykjavik has already guaranteed itself a place in history in that it showed the world's peoples more clearly than ever before that there is a constructive real alternative to the arms race and to confrontation between the two countries.

The other lesson we can learn from Reykjavik is that it shows what is the real cost of the U.S. President's "strategic defense initiative." Even before it has taken practical shape it has claimed its first victims. What else will happen?

As is well known, there was no agreement in Reykjavik because President Reagan refused to limit research into SDI to the laboratory. In the Western press it is possible to read from time to time that Gorbachev tried in Reykjavik to pressure Reagan into renouncing SDI. But this is an incorrect

assertion. Yes, we are convinced that if arms are taken out into space this will have a further destabilizing effect on the international situation and have unpredictable consequences. All logic also tells us that in a period with such radical reductions in nuclear arms on which the Soviet and U.S. leaders reached agreement in principle there is every need to make sure that the brakes that have been applied and which stand in the way of the development of new types of weapons are not only preserved but also strengthened. In this respect the most important brake today is the unlimited-duration Soviet-U.S. ABM treaty. Article 5 of this treaty states: "Each side undertakes not to create, not to test, and not to deploy sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based antimissile systems or components." That is why Mikhail Gorbachev proposed in Reykjavik that both sides should strengthen the ABM treaty by undertaking not to exercise their right to withdraw from the treaty for 10 years—the period in which nuclear arms would be cut. In this period the United States would be able to engage in reasonable laboratory research into SDI without breaking the treaty.

When Washington insists that it has the right to test SDI components, in space for example, it is operating with a so-called "broad interpretation" of the ABM treaty and points here to one of the declarations which is an addition to the treaty and which deals with the possibility that on either side there might emerge the means of constructing antimissile defenses which are based on other physical principles than those existing at the time when the treaty was signed. And so it is now being said that since it is means that are new in principle that are being developed within the framework of SDI—such as laser weapons, weapons using directed energy, and so on—the development and testing of such weapons, in space for example, does not fall within the jurisdiction of article 5 of the treaty.

But here Washington is silent about the fact that the aforementioned article only admits the possibility that such "exotic" weapons can emerge to replace those which already exist in the limited field of the antimissile defenses permitted by the treaty (one system for each side) and only in the form of stationary land-based systems. In other words the U.S. explanation has nothing to do with article 5, which forbids space-based weapons for antimissile defense.

No other interpretation of the text of the treaty or the additions to it is possible. And this is not only the view of the Soviet side. An official report from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency submitted to Congress 31 January 1983 states that the ABM treaty's ban on developing, testing, and deploying space-based antimissile defense systems or components of such systems "also covers directed energy technology used to this end." It could not be put any clearer. Indeed, ARBEIDERBLADET itself has written that the leader of the U.S. delegation at the ABM negotiations, Gerard Smith, has clearly stated that the ABM treaty forbids testing outside the laboratory. Who can know better than Smith what this treaty permits and what it forbids?

Another thing. Agreements are entered into so that they will be observed in strict compliance with their spirit and letter, and not so that they can be interpreted as you yourself think fit. What would be left of international law if the parties to an agreement take steps to withdraw from the agreement even before the ink they used to sign it has had a chance to dry?

So what is the escape from a situation in which the U.S. President stubbornly clings to SDI and appears willing to scrap the ABM treaty for the sake of this "initiative," while the Soviet Union makes absolute compliance with this agreement which does not allow the deployment of weapons in space an absolute condition for radical cuts in nuclear arms? Some observers in the West "advise" us to reach agreement with the Americans on "SDI's place in the world of the future" and to construct some similar system ourselves. I find that this kind of advice is the result of a poor analysis of the situation. And I will explain why.

The "strategic defense initiative" simply traps you in words about defense. But in fact it is an attempt to deploy first-strike space weapons (a concept which the Americans are careful to try to avoid). These weapons will be able to hit targets both in space and on the earth. According to U.S. physicists a laser system that is powerful enough to hit ballistic missiles would be able to set all the other side's major cities alight within a few hours and this would give rise to a climatic catastrophe comparable to the "nuclear winter." It is not therefore surprising that the U.S. researchers who have such a good knowledge of the first-strike space weapons' destructive potential are overwhelmingly opposed to SDI.

In addition the implementation of SDI would undoubtedly lead to a major destabilization of the strategic situation. The Soviet Union would be unable to close its eyes to a development such as the U.S. attempts to achieve superiority and would be forced to adopt countermeasures. As a result the arms race would enter a new and more dangerous phase at an even higher level. To say nothing of the fact that a headlong race involving high-technology weapons would simply have unforeseeable consequences. For this very reason we are convinced opponents of the extension of the arms race into space. That is not the road we wish to follow.

I take the view that the hopes for the future development of the Reykjavik process are linked with the new thinking in the nuclear age that is making progress among millions of ordinary people and among responsible political leaders. Mikhail Gorbachev's far-reaching and bold proposals in Reykjavik--on strategic offensive weapons, on medium-range nuclear weapons, and on the verification issue--are an example of such a new approach. Growing numbers of people are seeing the truth about SDI and growing numbers are beginning to understand that thinking in terms of deterrence and war in our age is the same as planning our collective suicide.

Reykjavik is not over. Time is working for the process which began there. The ideas which saw the light of day there have won the support of the peoples. Therefore there is every reason to view the future with optimism.

U.S.-Canada Institute Official

AU251213 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 19 Nov 86 pp 1, 2

[Interview given by Aleksey Vasilyev, director of the disarmament department of the United States and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, to ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI journalist Major Jerzy Markowski: "Disarmament--After Reykjavik"--date and place not given]

[Text] [Markowski] Although the Reykjavik "summit" did not bring concrete results, it was a momentous event in the sphere of disarmament and weapons control. In this regard, the package of agreements presented by the Soviet delegate played an enormous role.

[Vasilyev] Yes. The present complex disarmament problems caused by the modern political-military situation require urgent solutions. We adopted as our starting point the difficulties present at the Geneva talks which prevented positive solutions. The Soviet Union has decided on a more energetic approach toward disarmament problems. And in the spirit of M. Gorbachev's 15 January statement and of the CPSU Central Committee political report to the 27th congress, as well as on the basis of numerous other reports, a new package of proposals was formulated. It is this package that was presented in Reykjavik.

[Markowski] What is new about these proposals?

[Vasilyev] The essence of them is that the USSR's political stance, expressed by means of a broad range of very considerable concessions in all the problems that were discussed, has been changed. Concerning strategic resources, for example, we agreed as to the number of resources capable of hitting targets in our country, and returned to the former classification of these resources according to their range. As far as Eurostrategic resources are concerned, we agreed not to include the nuclear weapons in Great Britain and France. This is a concession that is more than considerable. It is particularly important when we consider a radical reduction of nuclear weapons. Please note that the first stage of the agreement to reduce strategic armaments by 50 percent involves intermediate-range weapons, but this proposal is contained in one package. In theory, one could achieve the first stage of the first proposal without taking British and French nuclear weapons into account. But if we see these forces in perspective, then it is difficult to regard them as having any strategic significance.

[Markowski] But it is not these matters that hampered the "summit." It is the American Strategic Defense Initiative that did so.

[Vasilyev] Of course, but here too we made far-reaching concessions. If we are dealing with the SDI, we are ready to permit laboratory tests.

[Markowski] How is one to understand that, and how does the Soviet side construe it?

[Vasiliyev] Before I explain, I would like to recall certain former complications of terminology brought to mind by the Americans. This will permit an easier understanding of our concessions vis-a-vis SDI. The Americans use the terms "development" and "research" [both terms appear in English and in italics], saying that the first is banned by the ABM treaty and the second permitted. In our text, which is identical to the American one and has the same validity, we use the term "издание" [appears in Russian] which is the equivalent of the American "creation." It means both development and research.

Now we have made a very considerable concession. We are permitting tests. What is more, we are toning down point 5 of the ABM treaty which bans these tests. We even allow the kind of tests that do not take place outside a laboratory. After all, the relevant point of the ABM treaty says that both sides are committed not to develop tests on antimissile systems and their space component. In other words, they are committed not to create space-based systems of antimissile defense and not to conduct any tests in space.

[Markowski] But the SDI problem is no longer a purely military problem for the United States today.

[Vasiliyev] Of course. The SDI is backed not only by military considerations, but political and economic ones as well. We understand this excellently. The President, under pressure from various groups, could be in a difficult situation if he immediately altered his SDI policy and signed the appropriate agreements. We know that the political price of such an act for the incumbent president would be big enough to prevent him from signing such an agreement on antimissile defense systems.

[Markowski] The package of Soviet proposals contained an end to nuclear tests, but not much was said about it, unfortunately.

[Vasiliyev] Indeed there was not agreement in Reykjavik about this. I feel it is a pity because on the one hand it is a very important proposal and on the other hand a very significant approach which has exerted important internal political influence on the [U.S.] Administration and has encountered a loud echo in all NATO circles, governments, and intergovernmental organizations. I had the opportunity of convincing myself of this at the recent session of experts at Monte Bello in Canada, where the above-mentioned circles were represented. It is therefore all the more clear to me that this is a problem on which the final word has not been spoken yet.

Comrade M. Gorbachev presented our proposals with complete openness in Reykjavik. We are ready to discuss everything that could turn our proposals concerning a total ban on nuclear tests to reality.

[Markowski] Can what we have said so far be described as a scale of concessions?

[Vasiliyev] Yes. That is the very scale of our concessions, because compromise is the only way to reach anything. It has to be said that these concessions are very important. And that is the military and political price we are prepared to pay in order to reach accord on this entire package of proposals, so that we may proceed to a lower level of armaments. And there is no need to be surprised that we expect a more flexible attitude from the United States.

[Markowski] Right now this is a matter for the future. What is your view of Reykjavik?

[Vasiliyev] As far as the "summit" is concerned, I will tell you something that may not conform to the official view at first sight. The official view says that in Reykjavik, SDI was a shadow on the path to agreement and a focal point for everything. I, however, would say that this is only true from the point of view of broad public opinion. All the details are sufficiently clear to public opinion. SDI was the symbol of the profound processes that are guiding American disarmament policy and a sign of the fact that the Reagan Administration does not want to disarm. They do not need disarmament. Disarmament is not the most important thing, according to official statements. Consider the official Republican election platform from which Reagan came to power in 1980. It says that there can be no disarmament accords with the USSR. The President's advisers have been saying and still are saying that the Soviet Union must be pushed into a kind of arms race that will choke it economically. The American Government circles do not need a reduction in the arms race. And all this means is that once again we are in a deadlock.

[Markowski] How dangerous is it?

[Vasiliyev] It is dangerous in the sense that the difficult and tense situation is continuing. On the other hand, one need not exaggerate this. After all, we are no longer dealing with the administration of 1981-83. The administration we are dealing with has already felt the weight of the problems lies not only along the United States-USSR line, and that there are serious domestic problems in the United States which are growing all the time. Furthermore, America has found itself in a new situation. And the latest "summit" has shown this clearly.

[Markowski] What comes after Reykjavik?

[Vasiliyev] We must retain our optimism. There are ways out of the present situation. The Geneva talks have received a strong impulse. The next round of negotiations has already been moved forward by one month. It was meant to be in January, but now it is going to start in December. Our proposals have encountered strong support not only from the socialist countries. Stockholm and its outcome will be of colossal importance for the future of disarmament talks. Reykjavik has sharply contrasted the problems that still exist in disarmament and which must be resolved. Let us hope that they will be resolved for the sake of all mankind. The USSR is constantly ready for this work, and our peaceful proposals provide clear confirmation of this. What is most important, they are still valid.

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR ARMY PAPER ON POLICY TOWARD U.S. NUCLEAR, SPACE THREAT

PM161239 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Dec 86 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Colonel M. Ponomarev, editor of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's foreign department and member of the editorial board: "Reason Must Triumph"; first six paragraphs are reader's letter]

[Text] "Esteemed Editors!

"Like everyone, I am concerned at the situation in the world and the strained relations between the USSR and the United States. I would like to share my views on this. I do not know much about politics, but, in my view, the U.S. behavior is senseless. In the past wars were unleashed and waged for the sake of capturing foreign lands and enslaving other peoples. But nuclear war will not give anyone anything. Even if the Americans start a war and stay alive themselves, having blown up (forgive me for writing this, but I do not know how else to put it) the USSR, they will have nothing to profit by: Everything will have been turned to ashes, and there will be no one to subjugate.

"But perhaps all their threats to unleash war are just an attempt to intimidate us and force us to make concessions? They are reckoning on winning the war without even starting it, by flaunting their strength.

"I look carefully at our policy toward the United States -- readiness for talks and for certain compromises -- and I think: Must we behave like this? Perhaps we too should be a bit tougher? Let them not think that we can be intimidated.

"I do not know, perhaps I am mistaken. Please answer me.

"R. Batrakova, Tashkent."

[Ponomarev] What should I say about your letter, esteemed Roza Adelshayevna? First of all, you are obviously excessively modest in writing that you do not know much about politics. You have good knowledge, you are able to seize upon the chief, most important thing in the complex strategems of contemporary international life, and you set forth your thoughts laconically and clearly. Incidentally, this ability is displayed to a greater or lesser degree by almost all who address the editorial office these days in order to share their opinion of urgent problems of world politics. This is a very noteworthy fact. It attests not only to the Soviet people's profound interest in questions of ensuring international security but also to their high awareness, their sense of personal responsibility for the fate of peace, their

boundless support for the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, and their angry indignation at the adventurist policy of the Washington administration, which is the lackey of the most reactionary U.S. imperialist circles and of the bosses of the military-industrial complex.

But let us return to your letter, Roza Adelshayevna. You rightly point out that U.S. behavior is senseless. Indeed, from the viewpoint of any sober-minded person, even one inexperienced in politics, the U.S. ruling circles' actions do not fit into any sensible framework. First Washington openly spoke aloud of the possibility of winning a nuclear missile war and bending the USSR to its will. Then it admitted at the summit meeting held in Geneva in November of last year that there can be no winner in such a war.

Now it is once again shamelessly striving for military superiority, accelerating the arms race, and intending to transfer it into space and create [sozdat] a system there which will supposedly be able to defend U.S. territory against a counterstrike following a nuclear attack on the USSR and thereby ensure impunity of aggression and its triumphant conclusion. For the sake of this chimera embodied in the notorious SDI it is giving up for lost the accords which had been on the point of being reached in Reykjavik to eliminate strategic offensive arms and implement other measures to avert the threat of self-destruction from mankind.

Are there in U.S. policy elements of bluff or a desire, as you write, to intimidate and blackmail the USSR and force it to make concessions? Yes, undoubtedly. But the threat to peace stems not so much from Washington's attempts to frighten us -- we know from history that they have never brought anyone any success -- as from their desire to act from a position of strength everywhere and in everything and to resort to force without balking at any consequences. People on the other side of the ocean spare no means to ensure this position. I do not wish, Roza Adelshayevna, to overburden my reply to you with facts and figures characterizing the scope of American war preparations. They have been cited repeatedly in the pages both of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and of other Soviet press organs. I will only remind you that \$291.8 billion are being allocated to the Pentagon for the next fiscal year. In all, during President Reagan's 6-year rule in the United States far more than 1 trillion dollars have been spent on militarist purposes. To depict this astronomic sum on paper, it is necessary to add 12 (!) zeros to the unit. This money has been used to create a giant war machine based on strategic offensive forces.

What should the Soviet Union's attitude be to all this? Historical experience shows that the USSR has invariably found a corresponding or, as people sometimes say, fitting response to any threat to its security. This will continue to be the case. Our country possesses sufficient intellectual, scientific, technical, and industrial potential for this. We do not strive for superiority, we do not need it. But the creation of approximate equality in the military strategic sphere between the USSR and the United States, as well as between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, was a truly historic achievement of world socialism. We will not abandon it.

Now, in the nuclear and space age, esteemed Roza Adelshayevna, political means of averting the threat of war appear the only possible means. Any conflict, any military clash harbors the potential likelihood of escalating into a world nuclear war with all its tragic consequences for the fate of mankind. This is why on questions of war and peace new thinking and new approaches to solving the most acute problems of the present have become the pressing demand of the times. It is a question not only of eliminating war from the life of society but also of behaving in a restrained and circumspect

manner in the international arena and asserting the principles of peaceful coexistence as the universal norm in relations among states. Only in this way can reason triumph. It must triumph.

This is precisely the approach by which the Soviet Union is guided. Precisely this determines the large-scale Soviet peace initiatives, whose core is mankind's deliverance from nuclear and other kinds of mass destruction weapons and the creation of an all-embracing system of international security. The USSR proceeds from precisely this in its relations with the United States and in holding talks with it. It is appropriate to recall here that all talks imply steps toward each other by their participants, certain concessions, and sensible compromises. But the Soviet Union has never made and will never make any concessions on fundamental questions -- and in this respect the fears expressed in your letter, Roza Adelshayevna, are quite unfounded, although explicable.

The Reykjavik meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan and the USSR's subsequent actions have clearly highlighted the Soviet Union's principled and constructive approach to relations and talks with the United States.

This is what I can briefly tell you, Roza Adelshayevna, in answer to your letter. In conclusion, accept our very best wishes.

/6091
CSO: 5200/1195

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: U.S. TREATY VIOLATIONS UNDERMINE STRATEGIC STABILITY

PM121542 Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Dec 86 p 3

[Candidate of Technical Sciences Colonel V. Chernyshev article: "Foundations of Strategic Stability: How Washington Undermines Them"]

[Text] At the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik, the accords which were practically reached on radical reductions followed by the elimination of nuclear arms were not finalized because of the U.S. Administration's reluctance to strengthen the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems (the ABM Treaty) and because of its desire in any event to continue the development of SDI, or the "star wars" program. And now the United States, by ostentatiously violating the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the SALT II Treaty), has effectively rejected it. These alarming facts shook the world. They reveal quite clearly the nature of the present American foreign policy course, which is aimed at an all-around arms race, the militarization of outer space, and the whipping up of international tension. After all, these two treaties constitute the foundation of strategic stability, a base for the process of reducing and then eliminating strategic offensive arms, that is, the starting point for the path which ultimately, and in a historically short space of time, can and should lead mankind to a nuclear-free world. What is the nature of these treaties, and what dangers are inherent in their rejection?

The ABM Treaty

The main crux of this treaty lies in the sides' effective renunciation of the creation of a defense of the country against a nuclear strike. Article I enshrines each side's pledge "not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense," and Article V the pledge "not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems of components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based."

Each side was granted permission (Article III) to deploy only limited ABM systems in two regions: (a) within one area having a radius of 150 km and centered on the party's capital; (b) within one area having a radius of 150 km and containing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo launchers. In each area a limited number of components of ABM systems are stipulated (ABM interceptors, launchers, and radar stations). Each side is permitted

to have no more than 100 ABM interceptors in one area. In 1974 the USSR and the United States signed a protocol to the treaty, whereby the number of areas of deployment of an ABM system for each side is reduced to one, and the USSR chose the Moscow region, while the United States chose the region of the Grand Forks missile base.

Why did the sides renounce something which appears to be of the utmost importance, namely the defense of the entire country against a nuclear missile strike? First, it is impossible to create a defense which is "impenetrable" to missiles, and this fact has been acknowledged by the world's major scientists, including American scientists. The recognition and open acknowledgement of this fact was the embodiment of state wisdom and political courage on the part of the USSR leadership and the U.S. Administration when they signed the ABM Treaty. The renunciation of the creation of ABM systems for the defense of the country's territory--until the elimination of nuclear weapons as such--is the only reasonable means and the best means of defending a country against nuclear missile attack. Each side is clearly aware that if it carried out a nuclear strike against the other, even a weakened retaliatory strike would do it unacceptable damage, and there could be no winner in a nuclear war. Western specialists express this aptly: "Shoot first, die second."

Second, the creation by one side of a large-scale ABM defense would lead to a sharp fall in confidence, the disruption of strategic stability, the stepping up of the arms race, and an increase in the probability of the outbreak of war. Indeed, in these circumstances the other side would have fears that the large-scale ABM defense was being created so as to be able to inflict a first nuclear strike and then, by means of the defense, to bring the retaliatory strike down to an "acceptable" level, that is, with the aim of making nuclear war possible and winning it. This in turn would force the other side either to create an ABM defense system of its own or substantially to improve and build up its offensive strategic forces, or most likely some combination of the two. The result would be an endless arms race following the cycle "action--counteraction--countercounteraction." And as the mountains of nuclear arms grew, the threat of nuclear catastrophe would increase.

The present U.S. Administration is trying to prove that the ABM Treaty is "obsolete," since it is now possible to create an effective ABM system. But nothing could be further from the truth. The laws of logic engendered by this treaty are of unlimited duration, and progress in science and technology only confirms the need for such a regime. After all, if in our time it is possible to create a more effective ABM system, as Washington dreams of doing, for instance, and through the use of space strike arms, then this would lead even more to an arms race with unpredictable consequences, strategic chaos instead of strategic stability, and an increase in the probability of a nuclear war starting--either intentionally or unintentionally, by accident.

SALT II Treaty

The Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 1972 (SALT I) and the SALT II Treaty (1979), which the USSR and the United States complied with on a basis of reciprocity, were designed directly to limit the strategic offensive arms race. The first document contains pledges not to construct additional fixed land-based ICBM's, and to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of the agreement.

The predominant significance of the SALT II Treaty is that on the basis of the mutually acknowledged principle of equality and equal security, it requires the sides to observe both quantitative and substantial qualitative limitations on the sides' strategic nuclear systems. It established not only the initial aggregate level of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, but also the reduction of that number to 2,250, if the treaty were ratified (the United States, as is well known, refused to ratify the treaty, but subsequently pledged to comply with its provision). The treaty also stipulated corresponding "ceilings" for the basic groups of strategic systems: 1,320 for ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's) and heavy bombers with their armaments, in particular cruise missiles; 1,200 for ballistic missiles (not including bombers) with MIRV's; and no more than 820 for ICBM's with MIRV's. Limitations are also stipulated on the number of warheads on each type of ICBM and SLBM and on the number of cruise missiles on heavy bombers.

Thus the main significance of the SALT II Treaty is that it limits the deployment of the sides' strategic offensive forces. Under the treaty both sides removed from the armory a proportion of their strategic delivery vehicles. At a press conference at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center on 23 May this year the following figures were cited, for instance: Since the time of signing the treaty the USSR has dismantled 72 ICBM launchers and 21 heavy bombers, and in all, under the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty, it has dismantled 540 strategic delivery vehicles, while the United States has dismantled 168.

The SALT II Treaty undoubtedly meets the security interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States.

However, the upper hand has now been taken in the United States by circles which are opposed to detente and call for the buildup of military might and for military-strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. Washington's fulfillment of the "comprehensive strategic program" announced on 2 October 1971 has now reached the stage where the administration must choose: either the further buildup of arms, or the SALT II Treaty, which "hampers" that buildup. And it has chosen the arms race. Representatives of the U.S. leadership have declared that the treaty is "dead," and the other day the United States ostentatiously exceeded the "ceiling" of 1,320 units laid down by the treaty for MIRVED ballistic missiles and heavy bombers by delivering to the armory the 131st bomber carrying cruise missiles.

The renunciation of the SALT II Treaty by R. Reagan's Administration is evidence that Washington seeks entirely to remove the barriers which still exist on the path of the nuclear arms race and that the American military is ready to continue to sacrifice its own people's security interests to the weapons traders' profits.

People throughout the world, including people in the United States itself and in the allied countries, condemn Washington's renunciation of the SALT II Treaty. This step is quite rightly described as an undermining of the arms limitation and reduction process, as a serious blow against Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva, and as an attack by the present White House incumbent on the foundations of the limitation of strategic weapons. And one can hardly regard as an exaggeration the remark by America's ABC television that although the talks continue, the two powers have "entered a world without SALT, where there are no longer any limitations on offensive nuclear arms."

Some people in Washington are most reluctant to learn the lessons of history, open their eyes to the realities of the nuclear and space age, and see where blind adherence to the cult of strength could lead their country and the whole world. The triumph of anti-Soviet ideology over common sense--that is how sensible politicians in the United States itself define the administration's attack on the existing agreements.

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CSO: 5200/1184

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS: U.S. POLICY ON NUCLEAR ARMS, WITHDRAWAL FROM REYKJAVIK

LD121358 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1254 GMT 12 Dec 86

[*"A Good Question"* — TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 12 Dec (TASS) — Political observer Yuriy Kornilov writes:

Touching upon the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons at a briefing in the White House, a spokesman for the U.S. Administration tried to say that in Washington they would like to know Moscow's point of view about where both sides now stand. A good question. But why is it addressed to the Soviet Union?

In the time since Reykjavik, the principled Soviet position has not changed, nor could it change, since it reflects the very essence, the pivot of peace-loving Soviet foreign policy. Our country remains today in favor of seeking mutually acceptable solutions to the cardinal questions of reducing and liquidating nuclear weapons, basing itself on the principles of equality and equal security for all sides and taking into consideration the interests of the USSR, and the United States and its allies. We continue to uphold today the platform that we put forward at Reykjavik of linked proposals, proposals that are carefully balanced both from the point of view of the participants in the talks and of the whole community of states. And we are convinced today — and the results of Reykjavik point to this -- that there does exist an opportunity to achieve progress on the path to disarmament, and especially nuclear disarmament.

Things are quite different in Washington. "If we are agreed that all nuclear armaments are to be eliminated by the end of this century, we can hand this accord over the our delegation in Geneva so they can prepare a treaty that you can sign during your visit to the United States," President R. Reagan said to M.S. Gorbachev in Reykjavik. But after a few days had passed, the world heard something quite different from Washington: First of all they began to deny that the Reykjavik accord referred to all nuclear weapons. Then they stated that it had been a question only of ballistic missiles, reserving for themselves those parts of the strategic forces in which the United States traditionally has had the advantage. Then they began to speak about preserving some of the ballistic missiles, etc. etc.

In withdrawing step-by-step from the Reykjavik positions, Washington demonstrates over and over again its striving to block any possible progress in questions of limiting armaments on the basis of what was achieved in the Icelandic capital, and then it exercises hypocrisy and demonstrates the gulf between its words and its deeds. For example: Washington talks a lot about the importance of an atmosphere of trust — and

explodes the SALT II treaty. It gives assurances that it is striving "to make progress" at the Geneva talks — and virtually puts the brakes on the talks. It states that SDI will make nuclear weapons unnecessary — and then feverishly builds up its nuclear arsenals both quantitatively and qualitatively.

If one pays attention to these facts, then the question is really fully justified, but it should be addressed to Washington, not Moscow. Where do we stand now? And in which direction are we going? Or to be more precise: Where and to what new and dangerous brink is the world being pushed by those circles in the United States that are striving to strike out the positive results of Reykjavik, and, contrary to reason, to continue to rely on the policy of force and not on the force of reasoned, honest, and carefully considered policy?

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRAVDA REBUTS WEINBERGER VIEW OF REYKJAVIK TALKS

PM041005 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Dec 86 First Edition p 6

[M. Vasilyev article under the "After Reykjavik" rubric: "The Self-hypnosis of Power"]

[Text] If someone were to carry out a lexical analysis of Washington's political vocabulary, he would discover that "strength" is the most frequently used concept in it. It is used virtually every day by both the White House and the State Department, not to mention the Pentagon. There is nothing at all unexpected here: The present administration came into office 6 years ago to the drumbeat of demands that U.S. military superiority be restored. The distinguishing mark of the present incantations is the claim that it is only this kind of superiority that makes the Russians conduct disarmament talks.

One would have thought the campaign had reached its apogee in a few weeks separating the Reykjavik meeting from the U.S. elections at the beginning of November. But now the electoral rhetoric, in which promises, boasts, and flagrant lies are all brought into play, is over. Over, with worse results for the administration than it expected. Just the time, you would have thought, to assess and ponder what is really needed for successful talks on the most important question of the present day--the question of mankind's survival.

Unfortunately, that has not happened. Again the President repeats: "We sit down at the negotiating table from a position of strength." This he regards as the guarantee of success. Moreover, a quite unusual spectacle is unfurling in the Western political arena. Through the chorus of praise of Reagan's "unyieldingness" regarding the militarization of outer space conservative circles, can be clearly heard urging that the Reykjavik path should not be taken even on those questions on which agreement in principle has been reached. The NATO leadership, FRG Chancellor Kohl and British Prime Minister Thatcher—who have paid successive visits to Washington--and the right wing of the U.S. President's own entourage preach that any talks with the Soviet Union must be conducted from "tough" positions.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger has even taken upon himself the task of expounding point by point a whole program on "how to conduct talks with the Soviet Union." This has already been reported in the Soviet press. However, since this constitutes the "catechism," as it were, of U.S. right-wing circles, the "basic rules of the game" as Weinberger himself has called them, they merit more detailed analysis.

The first point of the program is as follows: During talks with the USSR do not believe the "subversive idea of a moral equivalence" between the United States and the USSR and bear in mind that the "Kremlin's view of the world hardly tallies with our conception."

All right, no one disputes the fundamental differences in ideas, conceptions, and qualities between the two social systems. Of course, they are susceptible of differing assessment. Former U.S. President John Kennedy, for example, who can scarcely be accused of a fondness for socialism, once found the courage to acknowledge: "We look like defenders of the status quo, while the communists appear as the vanguard leading to a better, brighter, and braver way of life."

But that is not what the Soviet-American talks are about today. They are being held to ensure that mankind can survive and the earth's civilization can be preserved and can make further progress. Only then is it possible, through competition, to compare and contrast the two systems' values and give the peoples a choice. Moreover, the world is becoming, notwithstanding the existence of different social systems, more interdependent. And this applies not only to the possibility of mutual destruction as a result of a nuclear cataclysm. It is a growing daily reality. The dangerous erosion of man's environment, the finite nature of energy resources, the need for peaceful exploration of the heights of outer space and the depths of the oceans—all this demands a common human approach and a search for solutions transcending differences of social systems.

This has frequently been said of late in the Soviet Union from the highest rostrum. Of course, this cuts no ice with Mr Weinberger. After all, he maintains that "truth is a utilitarian concept, it is useful only for carrying out Soviet goals." Perhaps it is worth therefore looking at a statement by someone who is part of the U.S. Administration clique itself—the speech delivered by Secretary of State G. Shultz in Vienna. "The world is entering a period of radical technical transformations, when the old thinking and old traditions are becoming increasingly out of line with the new facts of actual reality," he notes, continuing: "The criteria of military might... are less and less able to capture the real sources of a society's viability."

It is only to be regretted that practical conclusions are not drawn from these words, and worse still, the old cliches about the "need for a foundation of strength," which are quite alien in spirit to them, are used. This indeed is another basic "rule for talks with the Russians" as proclaimed by Mr Weinberger, and indeed by the U.S. Administration as a whole.

It is, of course, undeniable that a state's might is a weighty argument at any talks. But might, after all, is a multifaceted element. It includes economic potential, social stability, wisdom of political leadership, and, finally, that elusive factor--a people's spirit, of which Leo Tolstoy said that without it any military strength is but naught. History has frequently borne out this truth. The American colonists who in the late 17th century rose up against their mother country, Britain, were surely inferior to it from a purely military standpoint. And yet peace was concluded on terms granting them independence. And in our time surely the military might of Vietnam was not comparable to the U.S. potential. And yet history judged that Vietnam prevailed.

History also shows the illusoriness of attempts to establish some desired world order by means of wonder weapons. Have the nuclear weapons initially created in the United States not ultimately become nemesis for the United States itself, depriving it of the invulnerability to which it was accustomed and which it considered virtually a "gift from on high?"

There is another instructive aspect. It was not when the United States had a monopoly of these weapons and correspondingly approached talks from a position of diktat that talks became possible. The ABM Treaty and SALT I and SALT II were concluded when the United States recognized the parity and equality of the other side.

And now the notorious "strategic defense initiative" is put forward in addition.

Looking realistically at the problem, does SDI strengthen U.S. might or boost the chances of successful talks? Yes, SDI does mobilize to a certain extent the technological resources of the United States and its allies. But these resources are disappearing into an unpredictable black hole. Yes, the SDI supplies an artificial boost to the American economy. But at the cost of trillions of dollars to the nation, even though the U.S. state budget deficit has, as it is, assumed an unprecedented size, and the country is already in debt. Yes, SDI does stir up a wave of chauvinism, but the fervor of nationalist passions is fraught with the danger of war, which in turn could destroy all life, and consequently, themselves.

It now takes only some tens of minutes for ICBM's to fly to their potential targets. A dangerous prospect which the Soviet Union is seeking to replace with the prospect of a nuclear-free world. Conversely, what the United States is proposing under the SDI program exacerbates the situation still further and means that mankind's fate will be decided in a split second. Consequently, responsibility for mankind's life will be completely delegated to computer equipment. With all the ensuing consequences. And for what? The defense of America? But General Abrahams, leader of the SDI program, himself attests that it is impossible to shelter U.S. territory under some kind of protective canopy. Thus, once again what is at issue is the invention of a weapon which will make it possible to exercise diktat over the world. But isn't the price mankind will pay for this latest illusion too high? And the fact that "star wars" is an obstacle to rather than a basis for agreement was convincingly demonstrated by Reykjavik.

And, finally, one other "prescription" of Mr Weinberger's--do not show "impatience" at talks. It is not a new formula. Talleyrand, no less, noted that in diplomacy one should show the "minimum of zeal." And, after all, a desire to outstay the other side at the negotiating table was suited to past centuries. However, the nuclear and electronic age is upon us. And the Pentagon chief, of all people, should know that. And a call for procrastination at the talks does not lead to a freezing of the arms race or its reversal. It could give it qualitatively new dimensions creating strategic chaos and undermining the very basis of the talks.

To briefly sum up the "prescriptions" which the U.S. Administration is following and obviously intends to continue following at the Soviet-American talks, they effectively amount to a rejection of the very essence of talks as a compromise between equal partners in pursuit of common interests. There is a kind of attack from the Right even on those parameters on which consensus was achieved in Reykjavik, and the very accords are being called into question. The only conception of talks recognized by militarist circles in the United States and West Europe goes as follows: One side concedes and the other graciously accepts the concessions. But the world has changed, there is no place in it today for U.S. hegemony or domination by any state. It demands a conscious understanding of how to combine the interests of each state with the interests of other states and the interests of all mankind.

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CSO: 5200/1184

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW: U.S. REACTION TO GORBACHEV CLAIM OF FLEXIBILITY AT REYKJAVIK

LD182354 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1745 GMT 18 Dec 86

[Text] An ASSOCIATED PRESS report from Washington says that a State Department representative has declared that, I quote: The claims by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev about the flexibility of the USSR at the talks on arms control are propaganda not corresponding to the proposals presented at the talks.

Hardly had Redman — it was he who spoke on behalf of the State Department — uttered his questionable opinion, to put it mildly, that the Voice of America and other propaganda services of the U.S. Government caught up his words and started spreading them all around the world. No doubt, a noisy and I would even say clamorous propaganda campaign is being mounted. Why? What is it based upon? I will ask my colleague Viktor Levin to answer these questions.

[Levin] First, I would like to note the immediate underlying cause of the pronouncement by the State Department. The point is that Democratic Senator Gary Hart, at a press conference after a meeting with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders in Moscow, discussed precisely the question of the flexibility of the Soviet approach to the talks with the United States on nuclear and space arms. In particular, Hart set forth what the CPSU general secretary told him and what followed from the position itself of our country both at the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik and at the talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva.

Indeed, the Soviet Union may speak with good reason about flexibility, about striving for a sensible compromise to solve the problems that are being discussed at the talks. Let us recall Reykjavik. As is known, our country made considerable concessions there. For example, we agreed when discussing the issue of strategic offensive weapons not to include in their number the U.S. medium-range missiles sited in Europe and aimed at vital centers of the USSR. When examining the issue of the medium-range missiles we considered it possible at present not to take into account British and French nuclear facilities. We also made a compromise on the question of the nuclear arms in the Asian part of the country, and also in the problem of stopping nuclear tests.

These concessions have vividly shown that our country is sincerely striving for achieving a mutual acceptable agreement with the United States and our position has been estimated at its true worth by the international public. Not a single sensible person has questioned the validity of the complex approach by the USSR to the problems of limiting nuclear arms. It is obvious that these concessions and this flexibility should not be used by the other side to damage the USSR, and for the detriment of our security. That is why our proposals were presented as a package. This is only natural.

The flexibility of Soviet foreign policy can be seen in literally all spheres of international life. Without exaggeration one could claim that it is a vivid and convincing indicator of the sincerity of our country and of its genuine and not declarative interest in the consolidation of peace.

That is why Washington does not want even to hear about our flexibility, and when Americans themselves speak about it Washington loses all reason, because it corroborates the honesty of the Soviet Union and lays bare Washington's urge to drive the Geneva talks into an impasse again. Shortly speaking, it reminds one of a well-known saying: You are angry, Jupiter, this means you are wrong.

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CSO: 5200/1195

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER MEETS WITH LEADERS ON SDI, SALT II

Meets With Gorbachev

LD051913 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Dec 86 First Edition pp 1-2

["M.S. Gorbachev's Conversation With Gro Harlem Brundtland"--PRAVDA headline]

[Excerpts] Mikhail Gorbachev met in the Kremlin on 5 December with Gro Harlem Brundtland, prime minister of Norway and chairman of the Norwegian Labor Party.

Another reality that is at the basis of the Soviet Union's foreign policy is the vital need for ending the arms race. There is no time to be lost. If the military-industrial complex succeeds in involving a large part of the U.S. economy in the development of SDI, no talks will help.

The interlocutors have the common awareness of the need for joint actions in the struggle for detente. The notion of "universal security" and the notion of "joint security" advanced by the Palme Commission are actually identical.

But following Reykjavik Western Europe assumed a vague stand, Mikhail Gorbachev said. Moreover, as soon as the shift toward nuclear disarmament started, certain West European leaders took fright. And the U.S. Administration assumed a direct course of eliminating the consequences of Reykjavik. All its actions, including the latest one -- the rejection of SALT II -- leave no room for doubt to this effect.

The Soviet Union will never go back on Reykjavik. Reykjavik brought the state of affairs with the arms race to an absolutely new level, and the way from it can and must be only forward. Mme. Brundtland agreed to such a assessment.

Mikhail Gorbavhev also said that the Soviet Union does not intend to disrupt the talks on nuclear arms, losing a sense of realism. "But we shall consent to possible agreements going into operation only if we have full confidence that the ABM treaty is observed. This is, specifically, the basis for our package of mutual concessions and mutual interests. We have understanding for Western Europe's interest in the elimination of medium-range missiles but Europeans must make their contribution too. We made very serious concessions and we have a moral and a political right to reciprocity".

The question of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing, whose term of operation expires, came up for discussion. Mikhail Gorbavhev said that the Soviet leadership

ponders how it should act and noted that the Western public has a tendency to make requests and demands only on the Soviet Union to continue the moratorium. Meanwhile, for some reason, they do not apply the same persistence in demanding that the United States stop explosions. And so, the following situation develops: everybody is for universal security, but it is only the Soviet Union that should wage the struggle for this with the United States. The West, too, should make readjustments in this sense, and should not count only on the Soviet Union's readjustments.

"However hard we are hindered in our endeavors, and whatever 'versions' are invented to frustrate our plans, we are convinced of the correctness of such policy and we shall persistently implement it. At the same time, no one will manage to make use of our interest in peace in order to compel us to waive our security".

"Notwithstanding the entire complexity of the situation, it is easy for us, in a certain sense of the word, to pursue this course: Our conscience is clear. We do what we say, and do not waste energy on thinking up crafty designs against the negotiating partner, and do not intend to use the confidentiality of the talks as a cover to draw him into a trap".

A large degree of mutual understanding on the main, most topical problems of disarmament and European security, as well as on environmental protection issues, the resolution of which Gro Harlem Brundtland has made great universally recognized personal contributions, was revealed during the conversation.

Present during the meeting were Anatoliy Kovalev, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, Kjell Vibe, permanent deputy minister of foreign affairs of Norway, and Olav Bucher-Johannessen, the ambassador of Norway to the USSR.

Talks With Ryzhkov

LD051600 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Dec 86 First Edition p 2

["Conversation With Norway's Prime Minister"--PRAVDA headline]

[Excerpts] Chairman of the USSR Council of Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov met in the Kremlin 5 December with Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland who has arrived in Moscow as chairman of the International Commission for the Environment and Development to attend its seventh session.

The sides held a thorough exchange of views on various aspects of world development and Soviet-Norwegian relations.

Having pointed out a considerable similarity of the Soviet Union's and Norway's positions in the realization of the need to end the arms race on earth and to prevent it in outer space, to keep the Soviet-U.S. ABM treaty and to observe the SALT II treaty, Nikolay Ryzhkov and Gro Harlem Brundtland stated that the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik had marked a new qualitative stage in the work to rid mankind of nuclear weapons and had revealed a real opportunity to reach mutual understanding on the cardinal issues of our time. An urgent need to preserve and further develop the positive results of Reykjavik was emphasized.

Both sides expressed the conviction that an end to the arms race would promote a successful solution to environmental and developmental problems.

During an exchange of views on matters concerning the state of affairs in the European continent, the two sides expressed mutual readiness to promote a continuation and intensification of the All-European process and successful holding of the Vienna meeting.

Matters of Soviet-Norwegian relations at the present stage and particularly the state of and prospects for trade-and-economic, scientific-and-technical contacts were discussed.

Mutual interest in giving an additional impulse to Soviet-Norwegian contacts and in looking for and establishing new forms of cooperation was stated.

Nikolay Ryzhkov and Gro Harlem Brundtland reaffirmed the USSR's and Norway's intention to maintain and develop traditional good-neighborly relations, regarding them as a factor of stability in Europe's north and in the European continent as a whole.

[Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1610 GMT on 5 December carries an otherwise identical report on the above meeting which adds the following:

"Taking part in the conversation were: on the Soviet side -- Vladimir Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers' State Foreign Economic Commission; and Anatoliy Kovalev, first deputy USSR minister of foreign affairs; on the Norwegian side -- Olav Bucher-Johannessen, Norway's ambassador to the USSR, and Kjeld Vibe, permanent deputy minister of foreign affairs."]

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CSO: 5200/1195

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR LEADERS, LIBYA'S MANSUR DISCUSS NUCLEAR, SPACE WEAPONS

Talks With Shevardnadze

LD152118 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1922 GMT 15 Dec 86

[Excerpt] Moscow, 15 December (TASS)--Talks were held today between Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of foreign affairs, and Kamil Hasan Mansur, secretary of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, who is in the Soviet Union on an official friendly visit.

In a warm, benevolent atmosphere, the heads of the foreign policy departments of the USSR and Libya discussed questions of bilateral relations and key international problems, concentrating on the vital tasks of strengthening peace and universal security.

E.A. Shevardnadze outlined in detail the complex and controversial situation that had shaped up since Reykjavik regarding questions of war and peace, matters that will determine whether mankind will be able to rid itself of the nuclear tumor and give life to a new concept of a world safe for all. Responsibility for missing a unique opportunity to earnestly embark on solving these questions did not lie with the Soviet Union, which has displayed and continues to display maximum political will, readiness to take into consideration the legitimate interests of the other side, and, above all, the interests of all mankind. Unfortunately, it must be noted that the U.S. Administration has not been on top of the situation and has not passed the test of political maturity. In the international community, the understanding is growing that the "Star Wars" program itself, which Washington is clinging to, has become the stumbling block to moving to a nuclear-free tomorrow. Now it is more obvious than ever that the aggressive militarist circles in the United States are ready to sacrifice the destiny of human civilization for a dangerous chimera of overlordship in space and on earth.

K.H. Mansur, on behalf of the Libyan leadership, highly praised the peace-loving course of the Soviet Union as the sole reasonable alternative to the policy of the imperialist circles of whipping up the nuclear arms race in space and undermining the established military-strategic parity. Libya favors the Soviet peace initiatives, the implementation of which would not only stop the planet's slide toward the nuclear abyss, but also free colossal funds to be used to overcome the gap between the developed and developing countries.

The sides reached the shared view that the struggle to save civilization concerns all states without exception — large, medium-sized and small — whatever the socioeconomic, ideological, and political differences between them. Their ability to concentrate their efforts on the highest goal — the preservation of the human race — will determine in large part the future course of world history.

E.A. Shevardnadze stressed that a model for such an approach is the Delhi declaration signed by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Gandhi, which reflects the shared attachment of socialist and nonaligned states to the ideal of a nonnuclear and nonviolent world. This document counters the policy of strength, which is looking more and more like an anachronism in the modern age, with a new mentality that regards peace as the main asset of all mankind, recognizes the right of all states to choose their own path of development, and aims for the solution of conflicts between them by political means, through negotiation. K.H. Mansur agreed with this assessment. He spoke in favor of an increase in the interaction of the socialist countries and the Nonaligned Movement in the struggle for an affirmation of the new political thinking and against recurrences of the imperial policy of diktat and hegemony.

Shevardnadze Luncheon Speech

LD152217 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1952 GMT 15 Dec 86

[Excerpts] Moscow, 15 Dec (TASS)--Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, gave a luncheon today in honor of Kamil Hasan Mansur, secretary of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, during which speeches were exchanged.

Meetings at the end of the year always prompt one to look back, and at the same time to cast a glance to the future, Eduard Shevardnadze observed.

The idea of a common link between disarmament, international security, and development runs through the Delhi declaration signed by M.S. Gorbachev and R. Gandhi. The philosophy of this truly historic document, which is imbued with new political thought and logic, is not only on a par with those guidelines which were mapped out by the nonaligned countries in the Harare Appeal, but it also gives them more depth in the context of the struggle to create an all-embracing system of international security.

We are happy that there is broad mutual understanding between the Soviet Union and Libya on key international problems. This is the capital which we must preserve and multiply. I think that we have quite good prospects for improving cooperation along the whole spectrum of bilateral relations, and for seeking out fresh forms of it and unused reserves. And there are such reserves, evidently. It is bringing these into play which I had in mind when I spoke of the natural human desire to look into the future. I hope that we shall be able in that future to turn up strata that have not yet been assimilated and prepare them for new good beginnings. There is no doubt that this will benefit our peoples.

It is with thoughts of their happiness and prosperity that we are preparing to meet 1987. May it pass in the shadow of the olive branch of peace, and may it bring mankind long-awaited tranquility.

Mansur Reply

LD151635 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2015 GMT 15 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow, 15 December (TASS) — A meeting of friends and fellow fighters is what Kamil Hasan Mansur, secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, called the Soviet-Libyan talks which took place in Moscow. He delivered a speech today at a luncheon given in his honor by Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of foreign affairs.

"We are struggling together for peace and international security and stability. The aim of this struggle is to deprive imperialism of the weapons it uses against the peoples of the world. These are above all nuclear weapons. But they are also attempts to militarize space; fleets and bases in many areas of the world, which are used to push imperialist domination; various means of economic pressure, plundering the natural resources which are at humanity's disposal; interference in the internal affairs of the peoples of the world, support for counterrevolutionary forces which come out against the development and prosperity of their own countries. Finally, these are the bombardments and raids, victim to which fall women, children, and ordinary citizens. And so when we talk of disarmament, we have in mind that it should embrace all these spheres," said Kamil Hasan Mansur.

"The difficulties which mankind meets with in different fields and areas are interlinked," the speaker emphasized. "The Soviet-Libyan talks light the path to a search for a peaceful solution to all the problems facing us."

In conclusion Kamil Hasan Mansur expressed the conviction that the results of the talks which took place between him and Eduard Shevardnadze would serve the interests not only of the people of USSR and Libya but also of all mankind.

Talks With Gromyko

LD161721 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1633 GMT 16 Dec 86

[Excerpts] Moscow, 16 Dec (TASS)--Despite the high waves in the postwar ocean of international life, and despite the fact that the imperialist circles have tried to use them in order to swamp our position [zakhlestnut nashu s vami pozitsiyu] in the principled questions of the struggle for peace, this position has, nevertheless, shown its sense of function and strength and is an attractive one for all peoples. Relations between the Soviet Union and Libya are at a high level, and both countries are fully determined to raise it even higher -- that was how A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, described the present state of Soviet-Libyan relations.

This was stated on 16 December in the Kremlin, when he received Kamil Hasan Mansur, secretary of the People's Bureau for Foreign Relations (minister of foreign affairs) of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, who is in the Soviet Union on an official, friendly visit.

The attention of K.H. Mansur was drawn to the persistent and wide efforts of the USSR aimed at ridding the planet of the threat of nuclear war in the speediest possible way, the demilitarization of space, strengthening mutual understanding between states, and creating a comprehensive system of international security, including in the Mediterranean.

It was stressed from the Soviet side that a complicated situation had arisen in the world which had posed the age-old question in all its magnitude: To be or not to be? Only now it applies to the whole of mankind and its demands from everyone — and primarily from statesmen — not stereotyped but new political thinking. It was an understanding of what would seem a simple but harsh truth that dictated the Soviet initiatives put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the Reykjavik meeting. His approach at the recent summit talks in Delhi was also permeated with this philosophy of peace.

It is truly deplorable that those people in Washington — who, it would seem, should carry their share of responsibility and a large share, at that, for the fate of the world — are continuing to cling to the dilapidated dogmas of the prenuclear age.

The Soviet Union, A.A. Gromyko stressed, will not be found wanting in determination to continue purposefully to try to achieve a radical change for the better in international affairs. All the Soviet initiatives and proposals on matters relating to averting the threat of war and to maintaining peace are directed toward this end. But no one should draw the wrong conclusions from our peaceableness. Illusions of this sort can lead to a false path fraught with serious political miscalculations incurring grave consequences.

K.H. Mansur declared that the purposeful foreign policy of the Soviet state is highly esteemed in the Libyan Jamahiriya. The USSR's proposals accord with the vital interests of all peoples and all states, regardless of the differences of opinion existing between them. The Libyan guest advocated expansion of cooperation between the socialist and nonaligned countries in the struggle to establish in international relations the principles of peace free from nuclear weapons and violence.

Present during the conversation were Yu.M. Vorontsov, USSR first deputy minister of foreign affairs; P.S. Akopov, USSR ambassador to Libya; and Muhammad Husni Sha'ban, secretary of the Libyan People's Bureau (ambassador) in the USSR.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

MOSCOW TV ON REYKJAVIK, EUROMISSILES, SALT II

0W130709 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0410 GMT 13 Dec 86

["Studio 9" program presented by Professor Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin, political observer of Soviet television and radio; with Professor Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin, first deputy chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee; Nikolay Ivanovich Yefimov, first deputy chief editor of IZVESTIYA; and political observer Vitaliy Ivanovich Kobysh--videotaped in the auditorium of the "Krasnyy Proletariy" machine-tool plant in Moscow; plant workers asking questions identified by screen captions]

[Excerpts] [Zorin] Hello comrades. Today's "Studio 9" program devoted to topical world political issues is being held at the Krasnyy Proletariy plant, one of the oldest Moscow enterprises with remarkable revolutionary and labor traditions. Well, for those who do not know it, I shall tell you that the plant produces the most modern machine tools, including robots, and highly qualified people work at the plant. Answers to questions of plant workers, engineers, and technicians will be given today by international affairs specialists -- Professor Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin, first deputy chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee; Nikolay Ivanovich Yefimov, first deputy chief editor of IZVESTIYA; and Vitaliy Ivanovich Kobysh, international affairs observer.

Many serious events are now taking place in the world; important political processes are in progress. I think that "Krasnyy Proletariy" plant people have questions connected with these events and these processes, and I am sure that these questions will interest you and will interest many of our television viewers. For this reason we decided to conduct this program at your plant. Let us begin with the questions. Who wants to ask a question? Please go ahead.

[N.Yu. Ogarev, deputy shop chief] I have a question. The year 1986 is drawing to a close. This year, the Soviet Union made many important proposals for reducing the threat of war, relaxing international tension. But Washington and its allies reject all these issues as a rule. Is it possible under such conditions to consider our efforts to be effective?

[Zagladin] In fact the year 1986 is a year in which our country has made so many proposals, initiatives never seen in the past. These initiatives cover all the basic

issues of stopping the arms race and disarmament, nuclear disarmament for the coming 10 years and for the period up to the year 2000, eliminating chemical weapons, and reducing conventional arms.

The second group includes proposals concerning reducing military activities in various parts of the world, for instance, reducing military activities in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The third group includes very far-reaching proposals on international cooperation in the most important fields. So the first part of the question is correct. The second part is also correct. As a rule the West does not accept our proposals, not from the very beginning at any rate. It cannot be said that they are rejected 100 percent. But on the whole they show a negative attitude, first of all to the basic proposals on disarmament and stopping the arms race.

Allow me now to ask you a question. Do you think we could expect to meet a different attitude from the very beginning? I do not think we could. We know very well that over many years our major initiatives in this field never met a positive attitude from the very beginning. Anything that could be achieved was done with great difficulty and was a result of a great struggle. That is understandable because the position of those who reject our proposals is not an occasional position, it is a position motivated by many causes. What do we place our hopes on?

We all know that when our leadership offers these proposals it understands perfectly all the motives for their rejection. Nevertheless, it submits them. Why? Let us now examine the other side of the issue. These circles, these military-industrial complexes and their allies, are very powerful but they are not all-powerful. We shall soon observe the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution. They have tried to liquidate us for 70 years. First they tried to encircle, rout, destroy us, and so forth. We all know this well. Nothing has come out of this. They also wanted to liquidate the other socialist countries, and have not managed to liquidate a single one. They wanted to rescue the colonial system; they did not succeed. It broke down and only separate enclaves have survived. We can be confident that they too will be liquidated.

In other words, the imperialists have had to admit their powerlessness in many issues. Now there is another clash, and this time it is a very serious and very responsible [as heard] one, because the stake in this clash is the survival of mankind.

If it is possible to impose on the imperialists the need to reduce the arms race, a major step will have been made in this direction. If that does not succeed, the danger of war will continue to grow. Therefore, it is understood that all forces, all potential must be mobilized to achieve progress here. Is there any success? Of course!

Let us take the year 1986, which is drawing to a close. This year, the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, a continuation of the Helsinki process, ended in success. We managed to agree on some measures dealing with the nonuse of force, on limiting military activities, and on the exchange of information concerning maneuvers and troop movements. All that strengthens certain foundations for peace in Europe.

Progress has been achieved in discussions on chemical weapons, and tangible progress to reach an agreement is being made. The Atomic Energy Agency conference, at which two major documents were adopted on safety measures at nuclear power plants and exchange of information on these issues, successfully closed in Vienna. This also has military and defense significance.

Serious progress has been made in our relations with Asian countries. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev recently made a visit to India. The mutual understanding achieved, the Delhi declaration signed there, is also progress along this route. So there are definite results. Well, there may be something else not very concrete, you may say, but which is very substantial. There has been a change in people's attitudes. A change in people's minds has begun. That is not a fast process. You know how difficult it is to change spiritually and mentally. Yet this process is going on.

[I.I. Maltsev, planing machine operator] A long enough period has passes since the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik to evaluate its significance. I have the following question: Has there been any improvement or deterioration in the international situation, or has it remained the same?

[Yefimov] It did not remain the same. It could not remain the same, because there was Reykjavik. Reykjavik led us to a completely different set of questions which, prior to Reykjavik, were thought to be unthinkable. Now, after Reykjavik, we can think and see on a larger scale: most importantly, we can be confident -- we now have reason for this -- that these proposals, these far-reaching proposals our country has made this year, are realistic.

Reykjavik has shown that they are not easily achieved, but we knew this from the very beginning. The situation is unquestionably different, nor can it be otherwise.

Reykjavik has been, in many aspects, a great disappointment. Hopes were not justified, that is true. However, if the question is to be put: Was it worth our while to go to Reykjavik, I would unhesitatingly answer in the affirmative. Reykjavik set the question in a most decisive way. Good. Everyone said, and Reagan said that, in the final analysis, he was for disarmament and liquidation of nuclear weapons. But these are generalizations. Here, on the other hand is a concrete program. One could say that a moment of truth occurred at Reykjavik. This moment of truth revealed a great deal. It revealed a great many serious and deep-rooted problems which we must solve, but even more so, the West must solve. First of all, it exposed those who really were for the liquidation of nuclear weapons and those who were against it, and what was against it. Above all, it revealed that the main obstacle on the path is SDI -- Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative or the Star Wars program. This became the stumbling block. Due to this obstacle, all agreements which, I repeat, were almost achieved, were not realized.

Finally, something else was revealed. If you wish, the weakness of the U.S. President. Over the past 40 years, the military-industrial complex made its profits above all from the manufacture of nuclear weapons. According to American sources, they earned \$750 billion from this. The sum is fantastic -- \$750 billion. But this nuclear klondike is being depleted. Already, both sides can destroy each other several times over. What point is there in increasing this arsenal another several times over? Say, the sides will be able to destroy each other not 7 times over, but 12 times? The picture does not change. Obtaining funds from the American taxpayer is becoming increasingly difficult. A new klondike is needed. SDI, from the point of view of the military-industrial complex, is precisely that new klondike which can provide the profits for the next 10 years, and not merely \$750 billion, but trillions of dollars. Sums of \$3 and \$4 trillion are being mentioned. This is several times greater.

You must understand that, in order for the U.S. President to say yes to our sincere, honest, and broad proposals, he needed to have enormous political courage, will,

character, and unquestionably, freedom of action. Whereas he was found to be hamstrung. It is not by accident that Shultz an hour later said one thing, 3 days later something else, and 5 weeks later, something else again. What they say 3 months hence, time will tell. This too was revealed at Reykjavik.

However, in my opinion what is most important is that Reykjavik has demonstrated that disarmament is possible. To achieve this, what is needed is simply a new way of thinking consistent with our new times. The problems we are faced with cannot be solved by the application of old thinking, of 19th and even 18th century thinking. Certainly, in this sense, Reykjavik has opened the eyes of millions and even billions of people to many things.

The process of disarmament is not simple. By no means simple questions were discussed at Reykjavik. These questions are not easily solved. I feel that any step in the right direction is important. Even half a step. Even a quarter of a step. Whereas, in Reykjavik it was not just a step forward that was achieved, but a significant jump. Now, after Reykjavik, we can only think in terms of going past that which was achieved there. Because, all other proposals are already being viewed as regressive. It is doubtful that this would please anyone.

[Kobysh] I think that, when speaking particularly about Reykjavik, we must not forget what it is precisely that is under discussion at the moment. There are two versions of what was discussed in Reykjavik. According to our version, the true version, the question of a total ban on nuclear weapons by the year 2000 was discussed. According to the U.S. version, banning of strategic weapons and ballistic missiles was discussed. In any case, the Americans were within a step of signing an agreement with us on banning nuclear weapons. Is this not in itself an enormous achievement, an enormous victory?

It has been said that it is difficult to deal with the present administration. Of course it is. Was it any easier to deal with the Truman administration when it was planning an atomic attack on the Soviet Union? When it was planning the Drop Shot plan and other actions? Was it easy then?

It became easier for us to deal with them when we achieved military parity. In Geneva, Reagan was forced to agree with the CPSU general secretary that a nuclear war was impossible, that there could be no victory in a nuclear war. In Reykjavik, he was forced — forced, because America and the world demanded this and the world could no longer exist without it — to speak about banning nuclear weapons in general.

This is a qualitatively new condition of mankind. This is precisely that change in thinking about which we started our talk. The world has changed since Reykjavik. New categories are now being discussed. We have already spoken about this, and I think that we are now entering a world which will be called the post-Reykjavik world.

[Zagladin] This post-Reykjavik world is both simpler and more complicated. It is simpler, because now we see the existing possibilities better. But it is more complicated, because now all those who were previously hidden, who previously did not openly display their position, are now doing this openly. We have already spoken here about Western Europe. The French and British position was not so clear prior to Reykjavik. Only when the cardinal solutions of the problems of missiles and nuclear arms in Europe became apparent, only then did they immediately show themselves as opponents of this decision. Prior to this, it was a different story. All supported, and everyone was in favor of the zero option. Nikolay Ivanovich spoke about this. But

now, their true colors are revealed. Therefore, there are now simpler things, forces, encouraged by Reykjavik, have entered the struggle, and there are those who have taken off their mask and revealed their true face.

[A.V. Kiryanov, tool setter] Could you tell us something about the Star Wars program, what it represents, and whether it can be taken seriously?

[Zorin] I shall attempt to answer this as briefly as possible. Reagan calls this the Strategic Defense Initiative; Senator Edward Kennedy flippantly called it the Star Wars program. Essentially, the idea involves an attempt to create an umbrella over the United States, which would prevent any missiles from reaching it by using various means to intercept all missiles directed at the United States during a large-scale war. In short, this is the idea. The second part of your question is whether this is possible. A majority, I would even say, the vast majority of serious scientists, including American, maintain that, in the forthcoming decades — not the next decade but several decades — this program, from the scientific point of view, is unrealistic, that today there is insufficient knowledge and technology to create this kind of reliable umbrella. Besides, even those believing this is possible say that it is perhaps possible to intercept 95 to 96 percent of the missiles launched. But specialists maintain that 5 to 6 percent of the missiles penetrating this umbrella is more than enough, as the specialists say, to cause irreparable damage to the United States.

Finally, specialists, both American and our own, maintain that asymmetrical, that is other, means exist to make this SDI program worthless. Asymmetric means we do not need to create our own umbrella. It is sufficient to resort to much cheaper and absolutely effective means to increase ways to overcome this umbrella. To make it functionally useless.

Why Washington continues to insist on this program and is already entering into it, despite the fact that all serious specialists maintain that, currently, the SDI program is unrealistic from a scientific and technical point of view, has already been spoken about by my colleagues.

[Zagladin] If indeed the creation of space umbrella, at the present level of equipment and technology, is impossible, what is possible is the creation of separate components of this umbrella. Which components? Laser weapons, which have already been created and the prototypes of which have already been tested; beam weapons — beams of directed high energy rays; kinetic energy weapons, accelerating metal objects, which can destroy certain targets, to incredible speeds; antisatellite weapons, which can destroy any orbiting satellite.

Even if the umbrella is not created, these weapons, which are already being made, and are 'y in existence, can be utilized, not only to defend against missiles, but for any reason as well. These weapons are real. What is not real is the plan — the absolute umbrella. But the weapons are real. Besides, the weapons are new and are capable of being put into space, operating with the aid of nuclear pumps, that is by means of nuclear explosions. What the consequences of the use of such weapons would be, nobody knows for sure. That is why our country, understanding this chimera, so to speak, from the point of view of its complete realization, is categorically against this new round in the arms race where, in effect, new types of weapons, hitherto unknown, are being created. We have put forward a proposal calling for a ban on the development and manufacture of any new type of weapon. I think this is the only correct approach to the question.

[N.D. Zhukov, fitter] What has provoked the scandal in Washington connected with the secret arms sale to Iran and, in your opinion, how will it end?

[Zorin] You have already read many reports on this scandal. I would like to draw your attention to one circumstance about which the American press, which now generally writes a lot about this and publishes much material on the subject, avoids mentioning one aspect of the affair. In order to answer this question, I think we should remember what happened in the seventies. Let us remember Watergate. Let us remember the history of the removal of President Nixon from the post of President. He was the protege of right-wing circles, the protege of Californian military-industrial corporations, the very same that now support the current President, a right-wing Republican, who at a specific stage fully suited the U.S. ruling class, including the military-industrial complex. Then Nixon, forced by circumstances, and taking into consideration the correlation of forces at that time, had to achieve some improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations, to reach major agreements and sign important agreements, which the military-industrial complex viewed as a threat to its profits. Do you remember what happened then? A scandal. A very ordinary scandal, according to Washington standards. By U.S. standards, there was nothing special in the installation of listening devices in the opposition headquarters. It was blown into a major political crisis, leading to Nixon being removed from power. He was removed from power because definite power circles, and particularly the military-industrial complex, saw in his actions a threat to themselves. What is happening now? For a period of 6 years, the Reagan administration followed a hard course, during which there were dozens of violations of various kinds, major and minor, of U.S. laws. A considerable number of people in the President's entourage were caught in illegal machinations. The administration as a whole violated existing laws. The President made statements, which were later found to be aimed at misleading U.S. society, and all that did not affect him. There was not a single major scandal. He was even given the nickname of the Teflon President.

Now President Reagan comes to Reykjavik, takes steps in line with common sense, we could say. He proceeds from some real issues and real circumstances, a realistic correlation of forces. You know that the matter concerns a bringing of positions closer in the issues of strategic arms, intermediate-range missiles, and nuclear arms testing. He takes definite steps, which frighten the military-industrial complex. Eventually Reagan dashes aside and does not take the final and last step for an agreement in Reykjavik. Moreover, on returning to the United States and finding serious discontent in the power circles -- apparently this can be supposed -- the administration started renouncing what had been achieved in Reykjavik. Reagan started making amends by coming out with strong anti-Soviet speeches, but it became clear -- at least I think so -- that it was too late. He had frightened definite circles in the military-industrial complex, which decided that he had overstepped permitted boundaries. Then an unquestionably ugly story, violating existing U.S. legislation, but a story no less loud than many during past years, is turning into a major political crisis.

I shall not assert that, in this given case, the affair will end as it did in the Watergate affair, and that President Reagan will be subjected to impeachment procedures and removed from the White House. I personally think that the U.S. ruling class will not now dare to take such an extremely damaging step. They have witnessed the damage caused by Watergate. I think the main reason for the political scandal which has now exploded in Washington -- and which, not accidentally, has been given the name Irangate through association with Watergate -- is to try to hamstring Reagan, to attempt to give him a hard lesson, so that steps like the ones the President took in Reykjavik would not recur.

[K.V. Shkarin, fitter-assembler] Could you tell us, please, what kind of reaction Reagan expected from the Soviet Union by violating the SALT II agreement, which occurred recently?

[Yefimov] I think he expected a very severe reaction. He thought that, if the United States does a bad thing — to put it directly — a provocative thing, then essentially the basis on which the process of disarmament has been built over the past 15 years is undermined. Apparently, he figured — not only he, but also those circles supporting him apparently figured — that we should respond straight from the shoulder. I am firmly convinced that our response — and our response was that currently the Soviet Union does not intend to violate SALT II and will adhere to the restrictions stipulated by the treaty — was a complete surprise to them.

This was obvious from the first reports, the first reactions of Western diplomats in Moscow in particular. Now, when we say currently, this means that our common sense, our patience, and our restraint cannot be taxed indefinitely. Nevertheless, we say currently, hoping that sensible forces in the United States — and the common sense of Americans was manifested particularly at the latest congressional elections — and sensible forces in Europe, in Western Europe, will eventually have their say. Our currently means that we want to give these forces a chance, a chance to have their say, so as not to let slip the historic opportunity existing today and to preserve this treaty, despite the fact that the United States has practically frustrated it.

[Zagladin] You know, comrades, that now our rivalry with the United States is proceeding on different levels. But, the main level lies in the fact that we are waging — and I do not really want to say an advance line, insofar as an advance is a somewhat singular one-time activity — a very consistent line aimed at achieving peaceful solutions. As my colleagues have correctly noted, it is better to take a step than to mark time, to take half a step or even a quarter of a step than to mark time, but we are constantly striving to move forward. We are constantly proposing new initiatives. If one is not suitable, we find another angle to this initiative, another point of view in order to keep moving forward.

Now, one of the tasks the U.S. Administration sees lies in derailing us from this path, making us flinch and blunder. You know how it can be in an argument. Someone blunders, and right away a fight ensues. No, we cannot allow this to happen. We shall continue to pursue our line, rebuffing calmly, without breakdowns, and without hysteria those hostile actions undertaken by the other side. The main thing is to calmly pursue our line without losing our cool, to strive for our aims.

[M.Ya. Kobrinskiy, technologist] I have a question on Euromissiles. This is an issue which possibly stirred all Europe in recent years, and it is now completely incomprehensible to me: How can the right-wing governments in Bonn, Paris, and London, after our Reykjavik proposals on Euromissiles which I consider sensational -- they were quite fantastic to me, I did not expect such proposals, you understand -- now suddenly completely reject these matters? This question is very disturbing to me.

[Yefimov] Indeed, it is hard for us to get used to the fact that there is so much hypocrisy, so many double standards, and a dual attitude in many Western positions and proposals. It is hard to get used to it. Now, when we took this and turned it around, you see, immediately all Western Europe, or rather the right-wing forces in Western Europe are at a loss what to do.

[Zorin] I think you are not alone in your perplexity; hundreds of thousands, and possibly millions, of Europeans are today just as perplexed as you. Therefore, the constructive position, the advancing and peaceful position of the Soviet Union besides everything else, helps the perception of truth and helps people to see the genuine features of those who have been hoodwinking them for many years, including their rulers and their reactionary politicians, and now, what is occurring, is also a moment of truth for many ordinary people in Europe.

[Yefimov] The late Olof Palme used to say that it is both the problem and the fortune of the Americans that they never really had to fight on their own territory. The Americans have got used to the fact that they are protected from the world by two huge oceans, which provide them with security. Wars, when they did occur, took place somewhere far away. This simplicity or complacency, which is to be found in the roots of history, is also being used by the present Reagan administration. Moreover, it is being used with dexterity.

[Zorin] Go ahead please!

[V.P. Fedyanin, foreman] I cannot entirely agree with the previous speaker that America has never fought on its own territory and therefore never felt anything. After Vietnam, it both received and felt a great deal.

[Kobysh] I also am not entirely in agreement with Nikolay Ivanovich when he says that the Americans still think that a world war and a nuclear war will take place elsewhere. That is all a matter of the past. They thought that way in the past. They do not think that way now. This is an absolutely new characteristic of contemporary American society.

The Americans feel that war has come closer to them, that it has become more real and they are beginning to smell gunpowder. You are right that, in this sense, Vietnam has helped Americans to see the light. Now, when the threat of nuclear weapons hangs over everyone, a majority of Americans lives in constant fear of the nuclear threat.

[R.Z. Zolotarev, electrician] I have the following question: As you know, in Reykjavik Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev proceeded from the assumption in his proposals that French and British nuclear forces, in balancing the overall nuclear forces in Europe, would not be considered. In that case, the following question may arise: It is known that France is actively testing and perfecting nuclear weapons, and it is possible that it will be increasing them quantitatively and therefore, by the end of the century, it could become a real force in the European military theater, which could develop. In this case, would this principle remain firm?

[Yefimov] You are correct. Even now, if taken in terms of the Hiroshima bomb, Britain and France have approximately 10,000 such bombs. Obviously, we cannot ignore this.

When we proposed our package in Reykjavik, and offered to reduce Soviet and U.S. intermediate-range missiles to zero, and to retain 100 missiles in our Asian part and on U.S. territory, we were making a compromise and not taking into consideration French and British missiles. That is true. But this does not mean that in the final analysis, we would close our eyes and would not take the British and French missiles into consideration. By the way, the Americans too would not agree to this. The goal at Reykjavik was to give an impulse to the talks, which were being held, or more accurately, were dragging out in Geneva. When

we introduced the package of proposals, we had in mind first of all the first half of this decade, the first 5 years. Of course, no one on our side could disregard 10,000 Hiroshimas, and obviously no one would accept this.

[A.A. Neshin, milling machine operator] It is now clear that the U.S. Administration did not support our moratorium on nuclear arms testing. In this connection a question and concern arises: How long shall we weaken our defensive capabilities with the unilateral moratorium, and generally was there any purpose in introducing that moratorium?

[Zorin] Nikolay Ivanovich, please.

[Yefimov] Yes. Well, your question is not a simple one and, insofar as the term of our moratorium is coming to an end, our government will not find it simple to solve this question. Was there or was there not any point in introducing the moratorium? I am convinced that it was worth it. It was worth doing it, if only for the reason that before we introduced it, there were very many false arguments, there was very much demagogic in the West. The moratorium has simplified understanding to the maximum, the understanding of the problem whether it is possible or necessary, and when it will be possible to ban all nuclear tests. It turned out that it is possible. The moratorium has exposed the essence of the problem, whether they like it or not. It is now extremely clear that they do not like it. Their rejection of the moratorium has very clearly, precisely, and convincingly shown everyone that they do not want it.

[Zagladin] Comrades, do you know how that change in the minds we have spoken about, that turn to new thinking began? Most probably with the moratorium. Because, previously our leadership spoke about our peaceful intentions, that we want to move forward. We were told that these were just words. You prove that. Two ideas were disseminated. First, the equal responsibility of the USSR and the United States for the confrontation and the arms race and second, the Soviet military threat. The moratorium was the first concrete act in the past year or 18 months after the April Central Committee plenum, the first concrete act which showed that we not only talk, but we also act. We act not without risk. We are taking a definite risk in order to really move along the road to the elimination of nuclear arms and really show our desire to move forward in practice. There were other steps after that. But that was the first step. Every extension of the moratorium was met with great relief in the entire world. People wanted to believe us and they were given proof. Yes, they can be believed. The question that was asked is justified of course, that possibilities for extending the moratorium are not limitless. The United States has gained definite advantages during this period while testing its arms. But at the same time there has not been any damage that could have been too noticeable. So it has not gained that great an advantage here, although it has gained some experience, of course. We cannot permit this to continue forever.

[V.S. Naydenov, metal worker] Well, I have been sitting here hearing that America is spending large amounts of money on arms for SDI. These are astronomic figures. My question is: Have they solved all their problems, have they nothing else to deal with? Or do they still have some problems?

Do they not have something good to do in the country and not engage in playing on the nerves of all mankind?

[Zorin] I shall try to answer your question briefly. It is fairly well justified on the whole. The question does arise: Do they really have nothing else to spend their

money on? After all, when you see homeless people on your television set — this is a national problem — please do not think that in our television reportages we hunt around for long in New York to find a homeless person, that we take a picture of some poor person and show it to you. It is not so. This is a mass problem. It is a problem of the homeless, a problem of the hungry, a problem of most substantial failures in the U.S. educational system, which are so serious that major U.S. scientists say that they will lose to competitors, to Japan and other countries, not in anything else but lose because they acutely lag behind in education, and the generation which is now completing education in U.S. colleges is badly educated and badly prepared for modern times. So you are correct, there are problems.

The matter lies elsewhere. The point is the Reagan administration is supported by circles which have linked their material welfare with the arms race. America today cannot provide both guns and butter. It has to choose, and money is short. I have said that the state debt is growing. The government, which is under the control and decisive influence of the military-industrial groups, sacrifices the people's interests, sacrifices the interests of millions of people for the sake of preserving the profits of the military-industrial complex. Here is the answer to your question. Go ahead, please.

[A.A. Kaltunchik, turner] What forecasts can be made on the situation in the world for 1987?

[Zagladin] Valentin Sergeyevich wants me to deal with forecasts now. Talking about what has taken place is simpler than about what will happen. Of course you can approach the question in the following manner -- there are some very global trends in development over a long period, let us say, 70 years after the October Revolution, or over a recent period of time after our congress. The trends are positive and it is possible to forecast that things will continue to be good in the future. But when you speak about the future it is necessary to take into consideration that it is not made up only of the main trends, but many opposing forces in action, including subjective ones, and for this reason it is necessary to consider different turns of events. Let us try to make such an excursion into tomorrow.

The main purpose of our enemies, American imperialists and other reactionary forces, when they started confrontation and intensified the arms race in the second half of the 1970's, was to weaken our country. On the one hand, the United States wanted to strengthen its positions in the world, to consolidate its dominance, including its dominance over its allies as well. But the main task was to weaken us, threaten us with war, and force us, as it said, to arm ourselves to death.

What forced them to such a decision? Many things, both the internal difficulties of imperialism, and also our problems.

Comrades, we must clearly realize and have documentary evidence that this switch to confrontation toward the end of the 1970's was linked particularly to the fact that the United States and the West noted an evident slowing down of our development, our accumulation of unsolved problems and they came to the conclusion that in these conditions it is necessary to exert pressure and press to the end [i dozhat].

Now they are looking from different positions. Despite the fact that a short period of time has elapsed and the improvement we have had is only a first step, it cannot be thought that we have passed the radical turning point. No, there is still a long way to go.

Nevertheless, the improvement is evident. Now they look and come to the conclusion that they may have been wrong, that it may not be possible to shake the Soviet Union, either with the aid of the arms race or any other means. If we wish 1987 to produce good results, then we shall have to continue our improvement, our perfection — and that is the most important thing, comrades. Every working hour or minute won, any improved product is a contribution to that money-box.

The second point is that much has depended and still depends on our foreign political activities. Here too it must be stated plainly if at the end of the 1970's and in the first years of the 1980's our activity had declined somewhat, yet we continued to expand our activities, but apparently not at the rate required by circumstances and without full consideration of all the new events which had taken place. That spurred our enemies. They used that and tried to prove that we are in a dead end or in a state of stagnation.

Now, beginning with the April plenum and especially the moratorium that we spoke of, with the 27th congress, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986 — from that moment, from the moratorium to the congress, from that moment our activity has been growing literally every month. If we wish 1986 to give us good results then that must be continued. You can have no doubt that it will be so.

Of course, a great role will be played by how our socialist community develops and the new basis of economic decisions adopted on cooperation, the development of joint production, and the creation of joint enterprises. In other words, we are moving to a higher level. Here of course a great role is played by the fact that our position on foreign political issues with the PRC is beginning to draw closer in many aspects, and in many issues we have practically identical positions. If we want 1987 to produce good results for us, this process too must be continued. This depends partly on you, because you supply equipment to fraternal countries. I have heard that they are satisfied with that equipment. The more actively we work together, particularly with Bulgarian comrades, and everyone else, the better the work will progress.

Another very important element and which has already shown itself this year and I think will continue to do so in the next is the position of the developing countries and nonaligned countries first of all. Here I would like to note the great role played by two events — the conference of nonaligned countries in Harare this year and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to India, the role of the Delhi declaration which was adopted there. In essence these two nations representing one billion people, the largest nonaligned country on the one hand and the largest socialist one on the other, outlined a document which has become, or rather more correctly, is becoming the platform of very broad actions of these two groups of states. They represent the absolute majority of the population of the world. Socialism and nonalignment represent the absolute majority of the population of the earth. They have a common platform, which is recognized or is being recognized more and more widely. That is a good guarantee for 1987.

Speaking as a sum total, next year will be a difficult one. Why? For us this is the year in which we will not only be celebrating the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, but will also be entering reconstruction in a deeper, tighter way. As of 1 January many of our new laws and resolutions will come into effect. This promises much for the future but it will not ease our tasks immediately and much effort must be made to truly make a dash forward.

In terms of international affairs following Reykjavik, we must go on further. To go forward is difficult, as we have said, but it is necessary. The struggle around this will keep growing. I think it will be a difficult year but will nevertheless bring us much good. I hope that both domestically and abroad we will manage to achieve serious improvements. The main thing, however, is still the home front. If on the home front things go as we plan, the way we want, then it will be so much easier for us to promote our line in the international arena.

[Kobysh] Finally, if you will allow me, I will once more return to Reykjavik, where we began, and which has become the symbol of a nuclear-free world, a world without nuclear weapons. I believe that we will attain such a world. Humanity will attain this. I wish to remind you of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's words during the talks with Mrs Brundtland, the prime minister of Norway: The Soviet Union will never retreat from Reykjavik. Reykjavik has led the situation of the arms race onto a totally new plane; and starting from this, it is possible, indeed necessary, to go only forward.

I feel that this is the crux of our discussion. But not the only one. The second crux is what we have just spoken about our work. More particularly about your work. It is you who are strengthening peace in the whole world. All hope now lies with you. You are not simply building robots here, possibly the world's and most advanced robots. You are building a peaceful life for our children and our grandchildren. You are building the future of civilization, a peaceful future for civilization. You should always remember this. We too will always remember this. Thank you very much.
[applause]

[Zorin] Our air time has come to an end. Obviously we managed to answer only some of the questions which interest you. But I think this is not our last meeting, at least on air. It remains for me to thank you, comrades, to thank my colleagues for the answers to the questions, and to thank the television viewers. So until we meet again in Studio 9. Thank you.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

XINHUA VIEWS 'FIERCE' U.S.-USSR CONTENTION OVER ARMS

OW180254 Beijing XINHUA in English 0239 GMT 18 Dec 86

[*"Year-Ender: A Year of Fierce Contention Between USSR and U.S. (by Tang Xiushan)" — XINHUA headline*]

[Text] Moscow, December 18 (XINHUA) — 1986 was a year of intensified confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States over disarmament, but despite a number of clashes the superpowers continued talking.

The November, 1985, Geneva summit of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan created an atmosphere of tentative detente. But as 1986 unfolded, events damaging to U.S.-Soviet relations soon piled upon one another and detente gave way to tension.

Trouble began in March when two U.S. warships intruded into Soviet territorial waters in the Black Sea. In April, U.S. bombers raided the Libyan cities of Tripoli and Banghazi, destroying Soviet-controlled missile bases. Moscow responded to the Libyan air raid by calling off a meeting between Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze and American Secretary of State George Shultz.

Throughout the year, political events were punctuated by rumblings under the Nevada desert, as the U.S. chose to ignore the Soviet Union's unilateral nuclear test moratorium and carried out several nuclear tests. Moscow's call for a comprehensive test ban went unanswered.

There was a series of tit-for-tat expulsions of alleged spies and the Reykjavik summit wound up on the rocks after Reagan refused to budge on his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Finally, the U.S. announced it would no longer observe the SALT-2 treaty on limiting strategic nuclear arms and rolled out its 131st cruise-missile-armed B-52 bomber.

Disarmament was at the heart of the Soviet-U.S. struggle. In 1986 the Soviet Union put forward a series of proposals including a step-by-step cutback plan that would eliminate nuclear arms by the end of this century. The U.S. also put forward proposals, but deep differences between the two sides resulted in an impasse at the Geneva nuclear arms control negotiations. Looking upon the stalemate in Geneva, Gorbachev suggested direct talks with Reagan in Reykjavik. In Iceland, Gorbachev insisted that the U.S. slow down space arms development by observing the anti-ballistic missile treaty for ten years and confining research into SDI, the Star Wars program, to the lab. But Reagan refused to yield an inch.

Both the disarmament talks and the Reykjavik summit showed that no number of lofty pronouncements about disarmament can disguise that the U.S. and the Soviet Union are still firmly locked in a struggle for military superiority.

The key problem in negotiations is space weapons. The United States is determined to use its superior technology and advanced economy to develop space weapons that will give it a strategic edge.

There are three good reasons Moscow has for trying to stop SDI: First, it will upset the military and strategic balance that now exists between the two superpowers; second, the massive research and development for Star Wars will widen the technological gap between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and have a positive economic spin-off for the U.S.; third, Soviet economic development and consumer production can only suffer if Moscow is drawn into an expensive space arms race.

Although neither side has changed its stand since the impasse at Reykjavik, the dialogue has continued. Recently Moscow expressed the hope that an agreement on disarmament can be reached between the Soviet Union and the United States during Reagan's terms of office, which ends in two years. The Soviets are anxious to reach an arms accord without delay. Military technology changes so quickly that it will be much harder to reach an agreement two years from now, and it is also impossible for Moscow to predict the mood of the U.S. Government that will take power when a new president enters the oval office in January, 1989.

What lies ahead are arms talks that will be unavoidably difficult.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRC JOURNAL SUMMARIZES 1986 DISARMAMENT TALK RESULTS

HK231513 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 50, 15 Dec 86 pp 26, 27

(Article by Li Nan (2621 2809): "Year-End Discourse on Disarmament")

[Text] As the year draws to a close, history will turn a page for next year. At this time, people always look back and review what happened in the world in the past year. Did events mean brightness or darkness? Did they bring hope to us or make us feel disappointed? But what people get is a mixed feeling as there was progress and prosperity to encourage us and wars, conflicts, hunger, and death to make us feel disheartened. All this shows that there was no peace on this small planet.

The keys to solving problems faced by man are mainly peace and development, which depend on each other for existence. The aim of pursuing peace is to promote development, and no development will be achieved without peace. The issues of peace and development influence everyone's thinking.

The issue of peace is more urgent because it involves saving humanity from catastrophe. Over the past year, voices calling for peace and disarmament could be heard in every corner of the world. The staggering amount of arms in the world was made and piled up with people's money earned by hard toil. But people must work harder for disarmament and limiting the arms race.

There must be disarmament talks in order to achieve disarmament. Over the years, series of disarmament talks could only achieve fruitless conclusions. It seems that the issue is a knotty one. The kinds of arms covered by the talks were so many that people felt confused, and the issue was so complicated that it was difficult for people to distinguish right from wrong. The talks came to a deadlock at one time but were resumed at another. Although the talks were declared unsuccessful in disarmament, they were said to have made progress in other areas. It was therefore very difficult for ordinary people to understand the issues behind the talks, even though they read the newspaper every day. Only the "disarmament experts" are familiar with the whole story of the talks and understand the crucial points. As the situation developed, they emerged and acted as think tanks for politicians. But the people who worked with the "disarmament experts" were their rivals -- the "arms experts."

Disarmament conferences and talks are an important business of the United Nations. Its General Assembly as well as the Political and Security Council discuss the disarmament issue each year. This year, they adopted 67 resolutions in connection with the disarmament issue. In 1978, the General Assembly convened the first special conference on disarmament. It will open the third special conference in 1987.

Conferences sponsored by the United Nations on disarmament also include the Geneva disarmament talks, which are held twice a year in spring and summer. Originally, the talks were alternatively chaired by the United States and the Soviet Union. Because of discontentment expressed by the participating countries, however, the talks were later chaired for a month in turn by the 40 participating countries. These countries proposed many bills and delivered numerous speeches. Quite a number of speeches gave brilliant expositions. But quite a considerable part of others were just diplomatic language that was understood and was just empty talk.

But this kind of disarmament talk at least brought us one or two advantages -- that is, to provide a forum for the participating countries. In order to avoid being the target of condemnation, the two superpowers were forced to spend much effort on the talks' preparation work.

The Stockholm disarmament conference is multilateral and participated in by 33 European countries, the United States, and Canada. Its title in full is the "European Conference on Establishing Trust and Safety Measures, and on Disarmament." It has entered the 11th round. In September this year, the conference reached an agreement that does not conform to its goal of convention; that is, the countries concerned should make notice to others before holding any large-scale military exercise and must be subject to ground and air examination.

NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the two major military groups of the world, also held talks on disarmament, which were the Central European Talks on Joint Balance and Reduction of Arms, which were also called the Vienna Disarmament Talks. Since 1973, over 400 meetings and 38 rounds of talks have been held, but none achieved any results and the talks continue.

The most significant talks are those held between the United States and the Soviet Union. The talks were first held in Helsinki, and some 120 sessions were convened. At the talks' conclusion, they signed the "U.S.-Soviet Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Missile Defense System." The venue of the talks was moved to Geneva in November 1972. By June 1976, some 300 sessions were convened and the 2 countries eventually signed the "Second Stage Convention on the Limitation of Strategic Arms." Though the convention's 5-year effective period had already expired, the U.S. Congress still has not adopted the convention.

In 1982, the two countries reopened their talks, but declared adjournment at the end of the following year. It was not until the beginning of last year that the two countries' foreign ministers agreed on resuming the talks. In addition, they formed three groups for participating in the talks on strategic arms, the talks on medium-range nuclear arms, and the talks on space weapons.

The talks between the two countries at a higher level were between the two countries' foreign ministers and leaders. After World War II, the U.S. and Soviet leaders met 12 times. The leaders always met when talks between the two countries' foreign ministers and so on came to a deadlock, or sometimes they met in order to approve the achievements made by the talks. In October this year, Reagan and Gorbachev met at a preparatory meeting in Iceland before the convention of a formal meeting. The atmosphere was quite good at the beginning, but it eventually became an unsuccessful session.

In other words, little has been achieved though the disarmament talks have been held for several decades and in various forms. It is no wonder that people of insight are worried about the future of world peace.

Nevertheless, both the United States and the Soviet Union proposed numerous plans on disarmament, including the renowned Zero Option, plans of reducing strategic arms by stages, plans of freezing the scale at the present level before disarmament, and so on. Only a few plans became agreements, still less were implemented. The reason for this is because both countries always want to maintain and develop their own superiority while limiting and undermining the superiority of their rival. It was just as Sun Tze said: "To make your rival soldiers yield to your pressure without fighting is the best strategy." [paragraph continues]

It is not that the goal of gaining victory without fighting a war will be achieved if one can undermine one's rival's superiority at the disarmament talks?

This makes one remember an ironic fable in which after a period of fierce fighting, the beasts of a forest wanted to make peace. But when holding talks on reducing the weapons of fighting, both the tiger and the elephant had plans for their own advantage: The tiger suggested banning the use of the trunk as a weapon, and the elephant proposed plans of prohibiting the use of claws. While both the tiger and the elephant agreed on prohibiting the use of other weapons, they always came to a deadlock whenever discussing issues concerning these "weapons."

The fact that the change of attitude toward the U.S.-Soviet summit in Iceland in October from optimism to pessimism proves the significance of this fable. The two countries may reach agreement on matters that are not the crucial ones. But neither of them will make any compromise on the key issues. At present, "Star Wars" is an important part of the current arms race. Compared to this, other weapons like medium- and short-range missiles become a bit inferior. Time and again, Reagan said that his attitude toward the "Star Wars" issues was resolute and steadfast.

The United States started the "Star Wars" program in 1983. If the program becomes successful, it will have no decisive significance on whether the Soviet Union has several extra missiles or the United States has fewer missiles. Therefore, both parties may reach an agreement on the number of missiles. When the talks involve the "Star Wars" program, however, the United States becomes steadfast in its position. On the other hand, the Soviet Union presses the United States hard.

In November, both parties made their stand more obvious at the Vienna conference of the U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers. The Soviet foreign minister urged the United States to give up the "Star Wars" program because the United States used it to "strive for military superiority." The U.S. Secretary of State expressed that the United States would under no circumstances give up the program because it was used to maintain a balanced situation with the Soviet Union. The secretary of state said: The Soviet Union "simply focuses on a single issue"; that is, to "weaken our strategic defense program."

It is as simple as this. In order to maintain superiority, one uses weapons that are under development in exchange for weapons of the opposite party that have been developed. This is the root cause for being unable to make any concrete achievements or reach any agreement despite protracted U.S.-Soviet talks. After understanding this, we can therefore have a general idea about the atmosphere of the talks in future.

Last year, the Soviet Union announced nuclear tests and urged the United States to make the same response. But the United States did not agree. This is because the "Star Wars" program requires nuclear tests.

The United States has gained superiority in strategic bombers, and the Soviet Union has gained superiority in short-range missiles. Therefore, the Soviet Union suggested destruction of the former weapon, but the United States made an opposite counterproposal. As a result, nobody's proposal satisfied the other party.

At present, the focal point of the U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks, as well as the people's attention over the world, is on the competition in space. The United States has invested over U.S. \$4 billion in development. According to the analysis of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the development scale of the Soviet Union was similar to that of the United States. Additionally, in Europe, France proposed the "Eureka Program." It simply makes one ask when the arms race will end.

Though there are setbacks in the disarmament talks, both the United States and Soviet Union are unwilling to make the talks break down, for this causes condemnation by world opinion, as well as questions their responsibility to their people. In addition to the "war of talks," both parties are engaging in the "propaganda campaign." This is because neither country wants to be criticized by the world as a bellicose element.

Whenever the talks become unsuccessful, the following occurs: Each puts the blame on the other party, acknowledges that there is a setback but never admits complete failure, makes new proposals and impresses people that new concessions have been made, and then leaves room for the next talks.

Since World War II, disarmament talks have been constantly held. But the amount of weapons also constantly increased and their quality keeps on being improved. After years of experience, one will easily find that the arms race and disarmament talks are just the two sides of a coin, which can easily be turned to the other side.

In the future, the disarmament talks will continue to be held. This is better than nothing, and it is better to reach agreements on some issues rather than reaching a stage of complete deadlock. It is also better to reduce some nuclear weapons rather than having them increase in number.

We must also realize that the strength of peace in the world is gaining more power. Many countries in the Third World and Europe oppose war. This year is the United Nations' Year of Peace, in which people of the world cried for peace in great strength and impetus. This is the strength of checking the arms race.

The people of the world hope that the two superpowers will take the lead in disarmament and that they will make achievements in the disarmament talks. In the year ahead, there will still be disarmament talks and the past situation will be repeated. Though the "International Year of Peace" in 1986 will pass away, the strength of peace will continue to grow and the struggle for peace will further surge.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRC PEOPLE'S DAILY ON U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS

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[("Year-End Feature" by Shi Jinkun (4258 6930 0981) and Cao Ye (2580 0396): "Three Ups and Downs in The U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Talks" — first paragraph is RENMIN RIBAO introduction, capitalized passages published in boldface)

[Text] Having seen ups and downs on three occasions over the past year, the U.S.-Soviet arms control talks have been quite changeable. The disarmament proposals between both parties have come closer, showing some definite signs of progress. However, they are more nominal than substantive. The differences on crucial issues are still serious. Having their eyes on the possession of a "technological commanding height" and motivated by internal and external demands, the United States and the Soviet Union are likely to reach some agreements on nuclear disarmament. But they will never relax efforts to gain superiority. The people of the world have attained some results in their struggle for disarmament and there is a louder voice calling on the two superpowers to take the lead in drastically reducing their armaments.

In 1986 U.S.-Soviet arms control talks have been so changeable that they have dramatically undergone ups and downs on three occasions. If people make an analysis of the fluctuations, it will not be difficult to find out that their proposals are more nominal than substantive and that they are lacking in sincerity. The difference is that, pressured by the people's opposition to the arms race and activated by their own internal and external demands, the two countries have never suspended the arms control talks. Compared with last year, new changes have been made in some aspects and there have been varying degrees of progress.

THE FIRST UPS AND DOWNS. On 15 January, in a wide-ranging new proposal, Gorbachev called for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in three stages by the year 2000 and the complete destruction in 5-8 years of the U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles deployed in Europe. Moreover, he no longer stuck to the position of placing the Soviet SS20 missiles on a reciprocal basis with the British and French nuclear forces. Although the United States also put forward a counterproposal on destroying all medium-range missiles in 3 years, it strenuously tried to force the Soviet Union to make more concessions under the pressure of U.S. strength. It also increased financial allocations for the "Star Wars" program and continued its nuclear tests. It stated on 27 May that its arms development would not be subject to the limitations of the SALT II treaty. [paragraph continues]

The endless debate on this issue between both parties caused the talks to bog down. Moreover, because of the U.S. air raids on Libya, the U.S.-Soviet foreign ministers' meeting originally scheduled for April was suddenly called off.

THE SECOND UPS AND DOWNS. On 11 June, at the fifth round of the arms control talks in Geneva, the Soviet Union again put forward a new disarmament proposal. It called on both the United States and the Soviet Union not to withdraw from the antiballistic missile treaty and for the first time agreed that the United States might engage in research on the Strategic Defense Initiative at the laboratory research level. It set down new limits on reducing strategic nuclear weapons on both sides and agreed not to include the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe's forward positions in the category of strategic weapons. It also indicated its willingness to freeze the Soviet medium-range missiles in the Asian region. Seeing that the Soviet Union had made new concessions, the United States made a positive response. On 26 July, Reagan proposed that both parties conduct research in strategic defense for 7 and 1/2 years within the limits permitted by the antiballistic missile treaty. The conciliatory attitude of the Soviet Union and the United States at that time increased the atmosphere of optimism. However, there was a sudden change in the situation. Following the spy incident in August and September, both sides increasingly traded recriminations. Consequently, the talks met with new obstacles.

THE THIRD UPS AND DOWNS. On 11 and 12 October, the Soviet and U.S. leaders held a meeting in Iceland. They engaged in an all-out and comprehensive contest on arms control issues. They began haggling over easy issues and then moved to the hard ones, and for a time had almost identical positions on restricting and reducing nuclear weapons. At the last moment, however, Gorbachev resolutely demanded that the United States restrict its research on the "Star Wars" program to the laboratory for 10 years. Otherwise, he said, he would not come to any agreement with the United States. Reagan indicated that he would not be able to agree to the Soviet demand aimed at strangling the "Star Wars" program.

Since then, both the Soviet Union and the United States have adjusted the concessions they made. Demanding more, the United States has raised anew its proposal for reducing the maximum numbers of different categories of heavy land-based guided missiles. Apart from this, it decided on 25 November to overstep a limit stipulated in SALT II by arming its 131st B52 bomber with long-range Cruise missiles. The Soviet Union reacted with a warning that this U.S. move had made it more difficult for the two sides to seek common ground. This year's last (the sixth) round of Geneva arms control talks has been fruitless as a result of all this.

The U.S.-Soviet arms control talks have been beset with difficulties and complications over the past year. However, compared with those in 1985, the talks in 1986 have yielded some notable results. They are: The differences over the medium-range missiles and test ban issues have been basically settled, their positions are closing up at the strategic nuclear arms talks, and they have shown considerable flexibility on the space arms issue. All this is a reflection of their readjusted strategic objectives in the disarmament issue.

Since the advent of the 1980's, the United States and the Soviet Union have introduced a "high-ground [gao bian jiang — 7559 6708 3984] strategy" and a "development acceleration strategy" in their attempts to take the "technological commanding height" and to boost their overall national strength. Now, space arms are gradually replacing nuclear arms as the focus of the arms race between the two countries. All this has produced pressure on their economic development and on the development of their bilateral relations. However, trying to gain the diplomatic initiative and to improve their images, both the Soviet Union and the United States show that they hold high the banner of disarmament. (paragraph continues)

If some agreements can be reached between them, they will be able to alleviate some of their external and internal pressure and solve some of their economic difficulties. In addition, before 2000, it would be rather impossible to finish building the strategic defense system and their nuclear strength will remain balanced and in a "super-kill" [chao sha 6389 3010] state. As far as the Soviet Union and the United States are concerned, an appropriate reduction in the number of nuclear arms is out of the question from a security point of view. Precisely because of all this, the Soviet Union and the United States have always tried to introduce some flexible measures whenever their dialogue meets with obstructions, in order to avoid situations like the suspension of the talks in 1983.

Although they are trying to seek compromise, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has given up their attempt to develop themselves and to contain the other. Contention remains intense. The U.S. refusal to shelve the "Star Wars" research is a reflection of the Reagan administration's intention to achieve supremacy and to contain the Soviet Union economically by resorting to its more advanced technology. On the other hand, the Soviet attempt to force the United States to make concessions on the "Star Wars" program by means of a nuclear disarmament treaty is a reflection of its intention to hold back the United States and to allow itself a breathing spell. This is why they are such a pair of strange bedfellows who find it difficult to settle their differences over the major issues. In addition, the influence of their allies and their domestic politics can also significantly affect the talks. These factors dictate that the Soviet-U.S. arms control talks will be beset by difficulties and complications.

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CSO: 5200/4042

SALT/START ISSUES

MOSCOW COMMENTARY ON U.S. 'ABANDONING' SALT II

LD231528 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1115 GMT 23 Dec 86

["Ideas of Reykjavik and U.S. Actions" program, presented by commentator Andrey Ptashnikov, with TASS military observer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Excerpts] [Ptashnikov] There is seemingly no danger in the introduction of only one additional nuclear weapons' carrier in excess of the level stipulated by the SALT II Treaty, if the treaty permits possession of 2,400 carriers, with 1,320 of them allowed to have MIRVed warheads or to carry cruise missiles.

[Chernyshev] Right, strictly speaking this is true. Nothing out of the ordinary happened at first sight — the United States had 130 heavy bombers fitted with cruise missiles, now they have 131; what is the big deal? This only led to an increase of some fractions of a percent in the potential of the U.S. strategic bomber force, and in terms of strategic nuclear forces as a whole, even less than that. Perhaps that is not perfectly right, but there still is nothing terribly wrong with it. Right, it seems to be true. The addition of one more bomber carrying cruise missiles, to the U.S. nuclear arsenal has not effectively impaired the approximate military balance of the USSR and the United States. But what is involved, however, is not just one aircraft. The point is, the Washington administration is derailing the agreed-upon legal system securing a military parity between the Soviet Union and the United States, and this system has been curbing the strategic arms race over a number of years.

Having trampled upon the SALT II treaty, Washington acted as a violator of the process of cardinally reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons, and did this in the most cynical way. It is destroying the very foundation of that process. The repercussions of the relinquishment of the treaty by the United States are quite far-reaching. First, it means that Washington abandons the principle of equitability and equal security, which was laid in the foundation of the treaty.

[Ptashnikov] Vladimir Nikolayevich, what precisely are the objectives pursued by the U.S. Administration in connection with their abandoning the SALT II treaty? How can their moves be assessed in the light of the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Reykjavik, and how would they affect the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons?

[Chernyshev] The decision to increase its strategic means arsenal and to cross out the SALT II treaty is dictated by nothing else than by Washington's desire to achieve military superiority. The Reagan administration long been undertaking actions obviously violating the treaty. Thus, for instance, in ignoring the special limitations envisaged by the protocol attached to that treaty, the United States has embarked on mass deployment of long-range cruise missiles. Washington also tiptoed around the treaty, having deployed medium-range missiles in Western Europe, missiles which are a direct extension of the U.S. strategic potential. And now Washington has decided to get rid of the treaty altogether, because the latter has become a serious obstacle on the path of fulfilling military programs.

In precisely the same way, plans and interests of the U.S. military and industrial complex come into conflict with another very important treaty — that on limiting the antimissile defense systems, or the ABM Treaty, as we call it. The United States has conceived the creation of a widespread system of antimissile defense with space-based elements, the system of strike space weapons. That is why the ABM Treaty is, for the U.S. Administration, the next target after the SALT II treaty. The administration has now started shaking this treaty loose as well.

The breach of the SALT II treaty and the attempts to do the same with the ABM Treaty are constituents of a single design. Through stepping up their strategic offensive forces they want to create opportunities for dealing a first disarming strike. Through setting up a space shield, they aspire to protect themselves from a retaliatory strike of retribution.

It is also quite revealing that the U.S. Administration has decided to deal a blow on the structure of fundamental accords in the field of limiting strategic armaments precisely at the moment that a prospect for normalizing the international situation finally emerged. The Soviet program for eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2000 has met with wide understanding and an encouraging response throughout the world. The initiatives put forward on its basis and brought by our country to the meeting in Reykjavik, opened real ways for achieving a nonnuclear world. The premise for a turning point in the entire international situation emerged. The fact that the U.S. Administration chose precisely that moment to torpedo the SALT II treaty cannot be seen as anything else but a major provocation, an attempt to arrest the tendency for relaxing international tensions.

[Ptashnikov] Valdimir Nikolayevich, as is known, the Soviet Government declared that the Soviet Union, for the time being, would refrain from walking out from the accords on SALT I and SALT II. Could the unilateral adherence to these accords affect the security of our country, and for how long can the Soviet Union restrain itself? Judging from letters, a great number of our listeners are concerned with this issue.

[Chernyshev] Basically, you are right. It is a very serious and a very important question. The Soviet Union naturally had all grounds for relinquishing — and relinquishing automatically — the relevant obligations of the treaty and the accord, which are being dismantled by the United States. If one was to be guided by emotions alone, perhaps that would be the right thing to do. The Soviet leadership, however, was proceeding from different considerations when examining the issue, that is, from sensibly made estimates, from the inner logic of our policies. It thoroughly considered the political, military, and — I would even say — moral aspects of the situation which is shaping itself. It arrived at the conclusion for the need to make extra efforts in order to protect mankind from the threat of slipping onto the track of

strategic chaos. Having declared that the USSR will, for the time being, adhere to the limitations, the Soviet side proceeds from the enormous universal significance of that issue, from the same noble and humane motives that stand behind our program for eliminating all nuclear weapons — the Soviet 18-month-long moratorium on any nuclear explosions — behind the large-scale compromise proposals of the Soviet Union in Reykjavik.

The Soviet Union has declared that it will be following very closely the actions of the United States with regard to parity and whether it is affected by excessive loads by the U.S. military programs. All actions undertaken by the USSR, including those which are unilateral, have been thoroughly thought out and weighed, in order not to jeopardize the security of our country. The Soviet leadership has stated firmly that it will not tolerate U.S. military superiority over the Soviet Union.

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CSO: 5200/1191

SALT/START ISSUES

TASS: U.S. VIOLATION OF SALT II POSES 'DANGER'

LD161818 Moscow TASS in English 1752 GMT 16 Dec 86

(Text) Moscow December 16 TASS -- Military news analyst Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

In their recent message to President Reagan 57 American senators expressed concern at the U.S. Administration's rejection of the SALT-2 treaty. The senators qualify this step taken by the White House as being detrimental to the national security of the United States.

Indeed, the threat to the whole world increases and in this respect the United States is no exception.

The wrecking of the structure of restraining the race in strategic offensive arms would have unpredictable consequences. In the SALT-2 treaty and the SALT-1 agreement there are many provisions enabling the USSR and the United States reliably to monitor the development of the strategic situation. Each side has a possibility to predict what can happen in the strategic field on the other side and know that this can not transcend certain limits. And it is this that ensured strategic stability and impeded the possibility of disrupting parity by drastically building up strategic offensive arms.

Then there is yet another very important aspect of the Soviet-American accords on the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The SALT-2 treaty bans the creation of impediments to national technical means of verification of the other side, in particular, observation satellites and also the masking of strategic arms. In the absence of the treaty any side can consider itself free of these obligations as well and create additional difficulties for the other side in evaluating its strategic offensive forces and, I would even say, intentions. This is another factor that will enhance instability, a drastic decline in trust and a growth of suspiciousness with all the ensuing consequences. There arises the danger of a sort of strategic chaos.

The White House clearly did not give all this much thought. Trying to make up to the extreme right-wing circles in the United States for his "two-day infatuation" with a vision of a nuclear-free world in Reykjavik, the President evidently decided to show these circles that he not only does not intend to press for many progress along the road to limiting and eliminating nuclear arms but even intends in the remaining two years in office to make a serious effort to put an end to the existing agreements and totally wreck the existing regime of restraining the arms race. More than that, he thereby tries to fetter also the future administrations to the arms race. But such a policy poses a danger to the whole world, including to the United States.

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CSO: 5200/1191

SALT/START ISSUES

TASS CRITICIZES WEINBERGER SPEECH ON SALT II

LD121801 Moscow TASS in English 1752 GMT 12 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 12 TASS — By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev:

Casper Weinberger first lashed out at SALT, they say, when he did not even know what the acronym stood for.

And his comments on SALT since he took charge of the Pentagon suggest that he still believes that the 1979 treaty on the limitation of strategic arms did not provide for any cuts in nuclear weapons systems.

The impression, however, may be false.

It is more probable that the present U.S. defense secretary, who is opposed, for "ideological reasons", to any agreements with the Soviet Union has been deliberately playing the simpleton and making warped interpretations of the substance of this treaty.

Weinberger once called it a "pseudo-agreement" on arms control. But now that the White House is facing strong opposition to its decision to undercut SALT-1 and SALT-2 both in the United States and abroad, the Pentagon chief is pretending to be an advocate for cuts in strategic arms and feigning concern about the fate of treaties on lessening the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.

Speaking at the American Legislative Exchange Council in Washington, he went out of his way to assure world opinion that President Reagan, who has repeatedly declared his dislike for the SALT treaties, had also gone "the extra mile" in an effort to save them.

Weinberger claimed the United States was going to press for serious, drastic cuts in arms.

In practice, however, the U.S. present leaders have not only been wrecking one agreement signed by their predecessors after another but also backing out of accords they have themselves agreed to.

Seeking to justify its obstructionist posture on war and peace, Washington has lately issued forth an unprecedented torrent of such disinformation, distortions and outright lies as make the Irangate garbling seem a child's play.

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CSO: 5200/1169

SALT/START ISSUES

MOSCOW: WEINBERGER JUSTIFIES SALT II STANCE

LD140403 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 13 Dec 86

[Vladimir Pasko commentary]

[Text] The U.S. military-industrial complex is launching a new anti-Soviet campaign while extorting money for the implementing of militarist programs. That is how the AP news agency is assessing the statement of Secretary of Defense Weinberger made on Friday at a meeting of women representatives of the Republican Party in the Congress. Over to the commentator, Vladimir Pasko:

[Pasko] Weinberger laid the main stress in his speech, steeped in anti-Sovietism, on justifying the United States' abandoning of SALT II. The vast majority of Americans, including Republicans, are condemning the administration for this step. I shall remind you that in its parting words to the President just before the Reykjavik meeting the Congress demanded that the treaty be preserved. The administration has none the less embarked upon withdrawing from it. How is it now justifying its actions? There is nothing new in this. There are the same slanderous allegations about the creating [sозданиe] by the Soviet Union of an intercontinental ballistic missile, banned by the treaty, and about coding of telemetry in the testing of missiles, in circumvention of the agreement, and a certain exceeding of the limits on strategic delivery means for nuclear weapons. All this has been convincingly refuted by us many times. What is no less important, the groundlessness of these accusations has been noted frequently by Western experts, including American ones as well. Of course the point here is not the violations that they attribute to us. The only reason that the United States has renounced the treaty is that it began to hamper militarist circles. As the paper THE BOSTON GLOBE noted reasonably in connection with this, if the administration were really interested in arms control [kontrol nad vooruzheniyami] and it was concerned about observing accords, then it would, as the responsible approach to matters demands, try first and foremost to settle contentious issues. Instead of this, it has stated that it no longer intends to adhere to the conditions of the treaty and has even stressed that it does not intend to discuss its own complaints. Today the U.S. Administration's representatives, foaming at the mouth, and without standing on ceremony in expressing themselves are once again trying to convince both their allies and fellow countrymen of the threat from the east.

Commenting on Weinberger's anti-Soviet attacks, AP links them directly with the forthcoming discussion in the Congress of the Pentagon's budget requests for 1988 fiscal year. There is doubtless a link. But this is not only the point as it seems to me. In Washington, judging by everything, they did not expect that the Soviet Union would respond to the United State's abandonment of the SALT II with a statement on its

adherence to its provisions. This confuses the cards of the militarists. For however they hush up the policy of the Soviet Union, however they slander it, the fact remains that the United States has broken the treaty and not the Soviet Union, and the responsibility for the wrecking of this exceptionally important agreement is carried by no one other than Washington. There they are trying to keep Americans from realizing this, but it is apparent that it is becoming increasingly difficult to do this.

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CSO: 5200/1191

SALT/START ISSUES

IZVESTIYA REJOINDER TO WEINBERGER CHARGE OF USSR SALT BREACHES

PM151333 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Blinov "Rejoinder": "Knife Attack on the Truth"]

[Text] Washington—Not for nothing did U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's colleagues give him the nickname "Cap the Knife." He has a sharp tongue and he likes to use it. The victim is invariably the truth.

He has just been demonstrating his destructive propensity. Weinberger has been hawking "Star Wars" around Western Europe, trying diligently to persuade his NATO colleagues to step on the gas in the arms race. References to the trumped-up "Soviet threat" were a constant refrain in his speeches. Weinberger really went to town when he got home. Scarcely had he unpacked his bags when he dashed onto the platform — in this case at the U.S. Council for the Exchange of Legislators. In his speech Weinberger accused the USSR of... "overt and systematic violation of the SALT II treaty" (!!) and of intending to violate the ABM Treaty. At the same time he criticised agreements on limiting strategic armaments, stating that they "encouraged the arms race." That is why the United States apparently gave the USSR an important warning by bringing into service the 131st heavy bomber equipped with cruise missiles. In so doing, as is known, the United States exceeded the threshold established by the SALT II treaty, thus cramping upon it.

As the Soviet Government statement in connection with the U.S. SALT II violation says, the Soviet Union has always strictly and honestly observed all articles and all provisions of the SALT II treaty and other international agreements, and even in the present conditions it intends, for the time being, to refrain from exceeding the limitations under the SALT I agreement and SALT II treaty.

So Weinberger's slanderous statement is nothing but a desperate gesture, an attempt to disorientate the world public. When he went to Europe Weinberger was able to see for himself how strongly the peoples are condemning the U.S. Administration's irresponsible actions. Broad political and public circles in the United States have also reacted negatively to this step. This mood was reflected in the resolution adopted the other day at a session of Democratic members of the House of Representatives. It proposes that the Democratic leadership embark on preparing a legislative act obliging the administration to resume observance of the SALT II treaty. Some eminent Democratic senators came out in favor of adopting similar legislation. According to THE WASHINGTON POST, the stance adopted by the Democratic Party, which from January will

control both houses of Congress, means that the White House faces the danger of confrontation in conditions where its authority has been seriously undermined by the "Irangate" political scandal.

In the grip of a political crisis the White House is taking one reckless step after another. And in self-justification the government leaders are resorting to more and more packs of lies. The U.S. secretary of defense's gratuitous pronouncement is graphic evidence of this approach.

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CSO: 5200/1169

SALT/START ISSUES

USSR: REPORT ON SALT II BREACH, GENERAL's REACTION

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 49, 15 Dec 86 p 5

[Text]

At 11 hours 59 minutes on November 28, 1986, the 131st B-52 bomber took off from the Kelly air base, San Antonio, where it had been converted, and headed for the Carswell air base, Texas, to be armed with nuclear cruise missiles there. The U.S. thus exceeded the quota set by SALT-2. The move came as part of Washington's persistent efforts to undermine the present system of strategic stability.

It will be recalled that in 1979 the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. committed themselves, in Vienna, to an agreement not to seek military superiority as it would bring only dangerous instability, generating higher levels of armaments with no benefit to the security of either party. The leaders of the two states gave this solemn pledge when signing SALT-2 in the Austrian capital. For the first time ever in the arms limitation process, the treaty set a quota of arms totals for both sides. The ceiling for intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, submarine-carried ballistic missile launchers, and heavy bombers armed with cruise missiles and air-to-ground ballistic missiles with ranges of over 600 km was set at 2,400 units.

Since the signing of SALT-2, the opponents of disarmament in Washington have been determined to destroy the letter and spirit of the treaty which they find abhorrent. First, the Senate refused to ratify it. Subsequently, efforts were made to bury the treaty by which both sides had agreed to abide.

Here is an example. In June 1985 the

National Security Council met in a session to decide the fate of SALT-2 which interfered with the commissioning of the latest weapons. Defence Secretary Casper Weinberger, a civilian, objected to it on the grounds that it was "senseless." Even the Joint Chiefs of Staff winced at the epithet. The generals were more discreet and suggested to the President that the U.S. should observe the treaty, but feel free to violate some of its provisions.

A year later the issue of SALT-2 observance crept up again, in connection with the routine testing of another Ohio-type submarine. At that time the White House did not venture beyond the limits set by SALT-2, but threatened to do so when arming another B-52 with cruise missiles. "The President has travelled the last mile, we are no longer bound by that flawed agreement," Weinberger said. The last mile was travelled late in November. The breaching of the treaty caused a considerable stir. The traditional allusions to SALT-2 violations by the Soviet Union did not work this time—many Congressmen were indignant at the White House's arbitrary decision. The Senate and the House of Representatives supplemented a war budget bill with a call to the government to continue to observe SALT-2 which, in their opinion,

served the interests of U.S. security. Many U.S. allies in NATO also insisted on its observance, as had been the case on many previous occasions.

What is making Washington bust the treaty now that Reykjavik has held out the prospect of getting the nuclear disarmament issue out of its blind alley and that Soviet initiatives have won widespread recognition? One thing is clear: Washington is determined to undermine the opportunities of reaching an agreement. By showing open defiance to the Soviet Union, it incites us to complicity in the arms race and seeks to wrest concessions from the U.S.S.R. at negotiations. Finally, the move is a reaction to "Trinagle." Responsibility for it is borne not so much by the President, of course, but by those whose interests he represents. It is the forces behind him that are gambling on international stability, unmindful of the dangerous consequences their actions could have both for the American people and the world.

[REDACTED] *U.S. Ambassador's despatch, 16 October 1983, reprinted in our request, by [REDACTED] (signature) PAVLOV*

"The decision to breach SALT-2 is a new manifestation of U.S. power politics. I would call it a reckless move dictated, to my mind, by the interests of the military-industrial complex who are seriously worried by the glimmer of a hope of reaching an agreement emanating from Reykjavik. Washington has plainly demonstrated its intention to reduce to nought the progress made in the field of arms limitation and reduction in the 1970s, and of the Reykjavik summit.

"A legitimate question arises: how can one reach a new agreement by trampling previous ones underfoot. It is time the U.S. leadership realized that SALT-2 is of equal benefit to the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Attempts to justify this adventurous move by allusions to imaginary violations of the treaty by the U.S.S.R. are untenable. I think Washington should harbour no illusions as to any possibility of gaining military superiority over the Soviet Union in that way. We shall certainly never allow the military-strategic balance to be upset. By undermining the SALT treaty, the White House bears full responsibility for all the adverse consequences this move may have."

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SALT/START ISSUES

USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY ISSUES STATEMENT ON U.S. SALT II ABDICATION

LD121122 Moscow TASS in English 1120 GMT 12 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 12 TASS -- The following statement by a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman in connection with the U.S. violation of the SALT-2 treaty was made public at a press conference here today:

The U.S. decision to abandon finally the SALT-2 treaty and exceed actually one of the key limits on strategic arms, recorded in that agreement, has evoked universal condemnation as an action directed at undermining the accord-based structure of curbing the arms race.

At the same time many governments and world public opinion highly assessed the wisdom and restraint of the Soviet Government which has not yielded to the provocative step undertaken by Washington and declared that it would not pull out for the time being from the restrictions under the SALT-1 agreement and the SALT-2 treaty.

The USSR has not become an accomplice of the U.S. in undermining and destroying the international agreement. As a result the U.S. has found itself in complete isolation, presenting itself to the world as opponent of international stability.

This position could not but doubt the sincerity and seriousness of the American Side's declarations about the intention to strive for the limitation of arms and to advance towards a nuclear-free world.

Realizing that abandoning the SALT-2 treaty deals a blow at U.S. prestige in the world arena, the American Administration has resorted to gross, unscrupulous slander with regard to the Soviet Union in a bid to whitewash itself at least in some way.

With this aim in view the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency issued the other day a special press release alleging in an attempt to justify the U.S. decision to break out of the agreement that the Soviet Union violated SALT-2.

The groundless arguments in the American propaganda document were convincingly refuted on several occasions by the Soviet side, so there is no need to dwell on them in detail again.

Under the pretext of the baseless allegations that the Soviet Union has developed a second ICBM, banned by the treaty, the U.S. wants to reserve the 'right' to acquire, along with the MX missile, another strategic missile, Midgetman. The decision to develop the latter had been adopted, however, long before the concoctions about the new Soviet missile were circulated.

Just as groundless are the attempts to accuse the USSR of exceeding the level of strategic delivery vehicles announced at the signing of the SALT-2 treaty.

As to the U.S. 'concern' over telemetry coding in missile tests, it is conspicuous that whenever the American side was offered constructive variants to remove the 'concern', it invariably evaded discussing them.

Hard as the U.S. may try, it will never deny the irrevocable truth that the Soviet Union has always honoured and continues to honour -- honestly and conscientiously -- its international commitments.

It is not up to the U.S. whose record comprises dozens of violations of international agreements to teach others how to abide by these accords.

It is now important to give most serious attention to another side of the matter, the side that cannot but cause general anxiety.

Ever new facts that surface nearly every day show that the U.S. has made disinformation and slander one of the basic tools of its foreign policy.

In order to justify the armed invasion of tiny Grenada, the U.S. fabricated the hoax about the 'threat' to the lives of the American nationals who were on the island.

In a bid to justify another bombing raid on Libya, the American Administration flooded its press with false reports about terrorist acts allegedly prepared by that country.

A similar campaign is being launched against Syria.

The latest example of U.S. actions of this sort is what has become known as the 'Irangate' affair that has triggered off an unprecedented scandal in America and beyond.

Every day of the inquiry into the affair irrefutably proves that in carrying out covert arms shipments to Iran the U.S. added for several years fuel to the fire of the bloody, senseless conflict between Iran and Iraq under the cover of peace rhetoric.

The deception was directed both at the population in the U.S. and the entire international community.

Facts of this kind show that the tactics of disinformation and lie employed to an ever greater extent by American diplomacy is playing a rather negative, destructive role in international life.

It plants mistrust and suspicion in relations between states, increases friction and conflicts between them. It is known from history -- the history of our time even -- that deception was often used for justifying armed attacks and kindling military conflicts.

One should be extremely vigilant and attentive to the behaviour of those who conduct such policies and expose timely their machinations.

Openly destroying one of the most important agreements designed to ensure strategic stability around the world -- the SALT-2 treaty -- Washington has neither moral, nor political, nor legal right to justify its actions by accusations against other nations.

All responsibility for the undermining of the agreement fully rests with the U.S. alone.

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SALT/START ISSUES

MOSCOW: JAPAN REBUKED FOR BACKING U.S. SALT II BREACH

OW071005 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 4 Dec 86

[Dmitriyev commentary]

[Excerpts] According to KYODO, Foreign Minister Kuranari, in his reply to a question raised by House of Councillors member Kurota, indicated an understanding of the U.S. breach of the SALT II ceiling.

In this connection, commentator Dmitriyev has the following comment:

The Japanese Government is again trying to get ahead of others in supporting U.S. adventurism. Even NATO member-countries have expressed concern to the U.S. Government on the breach of the SALT II treaty ceiling by the United States with completion of the work to equip its 131st B-52 strategic bomber with air launched cruise missiles -- ALCM.

Voices protesting against the violation of the SALT II treaty have been raised even in the U.S. Congress.

Explaining his government's position to fall in line with this new U.S. move, which is expected to escalate the nuclear arms race, Foreign Minister Kuranari used a typically inverted logic. The foreign minister said that, as long as there is no improvement in East-West relations, the U.S. action is at this time justifiable.

Does Tokyo think that an escalation of the nuclear confrontation between East and West will contribute to improving relations? In any case, Foreign Minister Kuranari's statement shows that Tokyo, like Washington, is obsessed with a dangerous approach toward world problems, especially toward relations with the Soviet Union, an approach from a position of strength.

It is impossible to examine the U.S. decision to breach the SALT II treaty ceiling apart from the accord on the abolition of nuclear arms reached at the Reykjavik Soviet-U.S. talks. How are the two related to each other? The U.S. scrapping of the only agreement limiting the nuclear arms race amounts to nothing more than an abrogation of the Reykjavik accord, which opened unprecedentedly bright prospects for nuclear disarmament.

Immediately after the Reykjavik talks, Japan supported their results. However, it now supports Washington's act which virtually scraps the results of these talks. Is Japan not going too far in reversing its position to curry favor with Washington?

By continuing to take such an unprincipled position toward the most important problems of the world, Japan is not only losing its so-called individuality but also impairing its prestige in the eyes of the people of the world.

Foreign Minister Kuranari's statement justifying Washington's violation of the SALT II treaty runs counter to all the statements made by Tokyo so far that it would pursue disarmament. Regrettably, however, this is not a unique instance. In 1983, Japan went ahead of Washington's NATO allies by supporting the deployment of Pershing II nuclear missiles in Western Europe. It is well known in the world, particularly among Asian countries, that, when votes are taken at the United Nations on nuclear disarmament resolutions, the Japanese delegate unfailingly falls into line with the United States and votes against them.

In September, Japan decided to participate in SDI, which is aimed at the militarization of space to strengthen the nuclear force of the United States. In addition, in October Foreign Minister Kuranari tried to defend a U.S. nuclear test conducted to develop an X-ray laser weapon, a component of SDI.

It is hard to understand why the government of a country, which was first to fall victim to nuclear arms, would do this. Speaking of U.S. atomic bombs, when he assumed the foreign minister's post, Kuranari spoke of this period of history, reminiscing about the U.S. atomic bomb which was dropped in Nagasaki, his native land.

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CSO: 5200/1191

SALT/START ISSUES

TASS: PENTAGON SAYS 10 MX MISSILES ON 'COMBAT ALERT'

LD232310 Moscow TASS in English 2140 GMT 23 Dec 86

[Text] Washington December 23 TASS--Ten latest MX ballistic missiles each tipped with ten nuclear warheads have been deployed and put on combat alert in the area of the U.S. Air Force Base Warren in Wyoming, a spokesman for the Pentagon said.

These ten missiles are the first among the 50 MX missiles to be phased in and appropriations for whose construction and deployment have already been set aside by Congress. The administration, according to a report of the White House and Pentagon press office, intends to seek from Congress appropriations for another 50 MX missiles and also for the development and construction of special railway flatcars for them. Simultaneously President Reagan has decided to give a go-ahead to full-scale work to develop a new mobile ballistic missile Midgetman.

Thus after trampling underfoot the SALT-2 treaty, the U.S. Administration is making fresh steps directed at starting a new spiral of the nuclear weapons race. In wresting from Congress ever new billions of dollars to create new types and kinds of nuclear weapons on the "Star Wars" programme the administration is cynically using the "argument" that a buildup of the U.S. nuclear arsenals and developments aimed at spreading the weapons race into outer space "will contribute to progress" at the talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

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CSO: 5200/1191

SALT/START ISSUES

BRIEFS

TASS: REAGAN APPROVES MIDGETMAN, MX--Washington December 20 TASS--The White House has officially announced a decision made by President Reagan on Friday to start the large-scale development of new Midgetman intercontinental ballistic missiles. The deployment of missiles of this type is due to start in 1992. Simultaneously the President gave approval to the Pentagon recommendation that a mobile basing mode be developed for the MX intercontinental ballistic missile. The U.S. Congress has already approved plans of putting 50 MX missiles in fixed underground silos. The administration concurrently intends to press with the deployment of another 50 such first strike missiles. The White House statement emphasizes that these two programmes are an integrated package to modernize ground-based ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles). [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1457 GMT 20 Dec 86 LD] /6091

CSO: 5200/1191

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR SIGNS PROTOCOLS ON SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

LD150643 Moscow TASS in English 0637 GMT 15 Dec 86

[Text] Canberra December 15 TASS -- By TASS correspondent Aleksey Voronin:

The Soviet Union has become the first of the nuclear powers to sign protocols to the treaty on establishing a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific.

The signing ceremony was held at the headquarters of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation, acting as standing secretariat of the South Pacific Forum, in Fiji's capital, Suva, this morning.

Protocols 2 and 3 to the treaty were signed on behalf of the USSR by the Soviet ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Australia, Yevgeniy Samoteykin.

The ambassador made a statement on behalf of the Soviet Government. The text of the statement was circulated for the press.

The ceremony was attended by G. Maisali, director of the Bureau for Economic Cooperation, his deputies, senior functionaries of the bureau and press representatives.

In addressing those present, Maisali emphasized that the signing of the protocols by the Soviet Union attested to international support for the desire of the South Pacific Forum member countries to press for ridding their region of the nuclear menace.

He highly assessed the Soviet Union's quick positive reaction to the proposal for all nuclear powers to sign the protocols urging to observe the nuclear-free-zone treaty and expressed the hope that the other four nuclear powers would follow the Soviet example and sign at least some protocols in the near future.

According to the director of the Bureau for Economic Cooperation, the establishment of a peace zone in this part of the world through concerted efforts by the South Pacific nations was probably the greatest achievement in the field of international disarmament in the past ten years.

The Soviet ambassador to Australia conveyed a message from Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to Fiji Prime Minister Ratu Kamisese Mara, chairman of the South Pacific Forum.

/9365
CSO: 5200/1167

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA EXAMINES NUCLEAR-FREE SOUTH PACIFIC TREATY

PM111201 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Dec 86 First Edition p 5

[Oleg Skalkin "Commentator's Column": "Region of Peace"]

[Text] The other day Australia ratified the treaty proclaiming the southern part of the Pacific Ocean a nuclear-free zone. It brought the number of Pacific states which have endorsed antinuclear principles to eight, which was the requisite condition for the treaty's entry into force.

As Australian Prime Minister R. Hawke said, the treaty "clearly and unconditionally confirms the burning desire of the South Pacific Forum countries to keep the South Pacific a region of peace."

You will recall that at an August 1985 meeting in the Cook Islands, 13 states from the region elaborated and brought together in a single document the principles on which they would like to develop relations in that part of the world. They were acting on the basis of their own national interests and were guided by a desire that preoccupies the whole world today: to deliver mankind from the threat of a thermonuclear catastrophe. The treaty proclaimed by them rules out the stationing, production, and testing of nuclear weapons in the region and bans the dumping of radioactive waste in the waters of the Pacific.

The Soviet Union has a high opinion of the peace-loving potential of the treaty. The USSR has called upon all nuclear powers to guarantee the zone's nuclear-free status and prevent its further involvement in the arms race and transformation into an arena of military-political confrontation.

Those who are upholding their "exclusive" claims to the Pacific Ocean, who are using it for hegemonic purposes, and who are infringing the sovereign rights of small island states have a different view of the treaty. These forces have attacked the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone and have tried to prevent it from being implemented.

And this is not surprising, when you recall that the United States has over 500 military bases in the Pacific on which it keeps around 10,000 nuclear warheads. U.S. tactical nuclear missiles are being deployed in South Korea, and new military nests are being built on the islands of Micronesia, which is being gradually absorbed by Washington. All this is bound to affect the general atmosphere in the region.

In this situation the declaration of the South Pacific as a nuclear-free zone is a constructive step, a natural consequence of the desire of the peoples of the region and of the entire population of the world to protect the future against the nuclear threat and to strengthen peace and security for future generations.

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR COMMENTARIES ON U.S. TESTING, MORATORIUM STANCE

U.S. Verification Argument

PM030905 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Nov 86 Second Edition p 5

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences Major General (Reserve) L. Korzun:
"Stubbornly Obtuse"]

[Text] The realities of the nuclear-space age dictate the vital need to take urgent action in order to save civilization on earth. For the majority of people in the world it is quite clear that the most effective step in this direction would be a nuclear test ban. Especially as there is a good example of this: the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions has been in effect now for more than 15 months. If the United States were to join this moratorium, people of good will would breathe a sigh of relief.

The Washington administration, however, continues its murky deeds, methodically exploding its nuclear devices in Nevada. The latest nuclear explosion was quite recent--the 23d since the Soviet Union introduced its moratorium. Appraising the White House actions in this respect, the West German newspaper FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU wrote: "What is shocking is the stubborn obtuseness with which Washington continues its nuclear weapon tests."

This obtuseness is also apparent in the American administration's use of so-called "arguments" to justify its reluctance to join the Soviet moratorium. In particular, its trump card is the alleged impossibility of ensuring strict verification [kontrol] of observance of a nuclear moratorium. In this respect the White House refuses to take into account the fact that the Soviet Union can accurately determine any American nuclear explosion with its national means alone and that it is also willing to conduct international verification. M.S. Gorbachev said in his statement on the extension of the Soviet moratorium on 18 August this year: "Our consent to the installation of American monitoring apparatus in the Semipalatinsk region is clear proof of this. The problem of verification would no longer seem to be an impediment to reaching agreement. It is still persistently exploited, however, in an attempt to conceal the real position--a reluctance for disarmament."

The Reykjavik meeting reaffirmed the profound validity and correctness of this conclusion. The Soviet side showed great flexibility in this matter at the meeting. It did not demand that the American side join our moratorium, rather

it proposed sitting down to full-scale talks to work out an agreement on a complete, definitive nuclear test ban. What is more, it proposed working toward such an agreement gradually, discussing at a certain stage the questions of nuclear explosion yield "thresholds" and the number of explosions per year. The Americans, however, basically proposed verifying the yield of nuclear explosions rather than ruling out these explosions.

The fact that the question of the feasibility of verifying nuclear explosions is nothing more than a subterfuge on the part of the U.S. Administration is apparent in a statement by "superhawk" R. Perle, U.S. assistant secretary of defense: "I am against a comprehensive test ban agreement even if it were verifiable." And this is not simply Perle's personal opinion--this is the essence of the U.S. Administration's position.

Well, this is just further evidence of the administration's duplicity and cynicism--not the first and, evidently, by no means the last such evidence. When the time came for Soviet scientists to go to the United States to take part in setting up monitoring apparatus in Nevada, the U.S. Government made this reciprocal, prearranged action conditional on our specialists definitely participating in one of the next American nuclear tests. Such a condition can be termed nothing other than blatant provocation.

[PM030907] One can judge what is really happening in the United States in the nuclear test sphere from a statement by L. Ferderber from the Livermore Laboratory: "We are experiencing a kind of renaissance, a period of enhanced quality and sophistication in our work."

There is no denying that the American nuclear madmen are sophisticated, if nothing else. This sophistication is apparent both in the development of more and more new and increasingly dangerous means of destroying mankind and in the propaganda screen concealing this criminal activity. Threatening the entire human race with a future nuclear apocalypse, the American nuclear maniacs are already causing irreparable harm to their own people by their insane actions. As a result of their criminal game with nuclear explosions at the Nevada testing grounds, in the southwest part of Nevada's neighboring state--Utah--the incidence of cancer of the thyroid is 8 times higher than the national average and that of bone cancer is 12 times higher. Many of the tests result in serious accidents and catastrophes, and also loss of life. Two scientists died at one of the tests in 1985. And in March 1984, 15 people were injured when they disappeared into the 10-meter crater formed as a result of an underground explosion at the (Reyner-mesa) test site, and 1 of them later died. A storm of indignation arose in the United States over an explosion at the same test site 10 April this year, which was given the pretentious name "Mighty Oak." In reality, however, the "oak" turned out to have a rotten core. A dangerous discharge of radioactive substances into the atmosphere occurred as a result of the explosion.

It is not only the Soviet Union that is urging a total ban on nuclear tests. The conscience of all mankind is appealing for this. The extension of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions has been welcomed and supported by the "Delhi Six," the Harare conference of the nonaligned countries'

heads of state and government, international organizations of doctors and scientists, many prominent political and military figures, and the broadest public circles in every country of the world, including the United States. The United Nations is in favor of putting a complete end to nuclear explosions. But, as yet, the thunder of nuclear explosions in Nevada is the only response to these appeals.

The criminal insanity continues. But however great the nuclear intoxication of present-day nuclear addicts, the hangover will inevitably follow. The first knell has already sounded for their representatives in the present Washington administration during the midterm elections to the U.S. Congress.

The American people are a great people. And one would like to believe that they will find the strength and the means to curb the nuclear madmen. This is essential if they themselves and the rest of mankind are to have a future.

Academician Rebuts U.S. Case

PM 011541 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 3

[Conversation between Academician V. Goldanskiy and IZVESTIYA correspondent B. Ivanov under the "IZVESTIYA Interview" rubric: "Learning How To Think in the New Way"; date and place not specified]

[Excerpt] Academician V.I. Goldanskiy, member of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat, replies to an IZVESTIYA correspondent's questions:

[Ivanov] The Reykjavik meeting showed that the main stumbling block at the Soviet-U.S. talks was the notorious SDI. It is no coincidence that for that reason the Washington propaganda machine's main efforts are now being used to disguise the true character of this militarist venture, including the U.S. refusal to end nuclear tests and join the Soviet Union's moratorium on all nuclear explosions. On the Potomac they are again using the hackneyed old refrain that explosions are needed to maintain the reliability of the existing stocks of U.S. nuclear weapons. Vitaliy Iosifovich, why are these assertions groundless from the scientific and technical viewpoint?

[Goldanskiy] There are around 60,000 nuclear warheads stockpiled in the world at present, which in both quality and quantity is enough to destroy mankind several times over. In other words, the arsenals contain more than the necessary level of armaments. Thus, nuclear explosions are necessary not for deterrence but for the creation of new types of nuclear weapons, that is, essentially for the further preparation for war. Explosions are not necessary for verifying the existing arsenal because the reliability of the accumulated nuclear facilities can be monitored quite effectively and surely without tests.

The fact is that all the fissile components used in the production of nuclear munitions are highly stable. The half-life of plutonium-239, for example, is 24,000 years, for uranium-235 it is 800 million years, and for uranium-238

it is 4.5 billion years. Some designs of hydrogen bombs also use tritium. The half-life of this element is 12 years. Thus, from the "nuclear viewpoint," to maintain the reliability of this kind of weapon it only needs the periodical replacement of the tritium.

In addition to fissile substances, nuclear munitions also contain other components--the explosive and various detonation systems, various mechanical, electrotechnical, and radiotechnical devices, and installation and design sub-assemblies. During prolonged storage each component can lose some of its reliability, for example, it can be subject to corrosion, harmful mechanical influences, or chemical decomposition. However, each component can be effectively tested without an explosion. For example, explosives or detonators can be tested either on test benches in the form of individual subassemblies or in their assembled form in the bomb itself but with no nuclear detonator. There now exist many developed and tried methods of nondestructive testing which can be used to look inside the bomb, so to speak. They are comparatively cheap and perfectly reliable.

There is another feature. Since 1974, when the USSR and the United States concluded the so-called "threshold" treaty limiting the yield of underground nuclear tests to 150 kilotons, neither country has conducted explosions with a yield above that level. Despite that, however, both the U.S. and the Soviet arsenals continue to hold munitions with a far greater TNT equivalent. For example, the U.S. B-28 bomb has a yield of 1,450 kilotons, the B-43 bomb has a yield of 1 megaton, and the B-53 bomb has a yield of 9 megatons. The yield of the W-53 warhead is 9 megatons and the W-56 warhead is 1.2 megatons. Consequently, U.S. military specialists continue to have no doubts about their reliability.

[PM011543] [Ivanov] Judging by what the U.S. press is saying, they are now becoming noticeably agitated on the Potomac as they try to justify their present political course. Presumably Washington is well aware that the U.S. juggernaut, crammed with nuclear weapons, is gathering speed day by day. And indeed it is aware but seems incapable of abandoning its pernicious aspirations of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union.

[Goldanskiy] The main aim of the tests currently being conducted by the U.S. side is indeed to improve its second-generation nuclear weapons. This means increasing the yield of munitions of a given size and also miniaturizing and reducing the weight of the charges themselves, which increases the accuracy and range with the existing delivery vehicles. Furthermore, nuclear explosions are used to test the survival of communications, control, and guidance systems in conditions of real war. Thus, Washington's assurances that nuclear tests are needed to "deter" a possible war sound absurd, to say the least. Particularly now, when scientists have produced a mathematical model of "nuclear winter." Even if only a small part of the warheads stockpiled on the planet were detonated that would have the most catastrophic consequences for life on the planet. It is clear that there can be no question of deterrence here.

Not deterrence, but the creation of new, increasingly sophisticated types of nuclear weapons in the expectation that they will be able to wage nuclear war

and not just wage it but win it, too--that is the aim that the White House is now pursuing. Thus, some of the tests being conducted by the United States are also aimed at creating third-generation nuclear weapons based on qualitatively new principles. I have in mind here the development of strike systems within the framework of the "star wars" program, and above all nuclear-pumped X-ray lasers. This is a complex matter and to date even the Pentagon's "think tanks" have not reached complete agreement on this score. For instance, it is well known that the main work on this project is being conducted at the Livermore scientific research center whereas scientists from the Los Alamos and Sandia weapons laboratories consider the creation of such lasers to be nothing more than a costly bluff. Nevertheless, whether you are building a laser with a nuclear trigger or trying to convince people of the impossibility of this project, it takes much time and many nuclear explosions. Anything from several dozen to several hundreds, according to some figures.

[Ivanov] Perhaps Washington's weightiest "argument" in favor of its course of continuing nuclear explosions has until recently been the far-fetched and artificial problem of monitoring. It is true that now, after the Soviet government's latest initiatives, this argument by the U.S. side has noticeably lost its allure.

[Goldanskiy] It is more correct to say that it has been completely compromised. National means can now detect any nuclear explosion, even the smallest. In recent years great successes have been achieved in seismological methods of detecting earthquakes and various types of tremors in the earth's crust. They also form the basis of the means now being used in the sphere of monitoring explosions. The U.S. side has claimed that it is not particularly difficult to conduct nuclear explosions "underground"--by making them seem like earthquakes. However, modern seismological equipment now makes it possible to detect the explosion of a nuclear device and to distinguish it unerringly from an earthquake. I myself have seen seismograms which clearly showed oscillations corresponding to a nuclear explosion. The effectiveness of such methods can be judged from the mere fact that last April our seismological station in Obninsk easily detected a nuclear explosion with a yield of just 1.3 kilotons which the Americans conducted in Nevada. The location of the seismological monitoring centers is also important. It has now become possible to record explosions from the territory of neutral countries--I have in mind here the proposal of the "Delhi six." Well, if seismological sensors were placed on USSR and U.S. territory, monitoring would present no problem at all. Thus, the monitoring question can hardly be considered an argument--clearly, this is just a pretext.

U.S., USSR Approaches Contrasted

LD081111 Moscow TASS in English 1038 GMT 8 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 8 TASS — "An end to the build-up of nuclear arsenals by introducing even bilateral Soviet-U.S. moratorium alone could become a serious practical step towards their reduction and elimination", points out professor Vadim Zagladin. He has contributed an article to the December issue of "SOVETSKIY SOTUZ" [SOVIET UNION] magazine.

The author stresses that an end to tests would sharply reduce possibilities for the development of new varieties of nuclear arms.

"If one really strives for an end to the nuclear arms race, the elementary logic suggests it is essential, to begin with to secure an end to tests immediately".

Soviet scientists, the article says, have worked out a procedure for checking nuclear weapons without testing them. American scientists, probably, know how this can be achieved.

If they do not know, then, after agreement on the cessation of tests is reached, the USSR would be ready to share its "secrets" in this respect with the United States. This is what Mikhail Gorbachev said in the interview to the editor-in-chief of the Czechoslovak newspaper RUDE PRAVO.

There has been no response to this idea on the part of Washington. And it is, however, understandable why. Arguments in defence of nuclear tests are being adduced in the United States not for the sake giving them up.

Touching upon the question of monitoring the observance of the moratorium on nuclear explosions, the writer of the article points out that the USSR is ready, if accord on the termination of nuclear tests is reached, to allow on-site monitoring, i.e. at its test ranges, by the Americans.

The Soviet side agreed with the proposals of the "Delhi Six" to institute international monitoring of the cessation of tests with its participation. The USSR is also prepared to consider any other proposals.

The moratorium issue is not only the question of nuclear weapons' tests. It is also the question of a test of policy, or, perhaps, a political test of the two administration, of the two great powers, the author of the article emphasizes.

PRAVDA: Stance 'Obstructionist'

PMI 21441 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Dec 86 First Edition p 5

[Commentary by Tomas Kolesnichenko: "The Moratorium--The 493d Day"]

[Text] Today, when this issue of PRAVDA comes out, will be the 493d day of the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions. We can definitely say that the silence at our nuclear test sites since 6 August 1985 has been duly appraised by the entire world community.

And this is understandable. To cease nuclear explosions means to halt the process of modernizing nuclear systems and creating more and more new, increasingly dangerous types of mass destruction weapons. Having broken this vicious circle, we can now stop and reverse the arms race and set about the actual elimination of nuclear arsenals. This is why the Soviet moratorium is the first important step (not just in words but in deeds) in this direction and a sign of the new type of thinking at the basis of the Soviet program to eliminate nuclear weapons by 2000.

And how has the United States responded to the Soviet initiative? After all, this appeal which, all else aside, is yet another example of the new diplomacy corresponding to present-day realities, is primarily addressed to the United States.

Alas, Washington has not budged an inch on the nuclear issue. Tests are still going on at the Nevada test site and the same old false arguments are used to justify them by people across the ocean. Either the United States is "lagging behind the USSR," they say, and is forced to "restore the balance"; or the "verification" [kontrol] does not suit it; or, without more tests, its nuclear arsenals will "become rusty" or even, heaven forbid, "waste away." We have been hearing these and other farfetched arguments for 493 days now and not once has the truth been said. But the truth is that, by stepping up its tests, Washington continues to bank on gaining military superiority over the USSR -- by creating [sostaniyu] space-based first-strike weapons in particular.

This has recently become especially obvious. The U.S. Administration is trying to wipe out the results of Reykjavik. All its actions, including its repudiation of the SALT II treaty, leave no room for doubt that it is now doing its utmost to "forget" the fact that the question of banning nuclear tests was regarded as one of the most important issues at the negotiating table in the Icelandic capital. Well, there is logic even in this: After all, the attitude toward nuclear explosions is a test of governments' historical maturity. It is a test of the correlation between words and deeds.

Hence the important conclusion that the world public must concentrate its attention on Washington's obstructionist actions. There is a specific address -- the country (the United States), the city (Washington), the street (Pennsylvania Avenue), and even the house -- the White House, where people are afraid of detente and where the imperialist bosses have no wish to part with their illusions of military superiority and even try to use somebody else's moratorium to upset parity. Nevertheless, people in the West are often inclined to appeal solely to the Soviet Union with requests and entreaties to continue the moratorium. Of course, this shows great respect for our country and is evidence that hopes of peace are primarily connected with its constructive policy. But with the best will in the world, one country cannot turn a unilateral moratorium into a bilateral one. If Washington wrecks the moratorium, the tough logic of confrontation will gain the upper hand.

Everything must be done to prevent this from happening. There is still time. We have extended our moratorium four times. Washington has to join it only once.

U.S. Prepares for 12 Dec Test

LD111411 Moscow TASS in English 1405 GMT 11 Dec 86

[Text] Washington December 11 TASS--According to a spokesman of the U.S. Department of Energy, another nuclear explosion codenamed "Body" will be conducted at the test site in Nevada on December 12, Friday. Its capacity will be 20 to 150 kilotons. It will be the 17th nuclear test conducted by the U.S. since the beginning of the year and the 24th one since the introduction by the Soviet Union of the unilateral moratorium on any nuclear explosions in August, 1985.

13 Dec Nuclear Test

LD141520 Moscow TASS in English 1512 GMT 14 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 14 TASS -- TASS observer Vasiliy Kharkov writes:

Another underground nuclear explosion conducted by the U.S. Saturday became the 24th U.S. nuclear test since the introduction by the Soviet Union of the unilateral moratorium on any nuclear explosions. Silence has been reigning at Soviet nuclear test sites since August 6, 1985, i.e. for about 500 days, while in Nevada, U.S., the ground is shaking with nuclear explosions conducted one after another.

This is a direct and deliberate challenge to world public opinion, as well as an open disregard of the demand of millions of Americans who insist that Washington join the Soviet moratorium, that an end be put to nuclear tests and real measures be taken for nuclear disarmament.

Another nuclear explosion in Nevada is another manifestation of the departure of the U.S. Administration from the Reykjavik positions. No other than President Reagan gave his consent in Reykjavik to the starting by the Soviet Union and the United States of talks whose final objective would be the termination of nuclear tests.

It is clear to any unbiased person that the complete discontinuation of nuclear tests is the shortest way to the curtailment of nuclear armaments and their subsequent scrapping. The present U.S. Administration voiced on more than one occasion its readiness to search for ways to curb the nuclear arms race. The continued nuclear explosions that block these ways show the true worth of the declarations of U.S. Administration.

There is no doubt that Washington's refusal to join the Soviet moratorium, and the continued U.S. nuclear explosions are connected with the U.S. striving for achieving military superiority, specifically, through the creation of strike space-based armaments. The implementation of the SDI program is being stepped up under the sinister accompaniment of nuclear explosions in Nevada which is fraught with unpredictable consequences for mankind.

The Delhi declaration signed by the Soviet and Indian leaders pointed out that a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world required concrete and urgent measures aimed at disarmament. These include the complete banning of nuclear weapons tests. The continued U.S. nuclear explosions confirm once again the topicality of this requirement. Resolute actions are needed for ensuring the survival of humanity.

U.S. Obstructed Test Monitoring

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 49, 15 Dec 86 p 16

[Interview with Igor Nersesov by E. Andrianov: "Obstructing the Test-Monitoring Project"; date and place not given]

[Text]

A group of Soviet seismologists has come back from the U.S. where, jointly with their colleagues at the Natural Resources Defence Council, they were to have selected sites for monitoring U.S. nuclear explosions in Nevada as part of the joint experiment now in progress. The following is an interview granted to New Times by the leader of the group Igor Nersesov, corresponding member of the Armenian Academy of Sciences and head of the seismology department at the Institute of Physics of the Earth under the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences.

Did you succeed in getting to the nuclear testing site?

No. The American authorities refused us visas for a trip to the environs of the test sites. Therefore, our American colleagues selected, in advance, eight control points from which we picked out three (on the basis of rock samples, slides and other research material): Nelson-1, Troy Canyon (both in Nevada) and Deep Springs (California).

Just as near Semipalatinsk, we are to install ground equipment first and more sensitive instruments underground afterwards, with the information obtained to be transmitted by a telephone channel to the Universities of San Diego (California) and Reno (Nevada) for decoding and processing.

How will the monitoring facilities be serviced?

The instruments will have to be looked after by our American colleagues as we are forbidden entry to those areas. And remember, the Soviet government has permitted U.S. citizens to keep an eye on the operation of the instruments installed near the Semipalatinsk test site.

This is not the only artificial problem to have been created by the U.S. Administration. Our colleagues in the Natural Resources Defence Council have warned us that since the monitoring points of our choice are on the state-owned land, the U.S. government can forbid any

experiments to be carried out there. Therefore, American scientists are now trying to find private plots near these points, whose owners would consent to having research equipment placed there.

What other problems were discussed during the visit?

Professors James Brune and Jonathan Berger of San Diego University and ourselves discussed preparations for the second phase of the experiment in Kazakhstan. They showed us prototype computers and measuring instruments to be installed there. Furthermore, we took part in scientific discussions on the possibility of verifying the observance of a nuclear test ban, and answered newsmen's questions.

Your trip came shortly after the end of the Reykjavik summit. How did the American scientists you met comment on its results?

Our American colleagues were almost unanimous in the belief that President Reagan had made a mistake in Reykjavik by forgoing practical moves towards disarmament for the sake of continued "star wars" research. At the same time, it was clear to all that a first step had been made. The Soviet side had come up with clear-cut and concrete proposals that provided the groundwork for further efforts toward disarmament.

Many U.S. Congressmen suggest that underground tests be restricted to the yield ceiling of one kiloton. Is this the limit below which nuclear tests for military purposes are of no use?

To be more exact, lower-yield explosions would be far less important militarily. But what really matters is that judging from such statements (of which more and more are to be heard in the U.S. today) an ever growing number of Americans realize that the present state of affairs cannot go on indefinitely. The tests must be ended by all means. This is a realistic objective, as evidenced by the unilateral Soviet moratorium and the successful verification of its observance in the course of the Soviet and American seismologists' joint experiment.

To conclude, the American authorities have repeatedly invited Soviet scientists to take part in nuclear weapon tests in Nevada. Such invitations were extended to us as well.

The only answer to this is that the purpose of our experiment is to prove the possibility of monitoring a nuclear test ban rather than watch nuclear weapons being tested. Surely the Pentagon cannot expect us to help develop new weapon systems for it.

Testing Program Criticized

LD152236 Moscow TASS in English 2210 GMT 15 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 15 TASS--TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

The latest nuclear test at the Nevada test site in the U.S. was heard by the world as the beat of the tom-tom, warning against the dangers kept by the current U.S. Administration in store for mankind. It was the 24th test since the Soviet Union announced its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions. It was the 24th exposure of those who, bent on achieving strategic superiority, do not listen to reason but are carrying out their obviously provocative course and placing themselves in ever tighter isolation on the international scene.

Pondering last Christmas on ways of preserving the atmosphere of Geneva, the U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT magazine noted, and with good reason, that one of the practical steps the President could have taken was to join the Soviet moratorium. That step in the interests of mankind, the magazine remarked, would have been welcomed all over the world. A year has passed and another Christmas is round the corner but tests continue to be carried out in Nevada, indicating that ever deadlier weapons are being developed.

It is not "the spirit of Geneva" that is at stake today. The U.S. Administration is attacking the results of the Reykjavik meeting, which pointed the way to a nuclear-free world and scared the U.S. militarists with this prospect. Carrying on nuclear weapons, President Reagan not only illustrates the gap between his avowed commitment to ending the arms race and his practical deeds but also shows that he does not have the last consideration for world public opinion.

There is no need to guess the causes of the U.S. refusal to halt nuclear testing. Formulating goals for the U.S. military policy for the 1990s in the FOREIGN AFFAIRS magazine, Pentagon chief Caspar Weinberger frankly said that the purpose of the American rearmament programme -- the introduction of new arms systems or the drastic modernization of the existing ones -- was the achievement of U.S. superiority over the Soviet Union.

Naturally, all this will not give strategic superiority to the United States because the Soviet Union will not allow military-strategic parity to be upset. Moreover, these steps will detract from U.S. security: the higher the mountains of nuclear weaponry, the greater the risk of nuclear catastrophe, which America will not survive. It is high time for Washington to realize this truth.

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CSO: 5200/1167

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: U.S. CONFIRMS COMMITMENT TO CONTINUE ARMS TESTS

LD190313 Moscow TASS in English 2358 GMT 18 Dec 86

[Text] Washington, 19 Dec (TASS)--In spite of the demands of the world public the U.S. Administration's policy of intensifying the nuclear arms race remains unchanged.

This was confirmed by White House Spokesman Albert Brashears who was instructed to inform newsmen about the administration's reaction to the Soviet Government statement of December 18.

The statement said that the U.S.S.R. could not show unilateral restraint indefinitely and would resume nuclear testing after the very first U.S. nuclear explosion in the approaching year. It also said that if the United States stopped nuclear tests the Soviet Union would be prepared any day and month to stop the implementation of its program of such tests on the basis of reciprocity.

Using the tone that sounded challenging not only to the Soviet Union but to all those who demand an end to nuclear testing, Brashears said that acceptance of the moratorium was not in the security interest of the United States or its allies.

According to American press reports, the U.S. has already made plans for at least five nuclear explosions to be conducted in January-March 1987. They are linked with the effort to develop new types and kinds of nuclear weapons and with the implementation of the "Star Wars" program.

After reading the Soviet Government statement and hearing the challenging reaction of the White House to it, over 130 members of the U.S. Congress protested against the administration's unwillingness to heed the voice of reason and stop whipping up the nuclear arms race.

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CSO: 5200/1185

RELATED ISSUES

TASS EXAMINES U.S. VOTE AGAINST 'NUCLEAR WINTER' RESOLUTION

LD051836 Moscow TASS in English 1628 GMT 5 Dec 86

[Text] New York December 5 TASS--The United States was the only member to vote against the adoption by the U.N. General Assembly of a resolution on the climatic consequences of a nuclear war. The delegates of 140 countries stated that removing the threat of a world nuclear war is the acutest and most pressing task of our time and stressed that its consequences would create an unprecedented danger to the existence of all states without exception.

The resolution emphasizes that in conditions of a "nuclear winter" the entire earth can be turned into a dark and frozen planet and contains a call to conduct new studies on this score.

Explaining the stance by the U.S. delegation, its representatives expressed doubt in the capability of the international community to carry out truly scientific and unbiased research, indicating that such studies have already been underway in the United States.

And indeed, a day earlier, scientists and specialists from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and from other research establishments subsidized by the Pentagon tried to simulate a forest fire in the environs of Los Angeles, which any nuclear war would inevitably cause. In observing smoke and soot lofting into the atmosphere, they hoped to make a global picture of how the earth would be plunging into darkness as a result of the block-out of the sun's light.

They had to suspend the experiment after a helicopter from which a section of the dead forest was set ablaze crashed.

Many scientists, among them U.S. specialists Richard Turco and Carl Sagan, theoretically predict the most catastrophic consequences ensuing from the changes in the climate as a result of a nuclear war. What puts one on one's guard in the current experiments by the U.S. scientists from NASA is the bid to downgrade the danger of this aftermath. They have already expressed the views that thermonuclear catastrophe would induce not a "nuclear winter" but a "nuclear autumn," that is a drop in the earth's temperature will be less than was earlier calculated. One gets an impression that it is not advantageous to the White House and the Pentagon that the U.S. public develop a correct idea of a climatic catastrophe which will attend a nuclear war.

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RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW 14 DECEMBER ROUND TABLE ON SALT II TREATY, TESTING

LD142100 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 14 Dec 86

[*"International Observers Roundtable"* program presented by Nikolay Agayants, All-Union Radio foreign affairs commentator, with international affairs journalist, Dr of Historical Sciences Boris Dmitriyevich Dmitriyev, and TASS political observer Yuriy Immanuilovich Kornilov]

[Excerpt][Kornilov] Boris Dmitriyevich has given us a very convincing list of the laws broken by Washington. But the skein of "Irangate" is still unravelling; as has been said by the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives, the whole thing is a gigantic conundrum far more complex than the famous Rubik's Cube. That is so, of course, if you bear in mind the most secret operations of the Washington politicians, their bypassing of U.S. laws and the Congress by supplying arms to Iran and to the anti-Nicaraguan contras. All these facts put one in mind of the plot of some cheap detective novel by the way they keep coming to the surface and are continually being concealed. But I want to get back to something we've already talked about today. While the scandal continues to grow, the representatives of the upper reaches of U.S. society — as one of America's own papers expressed it — are trying to protect themselves by scalping each other. This whole yarn of detection and adventure reflects, as in a mirror, what Boris Dmitriyevich was talking about: Both the nature and the methods of U.S. foreign policy — a policy which has as its foundation, invariably and in every case, reliance on force, adventurism, and the desire to interfere in the affairs of sovereign states — are literally shot through with falsity and mendacity, whether it be a question of the key problems of disarmament, or the problems of democracy and human rights, or, say, the position of the United States regarding the young developing states to whom Washington, in theory, dispenses compliments and promises support, while in practice attempting to deprive them of their economic and political independence, regarding them as a preserve for blatant imperialist plunder.

[Agayants] Yuriy Immanuilovich, excuse me for interrupting. When we talk about the U.S. Administration violating its own national laws, one should bear in mind that Washington treats international law and accords just as unceremoniously. An example of that is the crude violation of the SALT II treaty, about which the foreign press is now writing a great deal, and which is constantly talked about in radio and television broadcasts. Incidentally, the foreign media stress that this thoughtless step was undertaken by the United States straight after the Reykjavik meeting and that it is fraught with an extremely serious threat to mankind. I should recall, comrades, that

the Pentagon has put into operation the 131st B-52 bomber equipped with cruise missiles, each one of which has a warhead with a power 15 times greater than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. By the way, it is emphasized in the dispatches of the world's major news agencies that the Soviet Union is exercising restraint, having announced that for the time being it will not go beyond the framework of SALT II.

[Dmitriyev] The fact is that the SALT II treaty, signed in Vienna in 1979, envisages definite limits for the number of nuclear launch vehicles. And now, by introducing this bomber, the United States has exceeded that restriction on strategic arms laid down in the SALT II agreement. In this way they have in essence torn up that treaty. I should recall, however, that the United States never even ratified that treaty, that it was not put into operation, but its limitations and provisions were still adhered to by both the United States and the Soviet Union for all these years. Regarding the 131st bomber, of course its introduction into the combat forces is not something fatal for the security of the Soviet Union; after all, we will somehow, thank God, overcome the fact that one more missile-launch vehicle has appeared in the U.S. Strategic Air Command. The point is not that the putting into operation of this bomber dramatically alters the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union; it is the principle that counts. The introduction of this bomber violates the fundamental accord. At the moment, Soviet-U.S. structure of strategic stability is based on two strategic treaties. The first one is the treaty on antimissile defense, and the second, until recently, has been the SALT II treaty. Thus, one of the bases, namely, the SALT II treaty, has now been completely wrecked by the United States. This once again demonstrates the danger and adventurism of the actions of this U.S. Administration.

What does it mean, to wreck the SALT I treaty? It means that we are now deprived of the mechanism which regulated our relations with the Americans in the military field. An entire system was set up according to the treaty, which provided an opportunity for discussing questions of strategic parity with the Americans, for exchanging information, and informing each other about the dismantling of one bomber or another, or submarine, or other launch vehicle. Thus, there was clarity on both sides on the quantity and quality of strategic forces. Now this system is being wrecked. Now there is a danger of the emergence of strategic chaos, strategic instability, unpredictability, in the development of the strategic situation.

[Agayants] All that is true, Boris Dmitriyevich, but I should like to add something more. Having now unleashed a blatant anti-Soviet propaganda campaign, the United States is now unleashing a systematic attack on the antimissile defense treaty, the ABM Treaty. Literally every recent step, every action by Washington on the international scene has aroused alarm, concern, and indignation among people of good will, and even among U.S. NATO allies. It is clear that the ABM Treaty, banning the development [sozdaniye], testing, and deployment [razvertyvaniye] of an antimissile defense, or components of it based in space, is like a bone in the throats of those who dream of carrying the arms race into near-earth orbit. Hence the attacks on it from the creators of the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, which are intensifying all the time.

[Kornilov] While they are wrecking the accords which to some extent -- to a significant extent -- have managed to restrain the arms race, at the same time they are going so far as to attempt to conceal these destructive, in essence militarist, aggressive actions, with the aid of all kinds of propaganda tricks. That is, lies and deceit are constantly perceived as the components of U.S. foreign policy.

[Agayants] If we are talking today about the violations which the Washington administration is permitting itself to commit, within its own country and on the international stage, we must also not move away from the fact of the continuing nuclear blasts by the United States, despite the fact that the moratorium on nuclear tests, adopted by the Soviet Union, continues to operate.

[Dmitriyev] Today, by the way, is the 497th day that silence has reigned on the Soviet test ranges, according to my reckoning; 497 days have passed since 6 August, when the Soviet Union announced its unilateral moratorium. Our moratorium operates until 31 December. Of course, it is legitimate to ask how the Soviet Union will act later, when the period of the moratorium comes to an end. Evidently, in this case one should look for an answer in the behavior of the U.S. Government, to think over that question coolly, and realistically, and from all angles, and to find the correct solution.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR GENERAL RELATES MILITARY TASKS TO NUCLEAR, SPACE AGE

PM051540 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Dec 86 Second Edition pp 2-3

[Article by Major General M. Yasyukov, doctor of philosophical sciences, under the rubric "The 27th CPSU Congress: Questions of Defense Policy": "Leading Military Building"]

[Text] The dynamism of social development at the present crucial stage is manifested in all spheres of human activity, including the defense sphere. The current and long-term tasks which arise here can only be considered and tackled in organic unity with the party's strategic course of accelerating the country's socioeconomic progress and firmly in the context of the problem of war and peace in the nuclear age, which is in the front line of human existence.

Military building has always been an exceptionally crucial, difficult, and costly matter. These features have taken on a new quality and become accentuated in our time. So we receive with all the more satisfaction the assessment of the 27th CPSU Congress that the USSR's defense might is up to a level which reliably guarantees the Soviet people's peaceful labor. The Soviet Army and Navy possess modern arms and combat hardware and have well trained personnel and commanders and political cadres who are well trained and selflessly devoted to the people.

The successes of Soviet military building are the tangible result of tremendous efforts by all our people. They were possible thanks to the party's leading and guiding activity in all spheres of public life, including the defense sphere. In view of the complex international situation and the growing aggressiveness of the reactionary circles of imperialism, the party, its Central Committee, and the CPSU Central Committee Politburo devote unremitting attention to the country's defense capability and the combat might of the USSR armed Forces. The 27th CPSU Congress reaffirmed that the party's leadership of military building and of the Armed Forces was and is the fundamental basis for strengthening the socialist motherland's defense capability. The party has the leading role in the elaboration and implementation of policy in the sphere of defense and the country's security and of Soviet military doctrine, which is strictly defensive in nature and oriented toward protection against attack from outside.

Only a party possessing advanced revolutionary theory and endowed with the people's unbounded trust is capable of heading military building in all the diversity of its political, economic, social, and spiritual problems, elaborating the correct, scientifically substantiated policy, and ensuring the high combat capability and combat readiness of the Armed Forces and the reliable defense of socialism's gains.

The essence of the party's defense policy and its principles were revealed in depth and substantiated comprehensively by V.I. Lenin. The main component of his military-theoretical legacy is the bold, scientifically substantiated program for

military building in the socialist state. Following Lenin's ideas and guided by Leninist principles, our party of communists boldly and innovatively tackled highly complex defense issues not formerly met with, created a military organization of the new, socialist type — the USSR Armed Forces — and led them to victory on the fronts of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars. In the postwar years, under the leadership of Lenin's party, the U.S. monopoly of nuclear weapons was eliminated, a reliable nuclear missile shield for the motherland was created, and very many theoretical, technical, organizational, ideological, and other questions of Soviet military building were resolved.

The establishment of military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO was a historic achievement for socialism, it was noted at the 27th CPSU Congress. It consolidated the positions of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and all progressive forces, and foiled the hopes of aggressive imperialist circles for victory in a world nuclear war. The preservation of this equilibrium is a major factor for ensuring peace and international security.

The 27th CPSU Congress, assessing what had been achieved realistically, drew up principles for future defense policy. The new edition of the party Program adopted by the congress says quite clearly: While there is a danger of imperialism's unleashing aggressive wars and military conflicts, the party will devote unremitting attention to strengthening the USSR's defense might, reinforcing its security, and strengthening the Armed Forces' readiness to defeat any aggressor.

Military building in our country takes place in the spirit of general Soviet state building. It consists of a system of economic, sociopolitical, ideological, strictly military, and other measures implemented in the interests of strengthening the motherland's defense capability. The nature, volume, and tasks of military building are determined both by the social nature and potential of our socialist state and by the internal and external conditions of its development.

The backbone, the load-bearing wall of our country's defense capability is the Soviet economy. In this connection it is correct to say that the party's course of accelerated development, intensification, and increasing the efficiency of the economy objectively offers new potential for military building, too. The programs drawn up under the party's leadership for the radical modernization of the national economy and the resolute acceleration of scientific and technical progress have their defence aspects. The priority development of machine building, electronics, the nuclear industry, laser technology, information science, and other sectors which determine scientific and technical progress makes it possible to react promptly to imperialist circles' attempts to break the military-strategic parity in their own favor.

Naturally, in conditions where such attempts are accompanied by the unrestrained escalation of the arms race and the desire to take it into space, the maintaining of military-strategic parity sets exceptionally complex tasks for the Soviet economy and for our science and technology. It is not only a question of the military-technical aspect of the matter, but of the fact that the United States wants to exhaust the Soviet Union economically by means of the race for the latest, most costly space arms. But such plans are not only built on sand but are dangerous, since they could lead to fatal political decisions. "The Soviet Union has the means of responding to any challenge, if necessary," M.S. Gorbachev has noted. "Soviet people know this, and people throughout the world should know it. But we do not want to play power games. That is an extremely dangerous occupation in the nuclear missile age."

The material provision for the country's defense capability and for military building requires all-around, farsighted economic calculations, perspicacious vision, and careful accounting of all aspects of the present-day confrontation between the two opposing social systems, the forces of progress and reaction in the world arena. This strictly scientific, considered approach characterizes the party's activity and the work and documents of its 27th congress.

For the future of Soviet military building, paramount significance is attached to the comprehensive analysis carried out at the congress of the present international situation and the trends in its development, and to the new theoretical conclusions drawn on this basis.

The congress documents accurately define the sources of the present-day military danger, its real scale, and the trends in the development of imperialism's war machine and policy. There is convincing proof of the desire, characteristic of reactionary imperialist circles headed by the United States, to push the historical rivalry of the two opposing social systems onto the track of military confrontation, to exact social revenge, and to resolve their own worsening problems at socialism's expense.

In these conditions our party and the Soviet state face highly complex questions of defense policy. The resolution of these questions and the measures being undertaken to ensure the reliable defense of socialist gains and avert the nuclear war which imperialism is preparing and of which the threat is not receding, but increasing, amount basically to a struggle for the salvation of world civilization. This determines the increased role of policy and political decisions, and therefore of the CPSU's leadership in all spheres of social life, including the military sphere. In resolving defense questions our party proceeds on the basis that the realities of the late 20th century require a new way of political thinking and oblige us to overcome many accumulated problems creatively and with circumspection.

The modern world, it was noted at the 27th CPSU Congress, is too small and fragile for wars and strong-arm policies. It cannot be saved or preserved without breaking -- decisively and finally -- with the way of thinking and acting which grew up over the centuries on the basis of the acceptability and permissibility of wars and armed conflicts.

The Soviet Union did not and does not regard weapons as the main argument in international affairs. It has never sought military superiority but has waged and continues to wage a persistent struggle against the arms race unleashed by imperialism, doing all in its power to prevent any war, especially a nuclear war. Convincing evidence of this is provided by the numerous Soviet peace initiatives, the program for eliminating weapons of mass destruction and averting the danger of war put forward in the 15 January 1986 statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests which the USSR has extended repeatedly, and the principled Fundamentals of the Creation of a Comprehensive System of International Security proposed by the 27th CPSU Congress.

Constructive proposals, the most radical in the entire history of Soviet-U.S. talks, were put forward by the USSR at the meeting between the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the U.S. President in Reykjavik. A whole package of major measures was placed on the conference table, measures which, if adopted, would lay the foundations for a new epoch in mankind's life -- the nuclear-free epoch.

The Soviet peace initiatives are of truly historic significance. Our state's defense policy and Soviet military doctrine are constructed in full accordance with their spirit and letter. It was proclaimed unambiguously from the platform of the 27th CPSU Congress: In the military sphere we intend to continue to act in such a way as to ensure that nobody has grounds for fears, even imaginary fears, for their security. But we and our allies equally wish to be spared the sense of a threat hanging over us. The USSR has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and will adhere to that pledge in the strictest way. But it is no secret that scenarios for a nuclear attack on us exist. We have no right not to take them into account.

In organizing and guiding defense building, the CPSU is guided by the principle of identical security for the USSR and the United States, for the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO. And the Soviet Union advocates limiting military potential to a reasonable sufficiency. But the nature and level of that limit continue to be defined by the positions and actions of the United States and its partners in the blocs.

"In these conditions," it was stressed in the CPSU Central Committee Political Report to the 27th party congress, "we repeat and repeat again: The Soviet Union does not claim greater security and will not accept lesser security."

This firm position is dictated by the fact that the reactionary circles of imperialism, above all U.S. imperialism, far from accepting a lowering of the levels of military confrontation, seek, by continuing the arms race, to secure unilateral advantages. This is indicated by such convincing facts as the U.S. Administration's actions aimed at undermining the SALT II treaty and the ABM Treaty and the acceleration of military programs adopted in the eighties in the United States, programs which provide for the rapid buildup of arms, especially strategic first-strike arms. Highly accurate weapons are being introduced. Weapons of mass destruction based on new physical principles are being developed. The U.S. Administration and military-industrial circles are gambling particularly on the SDI, which is a concentrated expression of militarism. They are pushing into space with nuclear weapons, hoping in this way to achieve military superiority over the USSR.

Those are the facts and the stern reality of our time. The Soviet Union and its Communist Party are forced to reckon with this situation and face the need to take appropriate countermeasures, including measures in the defense sphere.

In improving the motherland's defense capability, the CPSU devotes particular attention to building the USSR Armed Forces and strengthening their combat potential. "The party," the new edition of the CPSU Program notes, "will continue invariably to ensure that the combat potential of the USSR Armed Forces is a durable alloy of military skill and a high level of technical equipment, ideological staunchness, organization, and discipline among personnel, and loyalty on their part to their patriotic and international duty."

The formula for combat potential expressed in the new edition of the CPSU Program assigns a special place in its structure to the human factor — military skill, the art of controlling troops, ideological staunchness, organization, and discipline among personnel, and loyalty to duty on their part. Strengthening combat potential means bringing into action the tremendous reserves inherent in the personality of the serviceman in a socialist army.

Showing concern for strengthening the country's defense and increasing the combat readiness of the Army and Navy, the party is stepping up its organizing and guiding influence on all aspects of the life and activity of troops and naval forces and asking military cadres to engage in restructuring in the spirit of the 27th CPSU Congress decisions. The times imperiously demand of military cadres the ability to tackle the very complex tasks of qualitative improvement of the Armed Forces — the mastery of new combat hardware, the improvement of the effectiveness of personnel training and education, and the strengthening of military discipline. Successfully resolving these tasks means actively seeking new forms and methods of political, ideological, and organizational activity by commanding officers, political organizers, and party organizations. The CPSU requires from military leaders of all ranks closer links with personnel and the ability to draw on the masses and use their collective intelligence in the interests of strengthening the country's defense.

"The CPSU considers it necessary," the new edition of the CPSU Program notes, "to continue to step up its organizing and guiding influence on the life and activity of the Armed Forces, to strengthen the principle of unified military and political leadership, to step up the role and influence of political organizers and party organizations of the Soviet Army and Navy, and to ensure that the close link between the Army and the people becomes even stronger."

Under the CPSU's leadership, an atmosphere has been created in the country of love and respect for the Armed Forces and for the servicemen who defend our motherland's freedom and independence, and active military-patriotic work is under way. In June the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution aimed at further improving the training of young people for military service. This resolution instructs party, soviet, trade union, and Komsomol organs and the relevant ministries and departments to implement additional measures to improve the standard of predraft training of young people and their physical tempering, to improve health work, and to develop military-patriotic education. The implementation of this measures is aimed at ensuring that the USSR Armed Forces are replenished with a young generation ready to worthily fulfill their duty to defend the socialist fatherland and Soviet people's peaceful labor.

Soviet military building is linked by strong bonds with the military building of the socialist community countries. Soviet Armed Forces servicemen fulfill their duty in defense of socialist gains shoulder to shoulder with the servicemen of the fraternal armies of the Warsaw Pact states. The CPSU, together with the other parties, seeks to strengthen the unity and increase the might and influence of the socialist community and to maintain the fraternal armies' combat readiness at a high level.

All the multifaceted activity of the CPSU in the leadership of military building is an expression of the CPSU's growing role in guarantee that the cause of defending socialist gains is in reliable hands and that no forces in the world will be able to hamper the confident march of the Soviet people along the path of improving socialism.

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RELATED ISSUES

GORBACHEV-KIM IL-SONG ON REYKJAVIK, SDI, PACIFIC NFZ

Gorbachev Dinner Speech

PM271157 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Oct 86 First Edition p 2

[TASS Report: "In a Friendly Atmosphere"]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 24 Oct (TASS)--Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, today made the following speech at a Kremlin dinner for Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea:

It can only be regretted that in Reykjavik it has not proved possible to reach agreement to incarnate the key problems of bringing about disarmament and eliminating the nuclear threat into binding accords.

We went there, as is known, with a whole number of important initiatives concerning the whole gamut of problems of nuclear-missile disarmament and made major concessions with the aim of taking the talks out of the deadlock but everything, alas, ran up once more against the American "Star Wars" program.

Although a unique chance has been passed up, an agreement meeting the vital interests of the entire world community is attainable. We believe in the common sense of the peoples, including the American people. The Reykjavik meeting has confirmed that work has to be kept up and a maximum of political courage and good will displayed.

When we say that it is the time to act, we certainly have in mind also the vital problems of Asia and the Pacific Basin.

Our constructive proposals for sizable cuts in the medium-range nuclear missiles deployed there offer new opportunities for detente. We think that the implementation of these proposals could help substantially also the Korean people's efforts to lower tension, strengthen peace in the Korean peninsula, and make it a nuclear-free zone. In the final analysis, this will be conducive to favorable conditions for achieving the country's peaceful unification.

Kim Il-song Dinner Speech

PM271441 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Oct 86 First Edition p 2

[TASS account of speech by Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Workers Party of Korea Central Committee and DPRK president, at dinner given in his honor in the Great Kremlin Palace in Moscow 25 October, published under the general heading "In a Friendly Atmosphere"]

[Excerpt] Socialism today is the great anti-imperialist revolutionary force of our epoch, a force opposing imperialism. Forming a broad united front with all peace-loving forces on the globe, the socialist countries must launch a powerful antiwar and antinuclear movement of peace champions, stop short and thwart the imperialists' attempts aimed at launching a nuclear war, and safeguard peace and security on earth.

Socialism today is the great anti-imperialist revolutionary force of our epoch, a force opposing imperialism. Forming a broad united front with all peace-loving forces on the globe, the socialist countries must launch a powerful antiwar and antinuclear movement of peace champions, stop short and thwart the imperialists' attempts aimed at launching a nuclear war, and safeguard peace and security on earth.

Proceeding from noble feelings of responsibility for the great cause of peace on our planet, the CPSU and the Soviet state have put forward a number of peace-loving initiatives and proposals on banning nuclear tests and reducing nuclear weapons, preventing the militarization of space and completely eliminating nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of this century, and transforming the Asian-Pacific region into a nuclear-free zone, a zone of peace and cooperation, and are making sincere efforts for their implementation. Last August the Soviet Union made the decision to extend again the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests through 1 January 1987. On the Soviet Union's initiative a Soviet-U.S. summit meeting was held recently in Reykjavik, where the USSR made a bold initiative and constructive proposals aimed at the reduction of nuclear arms and applied sincere efforts for their implementation. Thus the Soviet Union displayed with utmost clarity its responsibility for the preservation of peace and security on earth, the immutable nature of the Leninist peace-loving policy.

We actively support the Soviet Union's peace initiatives aimed at preserving peace and security on our planet and highly value the efforts made by the CPSU, and Soviet state, and the USSR people for their implementation.

The easing of the tension prevailing in Asia and the Korean Peninsula is a highly important aspect of the preservation of peace and security on the globe.

The U.S. imperialists, claiming world domination, are stepping up aggressive intrigues in the Asian-Pacific region, attaching great strategic importance to the Korean peninsula, this important military bridgehead in Asia. The United States, proceeding from its strategic objective of committing aggression against the Northern part of our republic and the Asian socialist countries, is using South Korea as a springboard, building up nuclear arms and aggressive armed forces there on a large scale. Their intrigues aimed at knocking together a military triangle comprising the United States, Japan, and South Korea are becoming increasingly evident.

The situation in Asia and the Korean peninsula is becoming increasingly serious in view of the fact that Japanese militarism has turned into a dangerous aggressive force which openly propounds its sinister intentions of overseas expansion. Recently Japan's ruling circles joined in the U.S. "Star Wars" plan, which is unanimously condemned by progressive peoples in the world. This is a very bad sign.

Our party and the republic's government are making tireless efforts for the easing of tension and preservation of peace in Asia and the Korean peninsula and for the peaceful solution of the problem of Korea's unification. For the sake of solving this problem independently and on peaceful principles we have put forward numerous rational and constructive proposals for the unification of the motherland, including the proposal to form a Democratic Confederal Republic of Korea. This year we put forward the proposal to hold talks between military authorities and the peaceful proposal to establish a nuclear-free peace zone in the Korean peninsula.

Since they are just, our proposals on the unification of the motherland and our peace initiatives enjoy active support from most countries and peoples in the world.

Last July Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, speaking in Vladivostok, devoted serious attention to the development of the situation in the Korean peninsula and its adjoining regions, condemned the U.S. intrigues aimed at building up nuclear arms in South Korea and knocking together a United States-Japan-South Korea military triangle, and expressed high appreciation and total support for our proposals on the unification of the motherland and our peace initiatives. This is a great inspiration for our people who are struggling for the independent peaceful unification of the motherland.

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RELATED ISSUES

PRC PEOPLE'S DAILY PRAISES PASSAGE OF UN RESOLUTION

HK070315 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese 7 Dec 86 p 6

[Commentator's article: "Positive Move for Stimulating the Disarmament Process"]

[Text] The two motions proposed by China on reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons have been adopted by the UN General Assembly. This is the first time China has proposed motions on disarmament to the United Nations which won the support of the majority of member nations and achieved satisfactory results. This indicates that the Chinese Government's disarmament proposal conforms to the common desire of the people of all countries to reduce arms and safeguard world peace. The proposal will give enormous impetus to world peace and disarmament.

The Chinese Government and people have always attached great importance to the disarmament issue. China declared to the whole world from the very beginning that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Last year the Chinese Government decided to cut its troops by 1 million. At a Chinese rally for world peace held this year, Premier Zhao Ziyang comprehensively explained the Chinese Government's basic stand on disarmament. At the present UN General Assembly, China again put forward its draft resolution on disarmament. This shows that China, as a founder of the United Nations and a permanent member state of its Security Council, has adopted a serious and responsible attitude toward disarmament and that the proposal made and positive move taken are sincere.

The two motions proposed by China include reduction of both nuclear and conventional weapons, and particularly stress that the Soviet Union and United States should be the first to act since they assume special responsibility for disarmament. Herein lies the key to whether progress can be made in disarmament. In the world today, the Soviet Union and United States possess the largest nuclear and conventional arsenals. The two big powers possess around 50,000 nuclear warheads and their nuclear weapons account for over 95 percent of the world's total. Their huge nuclear arsenals constitute the greatest menace to world peace and security of all countries, which is why the people of all countries have regarded the reduction of nuclear weapons as a top priority in disarmament. If the Soviet Union and United States can take the lead in drastically reducing their nuclear weapons, the nuclear menace confronting the people of all countries will be diminished. Naturally, the reduction of conventional weapons, a question not to be ignored, should be carried out simultaneously with the reduction of nuclear weapons. In this respect, the two superpowers also assume special responsibility.

The Chinese Government had stated long ago that China and the relevant countries will take corresponding moves in disarmament following the two superpowers' lead in drastically reducing their nuclear and conventional weapons which would reduce the menace to other countries. China will never hesitate in fulfilling the burden duties of a nuclear power.

The proposed disarmament motions expressed the consistent stand of the Chinese Government on disarmament and also accepted the reasonable suggestions of many countries. Disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, is a major event concerning the destiny and future of mankind. It is the target the people and government of all countries have strived for with unremitting efforts. To make disarmament a reality, we cannot place our hopes in the endless talks between the two superpowers. The arms control talks between the two superpowers have lasted for several decades. Their arsenals have expanded instead of reducing and the arms race for military superiority is still going on. For this reason, both big and small nations of the international community have the right to speak on this major issue. They should take an active apart in the disarmament process and urge the United States and Soviet Union to reach substantial agreements as quickly as possible that will be advantageous to world peace and relaxation of the tense situation.

It is no easy job to make diarmament a reality. Nevertheless, so long as the people of all countries make concerted efforts and impel the United States and Soviet Union to fulfil their unshirkable duties toward disarmament, there will be hope for disarmament. Together with the people of all countries, the Chinese Government and people are willing to contribute to this objective.

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MEXICAN PRESIDENT VISITS HIROSHIMA--Hiroshima, Dec. 4 KYODO--Visiting Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid vowed Thursday to work toward a total ban on nuclear weapons in order to "avert the destruction of mankind." De la Madrid made a brief visit to Hiroshima, the world's first atom-bombed city, on the last day of his state visit to Japan, shortly before his departure for China. Speaking as the first Latin American leader, before a monument dedicated to A-bomb victims in the city's Peace Park, De la Madrid said Mexico is a proponent of the Tlatelolco [as received] treaty which is designed to make Central and South American states a nuclear free zone. He said the treaty is the first step toward total abolition of nuclear weapons. Mexicans, he said, realize that peace cannot be achieved by the equilibrium of fear and will continue to strive for a total ban on nuclear weapons in order to avert the destruction of mankind. The president was accompanied by some 30 people, including his wife and four cabinet ministers. They arrived in Hiroshima in the morning by the Japanese National Railway's Shinkansen superexpress bullet train from Osaka. [Text] [Tokyo KYODO in English 0251 GMT 4 Dec 86 OW] /6662

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